Peace & Public Policy:

Recent Crisis on the Korean Peninsula and the Outlook for the Future

By Dr. Lim Yang-Taek
Professor of Economics, Hanyang University

Editor's note: Dr. Lim is a frequent contributor to this journal and is tremendously active in seeking a lasting solution to the lingering threat to peace in his homeland. For related articles by Dr. Lim, refer to "A New Proposal for a Northeast Peace City on the Korean Peninsula" and "A New Proposal for Korea's Reunification." In August 2002 Dr. Lim became the first recipient of the BWW Society Global Solutions Prize, which was awarded to him at the 2002 International Congress in Saint Germain-en-Laye, France for his tireless efforts to achieve peace and security on the Korean peninsula. He also authored the Feature Editorial of the September-October 2002 issue of this journal, "One Year Later: New Threats to World Peace Since September 2001 and New Disputes within the New International Order".

I. The U.S. and the Bush Administration's Foreign Policy

1. 'American Internationalism'

Under the new world order after the cold war, the US still enjoys a hegemonic position on the basis of superior power[1], and many believe it will implement its policies on foreign relations and security to keep its global hegemony.

US hegemonic foreign policy has become more realistic and concrete in the era of the George W. Bush administration. The Bush administration implements foreign policy based on strong military power by basing US security strategy on the 'American Internationalism', which is a traditional Republican idea on foreign relations and focuses on US global leadership and national interest.[2]

Indeed, President Bush said that "the primary concern of the new administration will concentrate on showing US power and authority in the international arena", at the press conference held at the White House on January 26, 2001. Since then, Bush's foreign relations and security team has not been reluctant to argue that US foreign policy's basic framework is to maximize US national interest on the basis of strong power. This trend has become a reality, as shown in the US's resolute war against terror after the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001.

In the eyes of many, when the US judges that an international treaty limits US national interest or is not highly effective, it abolishes or secedes from such an international promise, thus demonstrating a new isolationism. This includes the unilateral denunciation of the Kyoto Protocol on the world's climate, the delay in the ratification of CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), refusal to sign the Land Mines Treaty, intention to refuse the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol, and secession from ABM Treaty.

2. Hard-line Policy against North Korea

Implementing a policy giving importance to Asia in terms of world strategy, the Bush administration has turned to hard-line policy against North Korea. This hard-line policy limits the leading roles of the two Koreas in the problems of the Korean peninsula, and freezes North Korean-US relations consolidated during the Clinton era.

The Bush administration has a fundamental distrust of North Korea. Criticizing the Clinton's policy toward North Korea as a unilateral appeasement policy, the Bush administration has established and implemented a hard-line policy toward North Korea, which focuses on transparency and verification on the basis of 'rigid mutualism'.

This sudden change in the US policy toward Pyongyang provided large stimulus for North Korea, and worsened the Pyongyang-Washington relations which had been developed in the Clinton era, as well as South Korea-North Korea relations which had ripened since the South Korea-North Korea summit talk (June 15, 2000). This situation struck a large blow to the 'sunshine policy' of the Kim Dae-Jung government, and even had a negative effect on the South Korea-USA alliance.

When Bush named Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the 'Axis of Evil' in his State of Union Address on January 29 2002, the Pyongyang-Washington relation worsened, and anti-Americanism was raised in South Korea, together with worries about potential war on the Korean peninsula.

The report dated January 30 2002 by CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) was published on its website ( under the title 'Proliferation in the ‘Axis of Evil’: North Korea, Iran, and Iraq', and attracted significant public attention. In the report titled 'Evaluation of the North Korean behavior and intention regarding the nuclear arms and biochemical weapons", the US Department of Defense said, “North Korea has continued to provide complex challenges to the safety of the USA and its alliances for the recent several years”. And, it added, "the Korean peninsula is included in the scenario under which a large-scale local war is most likely to break out."

The South Korea-US summit talk (February 20, 2002) held in the midst of this situation was enough to attract world attention. Most of the South Korean people, loving peace, hoped that the talk could allow rational coordination between the presidents of South Korea and the US on the policy toward Pyongyang, and improved relations between Washington and Pyongyang, and between Seoul and Pyongyang.

The talk ended with the conclusions: 1) relations between South Korea and USA will be expanded and reinforced, and 2) South Korea and the US will solve the problem of North Korean WMD and conventional weapons through dialogue with the North Korean government. In particular, at the joint press conference immediately after the talk, Bush said, "we have no intention to attack North Korea", emphasizing dialogue. South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung said, "US President Bush made it certain that he would readily have dialogue with North Korea and does not want any war in Korea". This strengthened the South Korea-US alliance, emphasized dialogue, and featured the US's reference to its non-desire of war, and contributed to sweeping away worries about war after the reference to the 'Axis of Evil'.

However, taking a closer look, we can find that Bush's recognition did not show any changes. Considering international criticisms against him and the rise of anti-Americanism in Korea after his statement regarding the 'Axis of Evil', Bush manifested his negative view on North Korea in a somewhat softened tone. Saying that his reference to the 'Axis of Evil' targeted "the North Korean regime and its leaders, not the North Korean population", he showed strong distrust in Kim Jung-Il and the North Korean government, both of which should be subjects of dialogue. This aspect of Bush's view on North Korea perplexes the Kim Dae-Jung government, which intends to make the North Korean regime a direct partner and drive it towards reform and liberalization through support. Above all, the US doubt in Kim Jung-Il and the Pyongyang regime will be the largest obstacle to North Korea-USA talks for the time being.

In the meantime, North Korea attacked Bush furiously, calling him 'a boss of evil' on February 19, 2002, one day before his visit to South Korea. In a press release issued that day, Pyongyang Broadcasting called Bush an 'unmatchable boss of evil' and argued that "he nullified his predecessor's decision not to call us a terrorist-supporting country or rogue state, and cut a ridiculous figure by putting a hat of terrorism and rogue rashly on our head." And this official North Korean broadcasting added that Bush had slandered Pyongyang by referring to the human rights, religion, development of nuclear arms and WMD, and reduction of usable military force, and increased his maneuver to squeeze North Korea to death on the ground of North Korean threat of missiles they do not have.[3]

On February 22 2002, Pyongyang virtually refused to accept the proposal of dialogue made by Bush during his visit to Asia. In the statement by a spokesman of the Department of Foreign Relations, North Korea condemned Bush for viciously slandering 'the party leadership' (Kim Jung-Il), and argued, "Bush's mad speech about our system is an insult against the national emotion of the North Korean people who constitute the basis of this system, and a declaration of refusal to have dialogue with us." According to the Chosun Central News, the spokesman said, “We don't need such dialogue that USA proposes, which only finds any excuse for invasion without accepting our system", and emphasized, "we won't keep company with Bush's bandits fallen into a delusion of trying to change our system with force." (Yonhap News, February 22, 2002).

3. The Pentagon's NPR: North Korea as a Target of Preemptive Nuclear Attack

Reportedly, the Bush administration has directed the US military to frame urgent measures for using nuclear weapon against at least seven countries, including China, Russia, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Syria, and to develop nuclear weapons with low destructive power, which could be used in certain war situations (Los Angeles Times, March 9). In the secret report NPR (Nuclear Posture Review) submitted to the US Congress on January 8 2002, the Pentagon reportedly said that it is necessary to prepare for the possible use of nuclear arms against the seven countries named above.

The NPR places more weight on China[4], North Korea and some of the Arab states than on Russia, as potential targets of the US use of nuclear arms (Washington Post, March 10).

Meanwhile, Pyongyang criticized the NPR as 'a very dangerous nuclear war plan' (Chosun Central Broadcasting, Current Affairs Discussion, March 12, 2002). Pyongyang argued that the Bush administration has set North Korea as a target of preemptive nuclear attack since the country had been fighting against the US forcible demands. Chosun Central Broadcasting asserted emphatically that North Korea will not sit back and watch the US's open manifestation of its attempt for preemptive nuclear arms against Pyongyang and labeling of North Korea as a terrorism-supporter and WMD holder. The official broadcaster said North Korea will strengthen its national defense (Yonhap News, March 12, 2002).

The spokesman of the Department of Foreign Relations of North Korea announced following statement (Chosun Central Broadcasting, March 14, 2002; Yonhap News, March 14, 2002).

'If the US plan for nuclear attack against us proves to be true, it will create a new political situation forcing us to take any substantial and material actions against such plan regardless of any North Korea-USA agreements.

'If this (US nuclear attack plan) is true, it shows that the Bush gang throws away like an old shoe the promise not to use nuclear weapons, which has been complied with by his predecessors, after having frightened the world by mad ambition and recklessness for world hegemony since Bush's inauguration’.

‘Especially, USA guaranteed that it would neither use nuclear weapons against North Korea nor threaten North Korea via nuclear weapons in the North Korea-USA Joint Statement (June 11, 1999) and Basic North Korea-USA Agreement (October 21, 1994).

‘We have fulfilled our obligations in such a good faith in accordance with the Basic Agreement directing at the improved relation between North Korea and USA on the basis of our nuclear facility freezing vs. US provision of light water reactor’.

‘The Bush gang's nuclear attack plan is an indiscreet delusion to destroy our system by using nuclear weapons and exterminate the whole people in the Korean peninsula through the ravages of nuclear war’.

North Korea has repeated its basic position that Pyongyang will provide overall review of the Geneva North Korea-USA Basic Agreement (October 21, 1994), since USA included the country as a possible target of nuclear attack. In a comment (March 16, 2000), Chosun Central Broadcasting made a detailed reference to the Pentagon's NPR, and said that they would not 'sit back and watch' the US move in violation of the North Korea-USA Joint Statement (June 11, 1993) in which Washington promised not to use nuclear weapons against Pyongyang, and the Geneva North Korea-USA Basic Agreement (October 21, 1994). Then the broadcaster said these US moves are "US unilateral denunciation of North Korea-USA agreements", arguing "we have no choice but to have second thoughts of all agreements we made with the USA and take effective actions to cope with present developments."

Choi Tae-Bok, chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea, warned that if the US attacks North Korea, it would face 'harsh' counter-attack. According to the Russian news agency Interfax, Choi Tae-Bok, during his visit to Moscow, said, "we have never provoked the US. If, however, the US does any behavior infringing our sovereign rights or attacks us, the North Korean people will maintain their dignity and do harsh counterattack against the US." (Yonhap News, March 20, 2002).

North Korea asserted on March 29 that it would keep its promise made with the US in the Geneva Basic North Korea-US Agreement (October 21, 1994). On the show Current Affairs Discussion, Chosun Central Broadcasting (March 29, 2002) said that North Korea has suffered from a huge electricity loss because of the test reactor frozen under the Geneva Agreement (October 21, 1994), asserting "however, we have kept our promise made with the US and will keep it." Telling pointedly that the US government had disseminated a false rumor that North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and exported ballistic missile production technology, the North Korean official broadcaster argued that such rumor was nonsense and the US did not comply with the Geneva Agreement (October 21, 1994).

North Korea demanded that the USA show if it has any intention to fulfill the Geneva Agreement (October 21, 1994). According to the Chosun Central Broadcasting (April 2, 2002), in the comment of the day, Labor Daily (Rodong Shinmun) asked 'if the USA has any intention to fulfill the Geneva Agreement', and 'if the USA is ready to change its hard-lining and crushing attitude toward us', and said, 'if not, we will go on our way'.

Also, North Korea argued that it strengthened its national defense to cope with US 'invasion' rather than South Korean attack. Labor Daily (April 2, 2002) put forward the following arguments (Pyongyang Broadcasting April 3, 2002; Yonhap News, April 3, 2002). In the editorial titled 'Our Nation's Future Depends on Our National Anti-American and Anti-war Struggles', the newspaper put it:

The reason why we continue to strengthen our national defense and show good-army politics is because we try to cope thoroughly with the US imperialists' invasion rather than South Korea’.

‘Differences in the ideology, institution, political view and religious belief between South Korea and North Korea do not constitute any reason for one nation to point gun at each other, and the  Korean nation does not want war’.

However, 'if USA attacks us by using common weapons or nuclear weapons, we will have no choice but to make a self-protecting counterattack. This will drive the US imperialist invaders and US military bases in Seoul into a blazing inferno.’ Therefore, South Korea 'will not avoid damages by war caused by US troops, and the damages will be ever more devastating than in the Korean War’.

‘Therefore, everyone, whether he/she is in North Korea, South Korea or overseas, or whether he/she is communist or nationalist, regardless of idea, ideology, institution and belonging, should unite to participate in a national struggle to drive the US troops and military bases out of the Korean peninsula, protect national well-being and achieve peace and reunification’.

II. Primary Topics of North Korea-USA Talks

The Clinton administration emphasized 'comprehensive security' covering environment, human rights and terrorism, while the Bush administration puts emphasis on the 'traditional military security' focusing on alliance. Accordingly, the Bush government prefers pressure policy based on MD and military power to diplomatic talk in order to prevent the expansion of WMD like nuclear weapons and missiles.[5]

This 'traditional military security' view seems to be reflected in the Bush government's policies toward North Korea.

The Bush administration believes that North Korea gives priority to strong military force in spite of its economic depression and extreme food shortage. North Korean troops are located aggressively near the armistice line, and North Korean programs on nuclear weapons, biological weapons, biochemical weapons (NBC) and missiles are central to North Korea's security strategy. For this reason, it is expected that the Korean peninsula will be a place where the largest local war is likely to occur in the foreseeable future, which is most likely to attract US military intervention.[6]

Implementing simultaneously the Non-Proliferation policy seeking diplomatic dialogue with North Korea called a 'rogue state' or a 'terrorism supporter", and the Counter-Proliferation policy accompanying military solution, the US wants to solve the problem of WMD, including missiles. Also, the US government thinks that North Korea, with an ability to develop nuclear weapons, medium-and-long distance missiles, a large volume of biochemical weapons, and formidable conventional weapons, is a serious threat to the security of the US and its allies. Therefore the US proposes five topics for the talk with North Korea: North Korean nuclear problem, North Korean missiles, North Korean conventional weapons, North Korean biochemical weapons, and deletion of North Korea from the terrorism supporter list. 

I. North Korean Nuclear Weapons

The North Korean nuclear problem is the largest pending issue between the US and North Korea. In the Pyongyang-Washington negotiation the US argues that North Korean nuclear programs must be frozen and that even past nuclear problems must be verified. The US thinks that North Korea produced at least one or two nuclear weapons and appropriated plutonium necessary for it/them before the Geneva Agreement (October 21, 1994).[7] Particularly, the CSIS report dated January 30 2002 comments that if North Korea could eliminate fuel from the Youngbyon reactor in 1994 and re-treat it, the country could produce enough plutonium to produce several nuclear weapons.[8]

Also, the CISI report fears that North Korea may have been continuing a part of nuclear weapon development plan although it stopped producing plutonium in 1996. For this reason, the US puts stronger pressure upon North Korea to be subject to IAEA's inspection for verifying past nuclear programs before receiving core parts for two light water reactors, which will be provided to North Korea under the Geneva Agreement (October 21, 1994). In light of the present progress of construction, core parts will be handed over to North Korea in early 2005. Since nuclear inspection requires two to four years, it must start now in order to prevent any delay in light water reactor construction.[9]

Concretely, while the Clinton administration supported the fulfillment of the Geneva Agreement and provision of light water reactors to North Korea, the Bush administration will exert strong pressure to ascertain, through IAEA's inspection, that North Korea complies with the Geneva Agreement, including verification of North Korean past nuclear activities, in the process of talks between Pyongyang and Washington. Indeed, the Bush administration argues that IAEA's inspection over the nuclear re-treatment facilities in North Korea must be conducted before delivering core parts for light water reactors, and warns that if IAEA's investigation on the history of North Korean nuclear programs is not allowed on time, existing agreements will be in danger.[10]

This means that if North Korea refuses nuclear inspection, a dangerous situation likely to cause a war-threatening situation between North Korea and the US may be created. If, however, Pyongyang accepts the US demand on nuclear inspection, the US will promote economic support to North Korea under 'strict mutualism'.[11]

North Korea, of course, shows a strong reaction against such US arguments. Apart from whether inspection on past nuclear activities before is possible in terms of technology, if the US argues for thorough inspections and tries to expand inspection areas into military bases, it will be easy to expect strong opposition on the part of North Korea. Moreover, if Pyongyang demands indemnification for delayed construction of light water reactors, debates of both parties over the improvement in the Geneva Agreement will become more complex.[12]

Concerning itself about the fact that the Bush administration's strong pressure upon North Korea in regard to nuclear problem may make things worse, CFR (Council on Foreign Relations, Inc) recommended on September 9 2001 that the US should give foreign policy priority to the North Korea problem by quickly resuming dialogue with Pyongyang in order to prevent the communist country from restarting nuclear programs which were stopped under the Geneva Agreement and from causing tighter tension and conflict on the Korean peninsula. Also, CFR argued that the US needs to implement a double-sided strategy, i.e. the US should provide electricity to North Korea on the condition of North Korean nuclear freezing, on the one hand, and that it should solve the pending issues like North Korea's development and export of missiles through North Korea-USA talks.[13]

1. North Korean Missiles

The talks between Madeleine Albright and Kim Jung-Il, that was held on Secretary Albright's visit to North Korea (October 23 to October 25, 2000) in the late period of the Clinton administration, seemed to serve as an important key to solve the problem of North Korean missiles. At the time, the US and North Korea agreed on exchange between the inclusive control of North Korean missiles and US reward, through two talks.[14] However, in the sixth missile talk held in Kuala Lumpur, the US requested that North Korea join in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and stop exporting short-and-medium range missiles and the Rodong-1 missile, while North Korea requested cash compensation for its halting of missile exports, leaving both countries far from consent.[15]

The North Korean missile problem since referred to the Bush administration has large effects on US strategies for the world and for Asia. For the US, the 'North Korean missile threat' is an important ground justifying the buildup of the MD system. Consequently, the US may not hope that the problem ends quickly. Even if the problem is solved, the US will not give up the MD system plan. Because the plan's continuation has strong support from the US military and is designed in terms of US world strategy.

The Bush administration tries to solve the North Korean missile problem in such a way that it incorporates North Korea in the MTCR by presenting strong demands for checks and verification.[16] In contrast, utilizing the progress made under the Clinton administration, North Korea has continued to develop and export missiles as a means of protecting its security, securing practical benefit and gaining advantage over the US in talks. In this situation, if North Korea and the US have negotiations over the missile problem, the export, development, deployment, destruction and verification of North Korean missiles will be under inclusive coverage.[17]

In the post-cold war period, North Korea has implemented a strategy for achieving security goals through missile development and gaining political and economic rewards from the US through playing the missile card. Above all, North Korea seeks to secure system guarantees such as the North Korea-US peace treaty by using the threat of development and launch of long-distance missiles. Additionally, Kim Jung-Il raised his political status internally and externally by negotiating with the US on an equal footing.[18]

Table 1. The Situation and Threats of North Korea's Ballistic Missiles


  Range ()


 Weight ()



First Test Launch

  Development Level

Possible Target Area

Scud ModA






    Pilot Production

 Central part of

  South Korea

Scud ModB






    War deployment

  Central part of

   South Korea

Scud ModC






    War deployment

 All of South Korea






    War deployment

   All of Japan







      Test launch

  Important areas

     of China


 4,300- 6,000





      Under R&D



* Source: Korea Research Institute for Strategy, Strategic Balance in the Northeast Asia 2001 (Seoul: Korea Research Institute for Strategy, 2001), p. 294.

According to the CSIS report, North Korea has several hundred ballistic missiles which can strike targets in South Korea, and some of them have the range to strike targets in Japan. Particularly, North Korea's middle-and-long distance ballistic missile technology has reached to the point where it can produce mid-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and can threaten parts of the US.

Testifying on ‘foreign countries' missile development and threats of ballistic missiles by 2015', Robert D. Walpole (National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs) argued at the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee (March 11, 2002)[19], that “North Korea has delayed the missile launch test scheduled for May 2002 until 2003. But the delay covers only launch." He pointed out that North Korea's missile technology showed remarkable development over the last three years. Concerned with the fact that North Korea may prepare tests for launching a missile with a nuclear weapon-level warhead that can strike the continental US, he said that if North Korea has the ability to use the second-stage Daepodong-2 missile (ICBM) to send a warhead of several hundred kilograms over 10,000 km to Alaska or Hawaii, then the utilization of a three-stage missile could fly more than 15,000 km, thereby achieving a range which would encompass all of North America.

The US tries to put strong pressure upon North Korea to prevent the development of WMD including nuclear weapons, and the development and export of missiles able to carry nuclear warheads and reach the continental US in the foreseeable future. Consequently, the Bush administration is expected to impose tighter control on the North Korea's development, production, deployment, testing and export of middle-and-long distance missiles.

Meanwhile, North Korea considers that US demands for abandonment of missiles constitutes giving up its right to self-defense in the face of US missiles located in South Korea.[20] Regarding the decision on missiles as a matter related with its sovereign right, North Korea will exclude US interference and try to use its missiles as a bargaining chip in its talks with the US.

Moreover, as mentioned above, as long as the US maintains its MD drive under the pretext of North Korean missiles, Russia is more likely to increase its criticism of the United States[21] and form a solidarity with China and Russia. Indeed, Russian formal radio broadcasting of the 'Voice of Russia' reported that Pyongyang requested Russia to construct nuclear plants in North Korea (March 20, 2002). According to the radio program, 'Choi Tae-Bok chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea, on a visit to Moscow, met with the Russian Minister of Industry, Science and Technology, Iliya I. Klebanov, to present such a proposal, and discussed cooperation in railroad transportation and the modernization of North Korea's thermal power plants constructed by Russia.' Also, 'North Korea and Russia will hold a meeting of the "Inter-government Committee for Cooperation in Trade, Economy, Science and Technology" to deal with concrete problems.' (Jung-ang Daily, March 21, 2002).

Therefore, it is very likely to take a longer time to solve the problem of North Korea's missiles through talks between Pyongyang and Washington.[22] In the face of this difficulty in the progress of missile talks between Pyongyang and Washington, and on May 3 2002 when a EU delegation led by the Swedish Prime Minister Göan Persson visited Pyongyang, the North Korean government announced that it will delay missile development until 2003, in the hope of receiving some kind of reward for this delay.[23]

However, the Bush administration proposed a North Korea-US talk on June 6 of that year, and suggested a review and re-discussion from the starting point, via a 'comprehensive approach', to solve the problems of North Korea's nuclear weapons, missiles and conventional weapons.

North Korea then argued that the Geneva Agreement (October 21, 1994) and North Korea-US Joint Communiqué (October 2000 when Vice Marshal Cho Myong-Rok visited USA), both of which were made under the Clinton administration, should be fulfilled, and that North Korea should be presented with indemnification for its electricity losses[24] as a matter of top priority, and proposed a step-by-step approach based on priority.[25]

As for the missile talks, North Korea demands system security and special rewards from the US including cash, substitutive satellite launches and improved relations between Pyongyang and Washington. Especially, in regard to cash rewards, the Kim Jung-Il government has demanded that the US pay one billion dollars every year for three consecutive years in return for North Korea's abandonment of missile exports from the time of the third missile talks held in New York on October 1 1998. Additionally, North Korea demanded substitutive satellite launches in regard to the suspension of its development of missiles with a range exceeding 1,500 km.

The North Korean government will receive broad concessions from the US government in return for its missile abandonment. This will include many topics which the North Korean government can link to the missile problem, ranging from sensitive issues, such as withdrawal of US forces from South Korea and conclusion of a peace treaty, to economic aid.[26] It is needless to say that the key to the missile problem depends on what the US can provide to North Korea in return for the North Korean government's abandonment of their missile development.

Since, however, the Bush administration intends to review the fundamental issue of North Korean missiles and verify North Korea's fulfillment of promises made to the US, rather than choosing to provide rewards for the North Korean government's suspension of missile exports[27], conflict between the two countries over the missile issue will continue for a time.

2. Deployment of North Korean Conventional Weapons

The reason why the US government insists on reducing North Korean conventional weapons is due to the fact that North Korea deploys some 12,000 rocket guns and self-propelled guns, and about 500 long-range guns around the armistice line, all of which can be armed with biochemical weapons, providing a real threat to South Korea and USFK. To attenuate this threat, the US government wants to directly negotiate with Pyongyang on the deployment of North Korean weapons in the rear-guard areas and at the same time negotiate a reduction of North Korean conventional weapons.[28]

At the Personnel Public Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (January 17, 2001), US Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the US would have second thoughts about relations with North Korea, arguing 'as long as the North Korean dictatorship continues to develop missiles and non-conventional weapons, deploying conventional weapons much more than can be justified in terms of normal self-defense, we and our pacific allies will continue to be on full alert against North Korea.'[29]

At the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (March 8, 2001) on the day following the South Korea-US summit talk in Washington, Colin Powell presented the suspension of North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and missiles, and reduction of its conventional weapons, as conditions for improved relations between Pyongyang and Washington.

Before leaving to the APEC summit talk to be held in Shanghai (October 17, 2001), at a special press conference with Yonhap News in South Korea, Yomiurishimbung in Japan and People's Daily in China, Bush said, 'the North Korean government must withdraw its conventional weapons deployed around the armistice line to the rear if Kim Jung-Il himself wants to deliver a message that North Korea does not want war but peace.'

The unilateral US demand to transfer North Korean conventional weapons to the rear is related directly to the survival of North Korea, making it difficult to be accepted by Pyongyang. Indeed, the North Korean government criticized the US demand as a 'disarmament order', and made a countermove by arguing that withdrawal of USFK has top priority.[30]

On the other hand, being concerned that if the US takes an initiative in controlling the conventional weapons of North Korea, the South Korean government would have less room for talks with Pyongyang, President Kim Dae-Jung said, during his visit to Washington in March 2001, that he wanted the problem of North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles to be solved by dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington, and the problem of North Korean conventional weapons should be solved by dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang after tension in the Korean peninsula becomes relaxed.

However, George W. Bush set the problem of North Korean conventional weapons as one of the important topics for discussions between Pyongyang and Washington, together with the problem of North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles, in a statement announcing completed review of US policies toward North Korea (June 6, 2001).

Subsequently, South Korean Minister of Defense Kim Dong-Shin visited the US and presented a 'role assignment' on the basis of the premise that the US is in charge of strategic weapons like nuclear weapons and missiles while South Korea is responsible for reducing North Korean conventional weapons. However, South Korea and the US agreed on the principle of close cooperation without any reference to 'role assignment'.

On February 27 2002, Seoul and Washington agreed to set two dialogue channels to ensure that control of the two Koreas' arms, including North Korean conventional weapons, can be dealt with by Pyongyang-Washington talks as well as Seoul-Pyongyang talks. This agreement means that Seoul gave up the 'role assignment' under which the US takes initiatives in talks with North Korea over WMD, such as nuclear weapons and missiles, while South Korea takes initiatives in talks with Pyongyang over conventional weapons.[31] Actually, Thomas Schwartz the commander of USFK, attended the Senate Military Committee (March 5, 2002) to testify that South Korea and the US agreed to cooperate closely in the two pending issues: WMD, and talks over the reduction of conventional weapons.[32]

One of the reasons why the Bush administration is reluctant to accept the 'role assignment' and has raised the topic of conventional weapons since the start, is because the US intends to recover its leadership, which was relatively reduced concerning the issues of the Korean peninsula after the Seoul-Pyongyang summit talk, and wants to do so without leaving Korea to deal with the problem of conventional weapons, which is linked with the issue of USFK.[33]

3. North Korean Biochemical Weapons

After the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11 2001, the Bush administration has been very concerned about biochemical terrorism. For this reason, the Bush government is on special alert against the 'terrorist-supporting' North Korea, which it suspects of having large stockpiles of biochemical weapons. Therefore, North Korean biochemical weapons will be dealt with as one of the important topics in the talks between the US and North Korea.

North Korea has a formidable stockpile of biochemical weapons. Starting its development of chemical weapons in the 1960s with the aid of the former USSR, North Korea established independent organization and systems for producing these biochemical weapons. Ranked as the world's third-largest chemical weapons producer, North Korea presumably has 5000 tons of biochemical weapons stockpiled. Also, the communist country has large stockpiles of biological weapons including smallpox and anthrax bacteria, with eight biochemical weapons production facilities in Anju, plus four research centers and six storage facilities.[34] Moreover, North Korea has enough biological infrastructure to support the production of epidemic biological agents such as anthrax, cholera and pestilence, as well as various toxic chemicals. In particular, North Korea appears to have facilities to produce ammunition capable of transforming biological agents into weapons, and possesses available biological weapons. Moreover, North Korea can use carriers such as ballistic missiles, guns, rockets, bomb-guns, rocket launchers, fighters, bombers and helicopters to transform biological agents and toxic chemicals into weapons.[35]

These biochemical weapons have a low production cost, high economic efficiency and ease of evidence destruction. Therefore, a North Korea facing severe economic crisis will try to maintain its ability to produce biochemical weapons in spite of the international trend to ban them.[36] Although it signed the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in March 1987, it has turned out that North Korea has not shown compliance with the convention.[37]

On the other hand, North Korea has not yet ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)[38] signed under the leadership of the US in 1972. If North Korea ratifies the CWC, its chemical weapons will be controlled very effectively. For this reason, the US will put pressure upon North Korea to sign the CWC.

At the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention held in Geneva (November 19, 2001), John R. Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, United States Department of State, pointed out North Korea as a third biological weapon developer following Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda and Iraq, and urged North Korea to abolish any plans to develop biological weapons. At a press conference (November 26, 2001) US President Bush warned against the development and diffusion of North Korean WMD and urged Pyongyang to accept entry of an inspection team.[39]

Considering the US high officials' great attention to North Korean biochemical weapons, and remembering that the USA views biochemical weapons from the standpoint of a continuing anti-terrorist war, needless to say, North Korean biochemical weapons will surely become one of the important topics in the talks between Pyongyang and Washington.

4. Removal of North Korea from Terrorism Supporting Countries' List

Removing North Korea from the list of terrorism supporting countries will become one of the important topics if the talks between North Korea and the US resume. First, as is known, the US is in an on-going anti-terrorist war in the aftermath of terrorist attacks of September 11 2001. Meanwhile, as long as North Korea remains on the list of terrorism-supporting countries,[40] it will be difficult for North Korea to overcome its continued economic crisis, as the yoke of terrorism support brings with it a ban on international loans from IMF, IBRD and ADB, and weighs heavily on North Korea's ability to seek economic recovery with financial aid from the Western countries.[41]

Designating North Korea as a terrorist-supporter has served as a rationale for US economic sanctions against the communist country, including a ban on trade in important goods, a ban on the imposition of preferred trade partner tariffs, a ban on foreign aid, and a ban on guarantees by the Export and Import Bank. In regard to this, the US has taken a firm stance that a unilateral lifting of those sanctions cannot be provided without visible actions on the part of North Korea. If North Korea is removed from the US-made list of terrorism supporters, US economic sanctions against Pyongyang will be lifted and North Korean sovereign rating will be raised, bringing substantial economic benefit to the country.[42]

In relation to the removal of North Korea from the terrorism supporters list, Pyongyang and Washington have met at least three times since March 2000. In the process, the US presented four requirements to remove North Korea from the list: North Korea must ascertain that it will not commit any terrorist attacks; North Korea must confirm that it will not commit any terrorist attacks during the upcoming six months; North Korea must join in international pacts preventing terrorism; and North Korea must take necessary actions regarding its past activities.

It can be said that the first three requirements are met for the present time. However, the fourth requirement is not met yet, as is evidenced by North Korea's protection of the Japanese Red Army activists who hijacked a JAL airplane.[43]

North Korea stood against international terrorism as per its agreement with the US-North Korea communiqué of October 2000, when Vice Marshal Cho Myong-Rok visited the US; regardless, the US Department of State enrolled North Korea on the list of terrorism supporters including Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria (May 1, 2001).

The September 11 terrorist attacks made the US take more hard-line stance toward North Korea, due to North Korea's export of conventional weapons, WMD and related technologies to the Middle East and terrorist states.[44] The US makes it clear that if rogue states such as North Korea and Iraq use WMD to provide support for terrorism, these states will be regarded as terrorists and encountered with strong counterblow. The US is particularly concerned that North Korea's export of nuclear technologies and missiles may lead to terrorism support.[45]

On the day following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the North Korean government denunciated the attacks through a spokesman of the Department of Foreign Relations, and said that North Korea as a UN member strongly opposes all types of terrorism and any support for terrorist organizations.[46]

North Korea reaffirmed its public opposition to terrorism in a speech (October 5, 2001) made at the plenary session of the UN Congress by Lee Hyung-Chol, the North Korean Ambassador to the UN. The North Korean government said that the role of the UN should be expanded to deal with terrorism and that North Korea is against the infringement of sovereignty and military invasion.

On the other hand, the US Department of State deleted the Japanese Red Army from terrorists list in the 'Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations' (October 5, 2001) on the grounds that the organization had not shown any activity to speak of.[47] However, North Korea, which provided shelter for the Red Army, was left on the list of terrorist supporters.

On November 3, 2001 North Korea decided to participate in two international anti-terrorism conventions, i.e. the 'International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism' and the 'International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages', and signed the two conventions on November 12, 2001.[48]

However, at a White House press conference (November 26, 2001), US President Bush issued a strong warning against North Korea's development and diffusion of WMD, and said that any country developing WMD that can be used for terror would have to take corresponding responsibility, urging Iraq and Iran to accept nuclear inspection.[49]

In the process of conducting the anti-terrorist war, the US government showed a more hard-line stance toward terrorism-supporting countries. This hard-line was manifested more clearly in Mr. Bush's State of the Union Address (January 29, 2002). Criticizing that "the rogue states like North Korea, Iran and Iraq , and their terrorist allies, which constitute an axis of evil, protect terrorism, seek weapons of mass destruction, and threaten the peace of the world', Bush warned that 'the US would not tolerate their threats.'

If North Korea cooperates in providing information on international terrorist networks and takes active actions for the prevention of terrorism, including the deportation of the Japanese Red Army activists, Pyongyang and Washington will make more rapid progress in their relations, which will bring international finance organizations' loans to North Korea. If, however, North Korea continues to act passively in regard to anti-terrorism solidarity, the US will leave the communist country registered on the terrorism supporting countries' list and will maintain economic sanctions against Pyongyang.[50]

At the anti-terrorism related conference held by the ASEAN Regional Forum (April 17 2002 to April 19 2002), North Korea said that any unfair sanction against a country under the pretext of the anti-terrorist war is 'state terrorism' which it is against. (Yonhap News, April 22, 2002).

This stance of North Korea is interpreted as a kind of reaction to the fact that the US has continued to put alleged North Korean terrorism in question, although the North Korean government has expressed its opposition to all types of terrorism and against any type of support for terrorist activities, and has signed two international conventions including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The North Korean delegate who participated in the above-cited conference repeated that 'North Korea opposes all kinds of terrorism and support for terrorist activities', and added that North Korea showed high interest in the anti-terrorism preparations for the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup.

III. Conclusion

The two Korea's relations and changes in the political situation on the Korean peninsula depends upon the dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang. This is because North Korea places more weight on improved relations between Pyongyang and Washington than on the improvement between the two Koreas in terms of its security, and because Washington puts more emphasis on improved relations between Washington and Pyongyang in terms of world security.

Although the Bush administration has proposed unconditional direct dialogue with Pyongyang in regard to improvement in relations between North Korea and the US, the reason why the dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington has not gone well is mainly because of three topics presented by the US, i.e. North Korea's development and export of WMD, nuclear inspection, and deployment of conventional weapons in the rear-guard area of the DMZ, are directly related to North Korean security. From the standpoint of North Korea, it is not easy to accept the US proposal for dialogue, which may put Pyongyang's security in crisis. Moreover, since missile export is one of the main sources of North Korean dollar income, Pyongyang will not concede without what it feels is a properly corresponding economic compensation.

However, North Korea needs improved relations with the US in order to sustain its system and achieve economic recovery. If Pyongyang continues to refuse acceptance of the US proposal of dialogue, Washington will regard such refusal as an expression of North Korean will to spread WMD and remain a terrorism supporter, and will take military action against Pyongyang. In this respect, North Korea will not be able to continue to refuse the dialogue.

As described above, until March 19 2002, Choi Tae-Bok, the chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea, warned that a US attack on North Korea will be encountered with 'harsh' counterattack. On the other hand, unlike the Clinton administration, the Bush administration doubts if North Korea has complied with the Geneva Agreement on the nuclear freeze, and accordingly, will not certify North Korean compliance to the US Congress,[51] according to the Washington Post and the New York Times (March 20, 2002).

It should be noted that the real problem found in US policy toward North Korea is that 'it has no policy', as pointed out by the New York Times. Nicholas Christoph, a columnist for the New York Times, said cynically in his column titled 'Evil and the Axis of Evil' (February 26, 2002), "Although US government proposed North Korea to resume dialogue, if Pyongyang accepts it, the US will not have anything to say". He went further, "while President Bush tried to be sufficiently frank so that he could criticize North Korea as evil, the problem does not lie in his 'frankness' but in the 'nonexistence of any policy toward North Korea other than scolding."

Indeed, through Pyongyang Broadcasting (February 22, 2002), North Korea said, "North Korea-South Korea relations must shift from distrust and confrontation to reconciliation and cooperation." And, "dialogue and negotiation covering from two governments to political parties and social organizations must be conducted,” it added. If dialogue between South Korea and North Korea goes well, the 'sunshine policy' will resume its bounce and North Korea's image as a 'rogue state' existing in the minds of Washington will be largely weakened, speeding up the negotiation between North Korea and the US.

In this respect, presidential special envoy Lim Dong-Won's visit to North Korea (February 3, 2002) increased the possibility of dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang. South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung has proposed to sending a special envoy to Pyongyang in order to prevent tension on the Korean peninsula, to comply with 6.15 Joint Declaration of 2001, and to discuss opinions between the two Korean governments on the pending issues such as the fulfillment of agreements made between the two Koreas. (March 25, 2002)[52]

In regard to South Korean government's announcement of the special envoy's visit to North Korea on March 25 2002, the US government said that it supports dialogue between South Korea and North Korea. Also, the US press evaluated that the interchange of special envoys between South Korea and North Korea has a special significance to the leaders of both countries. According to the US press, Joan Procopowitz, the spokeswoman of the US Department of State, said, 'the US welcomes and supports dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang.’ In this regard, US Secretary of State Colin Powell assessed that the announcement of interchange of special envoys was 'very encouraging', according to the AP. On the same day, the New York Times reported the high official level envoy interchange between Seoul and Pyongyang in an article titled 'South Korea and North Korea Decided To Resume Dialogue', and commented that the envoy interchange was the result of a several-week long secret negotiation between Seoul and Pyongyang to eliminate diplomatic pressure put upon Pyongyang since George W. Bush defined North Korea as one of the 'Axis of Evil' in his State of the Union Address. Especially, the New York Times said the special envoy's visit to North Korea proved the legitimacy of Kim Dae-Jung's sunshine policy, i.e. efforts for dialogue between the two Koreas, and served to dilute the US attempt to press North Korea from the standpoint of Kim Jung-Il. The Washington Post commented that the special envoy's visit to Pyongyang was a sign showing that North Korea would look for another diplomatic alternative to the continued US demands for improved relations between Pyongyang and Washington. (Yonhap News, March 25, 2002).

As expected, after the Korean government announced Lim Dong-Won's visit to Pyongyang, a climate for dialogue between North Korea and the US was created, focusing on the topic that constructing two light water reactors would start at the end of March 2002. On April 2 2002, Bush announced that the US government will release 95 million dollars for the construction of two light water reactors as an international consortium planned to provide to North Korea, as a part of the Geneva Agreement (October 21, 1994) on nuclear freezing. Bush justified this decision of expenditure for constructing light water reactors in North Korea by saying that 'it was absolutely necessary for US national interest'. Bush eliminated the procedure requiring the US government's annual certification that North Korea has stopped its nuclear plan, as specified under the Geneva Agreement. (October 21, 1994)[53]

Further, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said that the US would continue to comply with the provisions regarding the US allotment, including the supply of heavy oil to North Korea under the Geneva Agreement (Oct 21, 1994), in order to protect US national security. (Yonhap News, April 3, 2002).

Simultaneously, according to the Chosun Central News (April 3, 2002), a spokesman of the North Korean Department of Foreign Relations replied to the question from a reporter, saying, "reascertaining that it would provide light water reactors in the meetings held in New York on March 13 and March 20, the US requested us to resume negotiations with KEDO.” He went further, "in careful consideration of the US position and request, we have decided to resume negotiations with KEDO."[54]

Konstantin Pulikovsky, Russian presidential representative in the Far East, said on April 19 2002 that Kim Jung-Il was "ready to meet the US." At an interview with the ITAR-Tass after returning to Russia from his visit to North Korea (April 19, 20002), the Russian official put it:

Kim Jung-Il told me especially about the talk with the former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and "made a friendly speech about the former US administration." However, he felt "offended" about the recent speeches made by the Bush administration. Also, he seems to desire the internal reform in North Korea. For instance, he ordered the organization of a special team researching Chinese economic change and new state structure after German reunification. In this respect, it should be noted that a North Korean delegation visited Havarovsk and Amur to examine Russian economic reform and the local power system. Trying to learn the advantages of foreign countries, Kim Jung-Il thinks that any change should be made progressively without any social impact or other shocks.

[1] Joseph Nye points out that US hegemony is still kept mainly because USA has strong soft national strengths like culture, ideology and institution in addition to the strong national strengths like politics and military power. Also, Zbigniew Brzezinski says that USA enjoys such hegemony since it is based on liberal order.

[2] In the US global strategic scheme, Clinton administration adopted a security strategy of 'Engagement and Enlargement' substituting for policy of blockage against communist countries in the cold war period. This foreign policy was designed to maintain the status quo in terms of military strategy and security, while expanding US political and economic influence.

[3] North Korean official newspaper Labor Daily (Rodong Shinmun) argued on April 9 that US selling of F-15K to South Korea would end up with fiercer military confrontation in the Korean peninsula. According to the Pyongyang Broadcasting, in the comment on the day, Labor Daily emphasized, "US maneuver to sell arms to South Korea and increase South Korean military force will end up with fiercer military confrontation in the Korean peninsula and increased tension in the Asian political situation". The newspaper went further to argue that US selling of F-15K with operation scope beyond the Korean peninsula to South Korea is to "use South Korea as a military strategic base for establishing its domination over Asia-Pacific area and utilize South Korean military force as a storming party to realize US strategy toward Asia."(Yonhap News, Apr 9, 2002).

[4] In response, Sun Yu Shi, the spokesman of the Department of Foreign Relations of China stated that Chinese government felt 'anxiety and worry' about the US nuclear policy setting China as a potential target(Yonhap News, March 11).

[5] Park Jong-Chol, ‘2002 Outlook on the relations between North Korea and USA, and between South Korea and North Korea’, Far Eastern IssuesIssue No. 278 (April 2002), p. 19.

[6] CSIS(Center for Strategic and International Studies) published a report titled  Proliferation in the ‘Axis of Evil’: North Korea, Iran, and Iraq on January 30, 2002.

[7] Robert D. Walpole (National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs) testified at the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee (March 11, 2002) that North Korea had one or two nuclear weapon(s), referring to the 'foreign countries' missile development and ballistic missile threat by 2015'. The Hankyoreh (March 13, 2002).

[8] It is certain that temporary IAEA nuclear inspection conducted six times from June 1992 to February 1993 played a central role in restricting North Korean development of nuclear weapon. IAEA has deployed its staff in Youngbyon to watch out the sealing of used fuel, and has installed sealed vigilance cameras around reactor. Therefore, it is impossible to hoard secretly nuclear fuel used in the Youngbyon reactor and produce plutonium. Consequently, US attention on the North Korean nuclear problem focuses on the possibility of using plutonium presumably extracted before IAEA's inspection to produce nuclear weapon.

  Yu Sok-Ryul, ‘Outlook of the improvement in the relation between USA and North Korea, and our response’(January 2001), (search date: July 10, 2001), p. 10/31, CSIS, Ibid.

[9] Lee In-Ho, 'Bush's Reference to the "Axis of Evil" and North Korea-USA Relation,' Far Eastern Issues, Issue no. 277 (March 2002), p. 28.

[10] Annual Report by Thomas Schwartz, commander of US Force Korea (USFK) to the US Senate (March 5, 2002), North Korea, Issue no. 364 (April, 2002), p. 75.

[11] At a special interview with reporters from Korea, USA and Japan on February 15 2002 before his tour to the third countries, the US President Bush made it clear that USA would have economic interchange with North Korea only if the country stops developing WMD. Joong-ang Daily, February 17, 2002.

Some officials of the Bush administration argued that it would be more desirable to provide North Korea with ten thermal power plants, or one light water reactor and five thermal power plants, instead of two light water reactors. This was mainly because it is necessary to prevent any possibility to develop nuclear weapon by re-treating secretly the plutonium in the waste nuclear fuel bar in the light water reactor to be provided to North Korea.

Korea Research Institute for Strategy, Ibid., p. 292.

If so, however, North Korea will think that USA annuls the Geneva Agreement (October 21, 1994), delay the take-out of waste nuclear fuel bar on such ground, and use nuclear card for protecting its system.

Lee Hun-Kyung, Situation of North Korean WMD and US Response: Strategy and Simulation (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2001), p. 39.

[12] Jang Eui-Gwan, 'Evaluation of US New Policy toward North Korea,' Asia-Pacific Peace Forum, Issue no. 50 (June 2001), pp. 12-13.

[13] Dong-A Ilbo, September 9, 2001.

[14] At the time, North Korea agreed to abandon the development and test launch of long distance missile, stop exporting short-and-middle distance missile and withdraw the deployed middle-distance missile. And, USA agreed to do substitutive launch of satellite, delete North Korea from the list of terrorism supporters, and provide food and finance for the country. Lee Hun-Kyung, Ibid., p. 60.

[15] Lee Hun-Kyung, Ibid., p. 61.

[16] Shortly before the Bush administration's official start, i.e. January 17 2001, then the appointed Secretary of State Colin Powell said, "any agreement on missile problems must be verifiable and able to be watched out by us" at the personnel public hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

[17] Park Jong-Chol, North Korea-USA talks over missiles and Korea's response, (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2001), p. 1.

[18] Hong Yong-Pyo, North Korea's Missile Development Strategy (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 1999), p.57.

[19] CSIS, Ibid., in The Hankyoreh, March 13, 2002.

[20] Lee Hun-Kyung, Ibid., p. 54.

[21] On the Chosun Central News on February 21 2001, the spokesman of the Department of Foreign Relations of North Korea said, 'Regarding the DPRK as a "rogue state" USA argues that it will continue to build up "national missile defense system" to prevent our "missile threat". This is an irony. In the past, we presented rational proposals like the suspension of long-distance missile launch since USA argued that our missiles for self-defense were a threat to the country, while missile talk was being held. We have presented USA relevant proposals several times. In other words, even though our satellite launch is a science-technology development for pure peace, if it matters to the US security, we are ready to accept substitutive launch. Our missile export is for gaining foreign currencies. If USA guarantees foreign currency based compensation for our suspension of missile export, we will stop readily exporting missiles. However, the new US administration does not try to pay careful attention to such proposals. Since there is no agreement between the DPRK and USA, we will not be bound by our proposals presented regarding missile problem in the era of former US administrations. Although we decided not to launch long-distance missile while missile talk goes, launch suspension will not drag on indefinitely. We cannot tolerate any brake on our science-technology development. We are ready for every possible case.'

[22] Korea Research Institute for Strategy, Ibid., p. 90.

[23] North Korea has reserved long-distance missile launch test. However, reportedly, Pyongyang has not stopped R&D of the missile. USA has found that North Korea has improved missile capacity by experimenting rocket engines and other parts. Annual Report by Thomas Schwartz Commander of USFK to the Senate (March 5, 2002), North Korea, Issue no. 364 (April 2002), p. 77.

[24] Meeting USA on June 13 2001, North Korea reacted against the talk topics set by Washington on June 18, and proposed to set the indemnification for electricity loss from light water reactor aid to discussion item.

[25] Ahn Sung-Ho, 'A Study on the Changes in the Bush Administration's Policies toward North Korea and relations among South Korea, North Korea and USA,' Korea Northern Academy Collection, Issue no. 9 (2002), pp. 192-193.

[26] Korea Research Institute for Strategy, Ibid., p. 311.

[27] Park Jong-Chol, Ibid, p. 43.

[28] Park Myong-Suh, 'Changes in the US Policies toward North Korea and Pyongyang-Washington Relation, Unification and Security Research, Vol. 1 Issue no. 1(2001), Institute for Research of the Unification and Security, Kyong-ki University, p. 23.

[29] Yonhap News, January 26, 2001.

[30] Lee In-Ho, Ibid, p. 29.

[31] Hankyoreh, February 28, 2002.

[32] Hankyoreh, March 7, 2002.

[33] Jang Eui-Gwan, Ibid., p.13.

[34] Chosun Daily, November 28, 2001.

[35] CSIS, Ibid.

[36] Ministry of Defense, National Defense White Paper (Seoul: MOD, 2000), p. 45.

[37] BWC provides the prevention of the development, production and storage of biological and toxic weapons and their destruction, and rules that no support or recommendation for the transfer and acquisition of the facilities producing biological agents shall be allowed. However, this convention does not have enough effectiveness since it does not provide concrete verification procedure for on-the-spot inspection and coercion of its fulfillment as well as sanctions against its non-fulfillment. Lee Hun-Kyung, Ibid., p. 44.

[38] CWC provides inspection system for banning and watching out the development, production, storage, transfer and use of chemical weapons. The convention rules that technologies related with chemical weapons shall be shared and that chemical weapons and their production facilities shall be destroyed and eliminated for next ten years. Moreover, if a country gets membership of the convention, it can send international inspection team other member states and inspect member states' corporations suspected of producing chemical weapons.

[39] Chosun Daily, November 28, 2001; Kim Kuk-Shin, US Policies toward North Korea and Pyongyang's Response (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2001), p. 46.

[40] Accusing North Korea of exploding the Korean Airline's airplane bombing by North Korean agents including Kim Hyun-Hee in 1987, USA included the communist country in the terrorism supporters' list on January 20 1988. The country is still registered in the list.

[41] Jang Eui-Gwan, 'Outlook for the North Korea-USA Relation after the Terrorist Attack on USA,' Asia-Pacific Peace Forum, Issue. no. 54 (October, 2001), p. 6.

[42] Yu Suk-Ryul, Ibid., p. 23/31.

[43] Lee In-Ho, Ibid., pp. 30-31.

[44] Indeed, at the special press conference on October 17 2001 with Yonhap News in Korea, Yomiurishimbung in Japan and People's Daily in China before leaving to APEC summit talk to be held in Shanghai, Bush said, 'we will call any country to account for its attempt to support and protect terrorist organizations.'

[45] Indeed, the hawkish conservatives in USA pay attention to the fact that North Korea exported the parts and technologies of missile to the Islamic countries and organizations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and argues that the organizations learned missile technologies from North Korea included the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Moreover, they suspects that North Korea might provide biochemical weapons and military training for Bin Laden's followers. Jang Eui-Gwan, Ibid., p. 6.

[46] This attitude was regarded as an appeasement gesture to USA. Accordingly, South Korean government requested North Korea to publish a South Korea-North Korea anti-terrorism declaration at the fifth South Korea-North Korea Minister Talk (September 15 2001 to September 18 2001), but North Korea government did not accept it..

[47] U.S. Department of State, 2001 Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations, October 5, 200, quoted in Kim Kuk-Shin, Ibid., p. 45.

[48] Through the voices of the Swedish special delegation visited North Korea from December 1 2001 to December 4 2001, North Korean government expressed its will to sign other five international anti-terrorism conventions which Pyongyang had not signed: International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (effective as of 2001), Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (effective as of 1987), Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (effective as of 1992), Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (effective as of 1992), and Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (effective as of 1992). Dong-Ah Daily, December 11, 2001.

[49] Chosun Daily, November 28, 2001.

[50] Park Jong-Chol, 'US Anti-terrorist War and Political Situation in Korea, (Paper presented at the 2001 Annual Symposium of the Korea Society of International Politics, December 14, 2001), p. 5.

[51] The US Congress demands the administration to certify every year that North Korea complies with the Geneva Agreement (October 21, 1994), in regard to the budget payment for the heavy oil provided to North Korea in return for North Korea's nuclear freezing under the Agreement.

[52] The presidential special envoy Lim Dong-Won left Seoul at 10:00 am April 3 2002 and arrived at Sunan airport in one hour and three-quarter minutes. In the night on April 4, the envoy met Kim Jung-Il and returned to Seoul through Panmunjom in the afternoon on April 5.

[53] Accepting the recommendation by the Secretary of State Colin Powell, Bush reserved annual certification for the first time, which was demanded by the US Congress, in spending fund related with non-proliferation plan, on March 27 2002. The annual certification requires North Korea to show that it has stopped nuclear plan, before receiving primary parts for two light water reactors.

[54] In regard to this, a high official of the Ministry of Unification of South Korea explained, "the Chosun Central News reported lately the meetings between North Korea and USA in New York on March 13 and March 20, and according to our knowledge, there is nothing new."(Yonhap News, April 4, 2002)

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