I. The Importance of the Korean Peninsula and the Recent Political Situation in the Surrounding Region

First, on the international political front, Korea has repeatedly been the focus of international conflict for the past one hundred years; examples include the Sino-Japanese War (August 1894-March 1895); the Russo-Japanese War (February 1904-September 1905); the Second World War (1939-1945); and the Korean War (June 1950-July 1953). Other examples may include North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in February 1993 after the decision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct a special inspection on North Korea’s nuclear facilities; the Geneva Agreement between North Korea and the United States on Nuclear Facilities Inspections (August 5-12, 1994); and the recent missile launch by North Korea. These are good examples of how important the Korean peninsula has been in the past, how important it is at the present, and how important it will continue to be in the future.

Second, on the international economic front, the Korean peninsula can play an important role both in fostering the coexistence of capitalist and socialist economic systems, as well as in furthering the restructuring of capitalist economies. The common goal of the Asian-Pacific nations is to cope together in the intensifying trend of regionalization in the world, while at the same time establishing a multilateral trade order. However, differences in opinion exist among the member countries on the appropriate method of solving various issues. So a cooperative organization which guarantees the continuity and effectiveness of economic cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region is desirable for a number of reasons. At present, APEC’s efforts to liberalize intra-regional trade will focus on the resolution of the various tasks that have been formed since the recent conclusion of the UR. The greatest expected effect of APEC is that it will elevate the global Asian-Pacific region, which will then share the fruits of economic cooperation with countries outside of the region, and will thus promote the establishment of multi-lateralism.

APEC is the single formal economic cooperation system of which Korea is a member. Therefore, in a situation where regionalism is expanding throughout the world, APEC will act as a restraining force on other regions, and thus Korea’s position on APEC is extremely important. Actually, Korea has been able to uplift its political and diplomatic position through the development process of APEC, through such efforts as helping to resolve the problem of simultaneous entry of the “three China’s”. For the successful development of APEC, cooperation must be made in an environment where the diversity of the Asian-Pacific region and in a unique position in terms of balance of power, can perform the role of balancing the interests of the developing and developed nations.¹

The four superpowers surrounding the Korean peninsula, the United States, China, Japan and Russia, are all striving to strengthen their influence on the Asian continent, and are seeking to establish military ties as well as economic relationships through the 9th Summit.²

The Korean peninsula issue was raised during the G7 meeting in July 1996, in Lyon, France. A more recent G7 meeting focused on an economic declaration designed to overcome disagreements occurring between advanced and developing countries, and it called upon the world community to participate in the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Regarding the four-party talks (South and North Koreas, the United States and China), China and the United States agreed to actively persuade North Korea to participate in this meeting. The United States and Japan reached a concrete agreement to resolve problems pertaining to North Korea.

In addition, at the G8 meeting (G7 + Russia) in June 1997, economic, diplomatic and security issues including the Korean peninsula and nuclear nonproliferation were discussed.

After Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s official state visit to the United States in October 1997, U.S. President Clinton responded with his own visit to China in June 1998. During his visit, on June 29, 1998, the U.S.-China Summit was held, and the two leaders agreed to conduct close consultations to secure stability on the Korean peninsula.

In November and December 1997, when Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng visited Japan, he strongly urged a four-party meeting between China, Russia, the United States and Japan to secure peace in the Asian-Pacific region. This four-party meeting began in Geneva in December 1997. The South Korean side raised the issue of turning a cease-fire agreement into a permanent peace between the two Koreas, whereas the North Korean side suggested a peace agreement between North Korea and the United States and a withdrawal of American soldiers from South Korea.

In a series of summits between the four superpowers, the security of the Korean peninsula has often been discussed. The stability of the Korean peninsula is directly connected to that of the Far East as a whole. Accordingly, it is natural that during their summit meetings the superpowers have discussed the Korean peninsula issues seriously, since it is directly linked not only to their political and economic interests, but will ultimately lead to peace in the Far East.

Through its summits with China, the United States achieved the following results: on the economic front, it urged China to correct its trade imbalance with the United States, and pushed for U.S. entry into the Chinese nuclear power plant market; on the military front, the United States succeeded in obtaining vested rights for military and security in the Far East by obtaining China’s agreement to change ‘The U.S.-Japan Security Agreement’, signed in November 1978 against the former Soviet Union, into ‘The New U.S.-Japan Agreement’, signed on September 23, 1997 with China as its counterpart. The Chinese concession for this agreement paved the way for Japan to strengthen its military power.

China, for its part, made its strategic partnership relationship with the United States official in the U.S.-China Summit in Peking on June 29, 1998, thereby reducing the possibility of U.S. economic sanctions, which could have slowed China’s further economic growth.

Russia, on the other hand, obtained practical success in resolving border problems with China by participating in the G7 meeting. In the G8 meeting in June 1997, member nations agreed to fully support Russia’s early joining of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The four superpowers surrounding the Korean peninsula hope to achieve a peaceful solution to the Korean peninsula issue through the relaxation of tension through dialogue between the two Korea. Recently, with the improvement of relations between surrounding nations, the environment has improved markedly for securing a lasting peace between the two Koreas, and beyond that their eventual reunification.

Nevertheless, the political situation surrounding the Korean peninsula recently entered a critical phase: in August 1998, North Korea fired its long-range Taepo-dong 1 missile, thereby posing a critical threat to the security of the Far East. South Korea, one of the major parties concerned, has remained relatively ‘silent’ on this matter, but behind-the-scenes talks between the United States, North Korea and China have been vigorously pursued. Japan, for its part, has responded by strengthening its military power by launching its own spy satellites, and by forging links with the United States to jointly develop the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system.

According to an assessment published in 1993 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS): “North Korea’s nuclear threat is a threat to international security, and military action will be needed if an inspection of its nuclear facilities is not enough.” The report continues: “If nuclear proliferation is permitted in North Korea, Taiwan may follow suit with nuclear weapons of its own, which would prompt China to further arm itself. This in turn might speed up the already existing nuclear competition between India and Pakistan, and provoke Japan into changing its nuclear policy.

II. The Normalization of U.S.-North Korean Relations

The basic principle of U.S. policy vis-à-vis North Korea, even though they say that it is not a policy but rather a proposal, is well represented in the Perry Report. This report offers a comprehensive overview of the future U.S. policy toward North Korea. The framework of this report focuses on leading North Korea along a path toward permanent peace on the Korean peninsula, suggesting a three-stage goal to clear away the last remnants of the cold war on the Korean peninsula.

The 1st stage (short-term): The goal in this stage is to remove the nuclear and missile threat from the Korean peninsula. North Korea should refrain from launching further missiles. The United States should respond by partially lifting economic sanctions against North Korea, and preparing for future diplomatic ties by establishing a liaison office in North Korea.

The 2nd stage (medium-term): This would be the period when relations between North Korea, the United States and Japan would become normalized. North Korea should prepare a system guaranteeing that it refrain from further missile launches, allowing for a basic agreement between South and North Korea. The agreement to normalize diplomatic ties with Japan would be substantialized, and the scale of compensation from Japan would be adjusted upwards. In a word, the three-party relationship between South Korea, North Korea and Japan would be normalized.

The 3rd stage (long-term): This period would mark the end of the cold war and the establishing of lasting peace on the Korean peninsula. U.S. and Japan relations with North Korea would be set on the same footing as with any other country. The South-North Korea relationship in Korea would develop into a South-North union, making reunification an eventual reality.

In addition, the United States announced measures relaxing its sanctions against North Korea on September 17, 1999. The significance of this is that it marked the first step towards the normalization of economic ties between the United States and North Korea.

As early as 1995, the United States began to relax its sanctions against North Korea by permitting the import of North Korean magnets. Such economic transactions between the two countries, however, have not been substantialized during the intervening years. The 2nd step of relaxation, announced on September 17, 1999, cleared the way for American companies to engage in economic activity with North Korean partners.

For example, free trade with North Korea is guaranteed, and financial services and capital flow are liberalized, thereby allowing American companies to invest in the fields of agriculture, mining, petroleum, wood, cement, transportation, road, harbor and airport facilities, and the travel and tourism industries. American-registered ships and aircraft needed to conduct such business are able to provide service to and from North Korea.

Regarding the above-mentioned Perry Report and the U.S. government’s lifting of economic sanctions against North Korea, some critics have charged that they do not contain enough ‘red lines’ (countermeasures) to apply against North Korea if it fails to fulfill its promise.³

With rise of the Bush administration, U.S. strategy on North Korea experienced a fundamental change. Bush’s diplomacy and security team expects that Pyungyang has not the will to reform but will open and continue to ‘deal’ with the West, including the U.S., by using the ‘WMD card’ to sustain the Kim Jung-Il regime. Therefore, Washington has taken a position such that the U.S. delivers a clear-cut and resolved message to Pyungyang to prevent the North Korean government from taking any misjudged actions in the way of threats of trial missile launchings, such as the trial launching of the Daepodong missile in September 1999. The U.S. government argues that Korea, the U.S. and Japan must strengthen mutual cooperation and build the WMD system. Regarding this change in Bush’s strategy toward Pyungyang, the Trilateral Coordination Oversight Group (TCOG) concludes as follows:

First, as a basic principle of relations with North Korea, negotiations with Pyungyang on every problem must be done in a verifiable way. ‘Perry process’-type nonexclusive reciprocity must be abandoned. Quid pro quo must be used on a case-by-case basis and conducted phase-by-phase. Occasional discussion with allies, including Korea and Japan, must also be done case-by-case and phase-by-phase.

Second, as long as North Korea fulfills the Geneva agreement (on the nuclear problem) of August 1994, in good faith, the U.S. will support Pyungyang’s fulfillment of the agreement. However, the U.S. government must avoid negotiating nuclear missile and terror problems simultaneously, thereby differing from the Clinton administration. In other words, the problem of long-mid- and-short range missile exports and the placement of missiles which threaten neighboring countries must be solved on the basis of thorough verification.

Third, the ploy of removing North Korea from the list of terror-supporting countries must not be used as a political incentive for embracing Pyungyang.

As previously mentioned, the U.S. government demands that the North Korean government show ‘verifiable change’. If Pyungyang takes a defensive position to this, North Korea-U.S. relations may come to a standstill. Thus, it is all up to North Korea if Pyungyang-Washington relations progress toward peace in Northeast Asia, or simply mark time under continued tension as a residual of the past cold war. The positions and countermeasures of those countries concerned can be summarized in the following manner.

North Korea

North Korea announced that the changes in the U.S. position vis-à-vis North Korea were ‘appropriate’, and that North Korea would ‘faithfully cooperate with them’. During high-level talks with the United States, North Korea declared that it would not engage in any further missile testing (Joongang Tongsin, Joongang Broadcasting, Foreign Minister Paik Nam-soon’s speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 21 to 25, 1999).

In order for North Korea to overcome its economic difficulties, particularly food shortages, and to solidify the Kim Jong-il regime, North Korea will focus on improving relations with the United States, while at the same time maintaining its longstanding relationships with China and Russia. With the improvement of relations with the United States, North Korea will benefit by the relaxation of economic sanctions, the inflow of foreign capital, and the resumption of negotiations regarding compensation from Japan. Taking a more practical and compromising stance than in the past, North Korea is expected to abandon its previous policy of “only with the United States - approachment with Japan - resistance against South Korea”, replacing it with the policy of “first priority to the United States, and after that South Korea and Japan”.

While the symbolic value of the lifting of economic sanctions against North Korea is great, in practical terms the effects will be minimal. As a way to maximize these practical effects, North Korea is expected to focus on improving relations with Japan. In 1998, North Korea’s foreign trade volume totaled U.S.$ 1.44 billion, and its GDP U.S.$ 12.6 billion. Alongside the modest figures, Japanese compensation in the range of just U.S.$5-10 billion would clearly provide a very significant boost to the North Korean economy within a short period of time. Accordingly, the introduction of Japanese compensation through food and social overhead capital sectors will facilitate the recovery of North Korea’s industrial base, which, together with the lifting of economic sanctions, will ultimately serve to attract foreign investment.

The recent North Korean policy of openness can be viewed as ‘contradictory’, as shown in the revision of the Constitution in September 1998, and in editorials of newspapers of ‘Nodong Daily Newspaper’ and ‘Kunroja’ on September 17, 1998.

First, the constitutional revisions of September 1998: 1) extended private property rights and the scale of private property; 2) stressed profitability of business activities and the need for economic progress; and 3) extended the subjects and criteria of foreign trade, thereby forming a legal base for the country’s reform and openness policies. Second, editorials jointly published in the ‘Nodong Daily Newspaper’ and ‘Kunroja’on September 17, 1998 said that: 1) the priority given to heavy industry will be maintained in North Korean economic planning; 2) the market economy, reforms and openness policies are all rejected; and 3) in order to spark the recovery of the economy, North Korea will once again stress its home-grown juche policy of self-help.

Kim Jong-il’s ‘contradictory’ economic policy seems to be aimed fundamentally at maintaining existing conservative ideology in order to retain his hold over the people, while at the same time instituting those reforms and openness policies necessary to boost its ailing.

Japan

Japan has insisted that we should have a safe instrument in the face of the missile threat from North Korea. It followed the course of missile negotiations with North Korea with particular sensitivity, and welcomed the North Korean announcement, under the pressure of public opinion, will now focus on proving the truthfulness of North Korea’s intentions through behind-the-scenes contact with South Korea, the United States, and North Korea, rather than through official government-level talks.

Korea

The South Korean government’s basic policy vis-à-vis North Korea is well manifested in three principles, expressed by President Kim Dae Joong in his speech before the National Security Council on January 4, 1999: 1) South Korea will promote peace and security on the Korean peninsula; 2) it will continue to make efforts to promote reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas; 3) it will pursue its policy vis-à-vis North Korea based on supports from the international community and mutual-assistance system with it.

The Korean government’s basic strategy toward North Korea is that if it activates its economic ties with North Korea with a more positive and tolerant attitude, it will succeed in having more contacts, more dialogue and more cooperation with the North. This so-called ‘Sunshine policy’will require not only a great deal of political restraint on South Korea’s part, but will also require considerable economic burdens.

For example, the Geneva agreement reached between the United States and North Korea from August 5-12, 1994, requires South Korea to pay at least U.S.$0.8-1 billion annually to North Korea in the form of food, crude oil and light-water reactors. South Korea will cover 70% of the construction costs for these reactors, an estimated 3.542 billion won (U.S.$2.95 billion).

The party most directly concerned with preventing North Korea from developing nuclear weapons is of course South Korea itself. It is therefore natural for South Korea to play a key role in this project. However, it will pose a great burden on the nation, particularly in the wake of Asia’s economic condition.

The South Korean government has responded positively to the Perry Report and to recent shifts in U.S. policy towards North Korea: they are seen serving to dismantle the cold war structure on the Korean peninsula and support the South Korean government’s position on such issues as the realization of basic agreements between South and North Korea, as the reunion of separated families.

But North Korea’s two-sided approach “negotiate with the United States, but exclude and remain hostile towards South Korea” - makes it unlikely that we will see remarkable reforms any time soon. For example, in a speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations, North Korean Foreign Minister Paik Nam-soon declared his expectation for the improvement of relations with the United States and Japan, but he demanded that South Korea discard its policy of inducing changes in North Korea, and also that it abolish its National Security Law.

III. The Establishment of Peace on the Korean Peninsula and Measures Designed to Promote Economic Cooperation: The Creation of a City of Peace in the Far East

While the new security order in Europe is characterized by the post-modernization and post-cold war system, then the security order of the Far East is based on military ties to secure individual security as well as to maintain the balance of power in the case of such threats as a possible breakdown of the North Korean government, a threat from China, or Japan’s emergence as a new military power. In order to assure complete security and a cooperative system for the Far East, the European-type collective security system can be an alternative. From the experience from NATO, it will take a great deal of time to establish such a collective security system.

In addition, despite the fact that the Far East has an economy of huge scale, dynamics and a high rate of mutually beneficial complements among nations, the sharp political and military confrontation, i.e. the legacy of the cold war, has been a hindrance to the establishment of an international division of local specialties within the region. Accordingly, in order to get rid of leftovers of the cold war system in this region, we must pursue an economic cooperation through localized economic zones based on economically complementary relationships within the region, and, one step further, we must pursue market-led functional integration based on the market theory. Such a market-led functional integration, however, will take a great deal of time due to differences of economic systems as well as the differing levels of economic development of each member country in this region.

Here, the issue that we can raise is what will be the systematic instrument and practical measures which can secure a multilateral security system, and at the same time satisfy a unity of economic cooperation in this region. One of answers is the establishment of the Northeast Asia Peace City (NEAPC), which the author has previously suggested.

The author has defined the NEAPC as a special ‘free city’ in which pan-national and ideology-free administrative theories are applied, the free flow of labor, products, capital and service is guaranteed, all tariff and non-tariff barriers are removed, and technical and physical barriers do not exist. Regarding to the concept of the NEAPC, ‘Tanchihi Free City’ is a good example for a free city between nations and international organizations. This free city was created in 1919 by the agreement of the major allied nations and participating allied nations under the auspices of the United Nations based on the Versailles Peace Treaty. The NEAPC will have the following characteristics:

First, the NEPAC will be a sort of a neutral nation with a free ideology, free politics, and free military characteristics. Under the basis of ‘the Basic Agreement between South Korea and North Korea’ and a multilateral agreement for the development of the NEPAC, the third party formed by the four powers of the United States, China, Japan and Russia and the two Koreas will take responsibility for administration of this city. In a word, South Korea and North Korea as well as four powers will jointly construct the NEPAC. Jangdan-myon, located within the demilitarized zone of the ceasefire line, is selected as the most ideal place for it.

Second, in order for the NEPAC to be constructed and be operated smoothly, ‘The Basic Agreement between South and North Korea’, like ‘the Basic Agreement between East and West Germany’, signed in 1972, and ‘the Economic Cooperation Agreement’(a trade agreement, an investment protection agreement and a tax agreement, etc.) should be signed respectively. Based on which, ‘The Multilateral Agreement Designed to Construct the NEPAC’ should be signed.

The important point here is to turn the legal status of South and North Korea from its current cease-fire status to a peace status. Again, in order to turn the confrontation relationship between South and North Korea into peaceful relationship of coexistence, ‘the Basic Agreement between South and North Korea’ should be signed. In this case, the two points overlooked in ‘the South-North Korea Agreement’ of December 1991 should be included: 1) it is not a simple inviolability, but it is a renunciation of the use and threat of military force in conformation with Article 4, Chapter II of the UN Charter; 2) the respect of human rights should also be included. Finally, ‘the Basic Agreement of South and North Korea’should undergo the process of consultation and ratification of the National Assembly, as was the case in Germany.

Third, companies which will be invited to the NEPAC will be joint ventures of South and North Korea, or multinational companies, which transcend ideology. Regulations pertaining to their economic activities within this city should be in conformation with agreements signed by both parties as well as the ‘Basic Agreement between South and North Korea’.

Such international organizations of the UN, including the UNDP, the ESCAP and the UNIDO, will facilitate and activate economic cooperation between South and North Korea and international industrial cooperation.

Fourth, in order to expand economic exchanges between South and North Korea and international industrial cooperation, and to guarantee the safety of companies which operate their business within this city, a so-called ‘Committee for Economic Cooperation in the Far East’ should be established. Discretionary rights and legal rights, based on the WTO agreement, should be given to this Committee, and this Committee should be permanently stationed in the NEPAC. This Committee will prepare a variety of systems including an investment guarantee, and it will engage in issuing letters of credit as well as in the resolution of clearance contracts between the central banks of South and North Korea.

IV. Conclusion

The author (1995 and 2000)⁴ has presented that there are three national objectives for Korea in the 21st century: domestically, a society that guarantees the greatest happiness for the greatest majority must be created based on humanitarian principles; a reunified nation must be constructed for the people; and, Korean people must take a leading role in the coming Asia- Pacific Age.

Particularly for Korean reunification, the author has presented a new model based on the five-step approach: 1) preparation, 2) economic integration, 3) social integration, 4) political integration, 5) military integration.⁵

To achieve the three national objectives, Korea must first solve the five crises: security, political, social, cultural and economic crisis.⁶ The establishment of Northeast Asian Peace City (NEAPC) which the author proposed can be an approach to the ‘general’ crisis and Korea’s vision in the 21st Century.

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Klein, Eckart, “Free Cities”, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 10, 1987.

Lim, Yang-Taek, “Research on the Development Strategy of a North-South Korea Special Economic Zone and the Selection of an Appropriate Region”, paper presented at the Economic Association, February 1990.

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¹ Yang-Taek Lim, “The Role of Korea in the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation”, Research in Asian Economi-c Studies, Vol. 8, 1998. pp. 91-92.

² The first U.S.-Russian Summit was held in Helsinki in March 1997; U.S.-China Summits were held in October 1997 in Washington, and in June 1998 in Peking; the Japan-Russian Summit was held in April 1998 in Tokyo; and the Japan-China Summit was held in the autumn of 1998 in Tokyo.

³ If a Republican Party candidate is elected the next President of the United States, it is possible that the Perry Report may be entirely altered or scrapped.

⁴ Yang-Taek Lim, The People Perish Where There Is No Vision, Seoul: Mail Economic Daily Press, September 1995.

⁵ Yang-Taek Lim, “A New Proposal for the Korean Reunification with a Special Emphasis on the Economic cooperation between North and South Korea as the Crucial Step”, DoSan Collected Papers, Vol. 3, Seoul: DoSan Academy Institute, August 1993.

Yang-Taek Lim, “A New Proposal for the Korean Reunification with Economic Cooperation between North and South Korea”, paper presented at the International Symposium Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies of Hanyang University, Seoul, September 1994, pp. 27~28.

Yang-Taek Lim, “A New Proposal for the Reunification of the Two Koreas: Economic Issues”, Journal of Asian Economies, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1997, pp. 547-578.

Yang-Taek Lim , “Economic and Military Issues in A New Proposal for the Reunification of the Two Koreas”, The Hanyang Journal of Economic Studies, Hanyang Economic Research Institute, March 1997.

⁶ Yang-Taek Lim, “The Current Five Crises in Korea”, National Intellect, Vol. 57, November 1990.