Economics: IMF Policy in the Developing World:

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The Sudan and the IMF 2013-2016:

IMF-Induced Policies Protected by Sheer Force

 

by Professor Ali Abdalla Ali

Omdurman Ahlia University

Sudan

 

“As long as Sudan is under the umbrella of the IMF (13 Annual Monitored Programmes) and as long as the policy fundamentals are not taken care of by the Sudanese policy-makers, the unhealthy state of the economy shall persist and the welfare of the ordinary Sudanese will continue to deteriorate precipitating discontent, apathy and impoverishment. The result shall be social and political upheaval,” By the author in “The Sudan and the IMF; A Policy with Disastrous Consequences” (2013 ),  Journal of Global Issues & Solutions, USA, 2016.(3)

 

INTRODUCTION:

The Sudan is one of few member countries that had a long operational relationship with  Bretton Woods institutions specially the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since its first Stabilization Programme in 1966. Before that the IMF gave its first assistance within the Compensatory Financing arrangement. This was because Sudan failed to market its major cotton production in the 1950s, as a result of the Korean war. It was a blessing  since it gave a first decent impression about an institution which Sudan shortly joined (June 1957) and which the Sudan can count on in future years. Its intentions and their guiding philosophy were not questioned or doubted by the  those managing the Sudan’s economy.

 

Since independence in 1956, governance of the country alternated between military and civilian regimes such that after 61 years since independence,  Sudan had only about nine years of a sort of weak and unclear democratic rule. The major objective of party rule as well as the military was to seek how to stay in power as long as possible rather than applying scientific ways and means to develop the country and improve the welfare and the state of knowledge of the citizens. Even worse and as a result of this alternation between civilians and military, the country’s management lost most of its qualified cadres and as well as damaged the imperial heritage of firm and decent administration in the form of rules and regulations. Sudan was often known to have the best civil service left by the British. But as best for whom no one talks about. Such rules and regulations  were made with an imperial objective in mind. These rules and regulations just needed to be amended and improved to satisfy the needs of a national independent country. The policies adopted were mainly mercantilist in nature. It therefore continued even after Sudan acquired its political independence. This is so because  those who took charge of the management of the economy were mostly trained along the Anglo-Saxon traditions. They, therefore, followed the same British legacy in the immediate years of independence. Such a legacy shall be explained in another article. In brief it constituted a trade policy of enhancing exports, mainly cotton to feed the mills of Lancashire, as well as an import policy which always tried to maintain a surplus in the balance of trade. Such a balance used to be kept in Britain. This is so because if imports were to be allowed to surpass exports Britain (being the holder of Sudan) would not be ready to cover the deficit in trade. The colony was supposed to behave according to its financial abilities and stretching its legs according to what it could produce (cotton in this case).

 

This pattern in policy was disturbed twice. In 1970 when the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) tried to take over rule assisted by a faction of the army. It tried to adopt a pattern of development  of central planning with the help of the Soviet experts at that time. It Failed. The second was in 1989, when the National Islamic Front (NIF) took over rule with the help of some faction of the military or some civilians dressed in army fatigue!! This regime continue to rule the Sudan until this moment, i.e. for more than a quarter century, a time during which the face of the Sudan was unusually changed. It claimed to run the country on the basis of Islamic principles (i.e. Shariaa). However, Sudan’s relation with Bretton Woods institutions, which it had joined in 1957, remained since then with every political change . The various regimes declared their adherence to international commitments and treaties specially that Sudan got into the habit of borrowing  financial resources without being able to repay such debts on time.  In this attempt to explain the latest in the development  of the relation between the Sudan and the IMF actually reflect the culmination of such an operational relationship which no one can tell how it could be brought to a normal state of affairs or a positive direction which will constitute improved economic and social welfare of the Sudanese in general.

 

The drain of qualified cadre had serious implications for policy-making and that was the weakening of the bargaining of those in charge of the country’s management. Coming back to the question of economic reform through adoption of austerity programmes as often suggested by the IMF as was the case in 2013. One finds an interesting parallel with the same programme of 2016 which we intend to discuss in more detail. It was indicated in the previous review of what happened in 2013 when the Sudan adopted its austerity programme (4) which resulted in the killing of more than 200 demonstrators who launched a peaceful demonstration in the capital city of Khartoum, protesting against the general increases in the prices of some basic necessities as well as fuel, which causes an overall increase in the level of prices. An official statement  contested the number killed to about 80 demonstrators!

 

The important fact is that the government, instead of undertaking serious corrective measures to improve policy fundamentals, took the easy road in the form of more and more taxes, freeing the exchange rate as well as restricting government borrowing from the banking system etc. the usual austerity package advised by the IMF. Such a package when adopted usually strongly hurts the fixed income groups and the rural and urban poor. Moreover, the government withdrew its major responsibility of providing social services such as education, health, clean water, cheap housing etc. in a very strange conception of fiscal philosophy!  It left the population, of which more than 46% are below poverty line, to take care of themselves. More than 75-80% of the budget is allocated to Defense and Security and its allied services. This was under the lame reason of protecting the country. The data of GDP shows that 30%  from agriculture (65-70% of the population are farmers and nomads), 22% from industry and Services around 40%. Ironically, 15% from Hotels, restaurants and trade, i.e. 50% of agriculture! Education right from the Khalwa (Quranic School) to the university level, which used to be free, became commercialized. The general government hospitals where medical care was free, have been neglected  in favor of private hospitals and clinics. 75% of the medical care is borne by the people according to the State Minister of Health(5). Both such services can only be affordable to the rich or those who became rich in the country during the last quarter century. In the aftermath of the 2013 uprising, the government decided to design a plan in order to enable it set the house in order. This exercise was conducted in 2014, i.e. just one year after the 2013 uprising. It was for the years 2015-2019. The plan’s major emphasis was the development of major sectors, i.e. the industrial sector, specially extractive industry as well as agriculture. The plan is in its third year but without any visible improvement since the proper environment such described was not provided.

 

THE 2016 AUSTERITY MEASURES:

In an atmosphere such as this the 2013 measures were on the advice of the IMF and government acceptance undertaken with its known unfortunate results. The same measures and even more were repeated in 2016 (Nov.). If the 2013 measures did not deliver the goods, what is the wisdom  behind  adopting  the same measures with considerable determination in 2016? Now let us see what happened between 2013 and 2016 to see whether there was any wisdom  repeating the same medicine once more. Moreover,  not forgetting  the potential consequences of such measures as will be discussed!

 

The following  background reflects certain key findings arrived to by a World Bank report(6). The report shows very clearly the overall environment and setting within which both 2013 and also 2016 programmes were executed in the country. It is thought useful for the purpose of reflecting on the 2016 measures. The author will try to add in italics what one consider as important, but not mentioned in the report for a reason or another. Such reports usually tend to avoid explicit criticism of member countries which might be thought of as intervention in the internal policies of the member country!

 

“Key Finding No.1

“This first finding states that “No lasting structural change: Manufacturing provides an almost negligible number of jobs in Sudan. Agriculture and services account for the vast majority of employment in Sudan with manufacturing providing an almost negligible number of jobs. This is even though both wages and labor productivity are much higher in industry and manufacturing than in agriculture. The sector that employs most people in the economy-agriculture- is also the sector that employs most people without education. Almost two in three workers in this sector have no education and less than one in fifty has secondary. Workers in the remaining sectors- manufacturing, non-manufacturing industry and services- have relatively similar levels of education.”(7).

 

It is no surprise that there is no lasting structural change. The Sudan has been under what is called the Monitored Programme(MP) of the IMF for more than thirteen  annual programmes which aimed among other targets help institute structural change in Sudan’s economy. According to one’s  knowledge, such programmes should have assisted the country to gradually institute the necessary structural change but no visible change can be discerned. Agriculture, which is the main employer with a contribution of around 30% of GDP, industry around 22% as  mentioned above. If  industry is to become a major provider of goods and employment and to gradually take part of the burden from agriculture, then what is actually happening with industry? More than 70% of the Sudanese industries are concentrated in the State of Khartoum, the capital. About 80% of tax revenues are drawn from the State of Khartoum. Yet the problems facing Sudanese manufacturing industries are phenomenal. “According to a recent report, 2034 plants  are totally disabled, 191 totally closed and 286  temporarily closed”( 8 ). The Minister of Industry declared that “the industrial areas lack basic infrastructure, water availability, energy (highest rates in the region in spite of dams constructed), security and roads”(9). He forgot working capital which is a major impediment. This is in addition to taxes and dues imposed on such plants which are immediately passed to the consumers. How can one expect these plants to contribute towards enhancing employment? Moreover, no less than 90% of inputs of these industries are imported from outside. One can imagine the agonies of those managing such industries when they try to fish for foreign exchange in the context of an ever depreciating currency vis-à-vis other currencies, specially the US Dollar and various unstable rates of exchange! Such a situation makes business planning rather impossible if not futile. It really needs to be traced. However, the report, in referring to the programme of 2013, ignores the fact that the measures were advised by the IMF and accepted by the government. Erasing subsidies was not justified by all measures because the oil prices were very low.

 

 This statement  is very  real. In fact long before 2011, inflation had gone up in April 2004  to 160%. This was due to the heated expansion undertaken at that time. This history of inflation had damaging effects on the economy which it constitute any subsidy. It is just that the government was in urgent need for more resources and had to milk the ordinary citizen. The IMF missions must have been aware of such a fact, but since it produces more revenue  they remain silent ignoring the potential consequences. Moreover, the direct lending by the central bank was not an exclusive habit of the present government. In fact since such lending  was included in the Act of the Central Bank (1959)(11). The objective was to lend the treasury at the start of every yearly national budget until estimated tax and customs revenues flow into the government treasury. The rule  was that such loaned funds (15% of the gross budget) were to be repaid after one and a half years. In fact all governments in Sudan since independence got into the habit of neglecting their fiscal function to realize taxes and customs, never repaid such funds. It was considered  easy money. They got into the unconstitutional habit of amending the Central Bank Act in order to borrow more! Such borrowing had its unseen implications of the price level and productivity and the performance of the economy in general. When unpaid, the balance due used to be converted every year by the central bank into long term loans by the central bank.

 

“Key Finding No.3

Weak resource revenues management, budget deficits and low saving. At its peak during the oil economy between 1999 and 2011, oil revenues contributed more than 50 % of total fiscal revenues. This situation ended abruptly in 2011 (secession of South Sudan) and oil revenues expected to fall to around 10% of total revenues over the next five years.

 

Sudan’s budget has consistently been in deficit since 1991 and only occasionally reached surplus during the oil economy. During the oil economy oil revenues rapidly became the main source of public revenues and contributed more than 50% of total revenues at its peak, but this situation ended abruptly in 2011.With the secession of South Sudan the share of oil to total revenues declined from 59% in 2011 to 16 % in 2012.

 

 Financing the budget deficit is one of the key challenges in post-secession Sudan, and options for foreign financing of the budget deficit are limited given Sudan’s debt arrears crisis. Revenue and expenditure management in Sudan has increased in complexity since early 1990s as the country has undertaken political and fiscal decentralization reforms with the aim to transition the responsibility for basic service delivery to sub-national state level. Decentralization has evolved a number of key responsibilities to the sub-national government, particularly vis-à-vis publicly funded pro-poor activities.

 

Fiscal decentralization has brought considerable extra resources to the States and substantially increased overall per capita social spending over the past ten years. Yet the observed increase in social spending has not translated into a more balanced distribution of resources by the government to address inequality across states and reduce poverty gaps. Ultimately, the weakness in public service provision in Sudan stems from poor prioritization of spending and inadequate focus on results. Yet, conflict and governance issues are complicating factors for the government to effectively deliver services.”(12)

 

Although the tax base is considered low relative to other countries, but it must be admitted that the issue is not so much the level and magnitude of revenues collected but it is the way such revenues  were managed and prioritized. Hence, the reference by the report of the WB to such weakness. In real terms it was not only weakness in management but a number of other crucial factors that led to the illogical management and allocation of such resources. First of all since the present government took power there existed  a very strange conception of public money as well as a clear disdain (either due to ignorance or intention) to rules and regulations governing the use of fiscal resources which had been long in existence. Moreover, most of those concerned with managing public money, whether ministers (some), governors as well as local administrators, had no previous civil service experience in managing public money. The only qualification used to be being a member of the NIF. Second, there existed a feeling that those concerned gave the impression that as if they were deputized by Allah (God) to take care of such monies and the way such monies been disbursed  did not need earthly regulations! Third, funds usually allocated to certain objectives used to be redirected to other  uses without any fear of being accounted for. This happened in spite of the fact that the national budget when approved by the National Assembly it is passed by a law to insure misuse. The Sudan Audit Chamber had drawn attention to this continued malpractice. In fact it is normal for some government units to refuse to be audited by the Government  Audit Chamber specially if the boss in charge of the unit is an influential member of the ruling party! Recently, the Deputy Auditor declared that “most of the corruption happens in government purchase contracts.” He called  for the right of the people to know the details of these contracts. He confirmed  that “all government units should be subject to audit including the Republican Palace, Security and the Ministry of Defense.”He added that some government units try to play with the percentage sharing with other non- government units to avoid being audited by the Government Auditor.  In fact there is hardly any degree of transparency or accountability in this significant fiscal field.

 

As regards the way such funds are allocated reflects the intentions of the ruling party and not necessarily logical conception and philosophy of public funds. In fact if a country such as Sudan claims to be adopting Islamic Sharia’a (law) it should restrict itself only to Zakat (an Islamic tax) which is usually paid by the wealthy and rich. The disbursement of Zakat is clearly specified in the Quran. Zakat should actually cover all the needs of the economy but it had to be adopted in a purely Islamic state. Taxation in Sudan is inherited from colonial times according to the concept of the members of  the society to pay such taxes by law in order to help the government to take care and provide them with social services such as security, education, health etc. Various governments took to this practice and adopted Zakat some decades. That is why in democratic regimes, there is often the proviso “no taxation without representation”. This means that the disbursement of taxations which is collected by law, by necessity must be disbursed by the approval of people’s representatives. When the legislative body is not elected  freely in a country, there is always the possibility that such funds are often approved and automatically disbursed  according to the wish of the government in charge and not to wish of the people. The 2017 estimates budget estimates show that the total revenues are estimated at SD83.8 billion (1 US Dollar=SD7.2, the parallel rate is 1 dollar-SD.18-December 2016). Total expenditure amounted to SD77.7 Billion. Out of this SD29.1 billion for Defense, Security and Police. Education (including higher education and research) SD.828 million, Health SD.555 million and agriculture SD.1.4 billion. 65-70 % of the 40 million population are either farmers, nomads or artisans. The sovereign authority (which includes the Palace, the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, The Federal Government Chambers, etc.) get SD 5.3 billion. The economic sector gets SD.1.7 billion, (the ministries concerned with economic policy-excluding agriculture). The above figure reflect very clearly that the social services, which include health (SD.555 million) and education (SD.828million) i.e. a total of SD1.383 billion, while  Defense and security and police were allocated SD.29.1 billion; agriculture, which is the main preoccupation of the majority of the Sudanese (65-75% of the population), got SD.1.4 billion and the Presidency got SD.5.3 billion of  total expenditure! The government had absolved itself from bearing the responsibility of both education and health as mentioned above. The present minister of finance said  in addressing the people in the media, ”your security is our responsibility and your daily living on Allah (God)”!(13) As to why there were no visible developments in the periphery states in spite of getting  resources from the central government, the same weaknesses mentioned above apply. Since these states were deprived of financial resources and were, therefore, hungry for every need, they were spent on items other than the specified objectives of such resources .

 

Key Findings 4, 5 & 6:

These include, a) Long history of overvalued real exchange rate, b) extremely low productivity in agriculture despite past irrigation investments, and c) highly concentrated export markets.(14)

These three findings are closely interrelated. They are also so true that these observations are real. However, Sudan never needed to think about the suitability of the exchange rate because its exports were needed at any cost and the level of development as well as other needs were  extremely modest specially in the years immediately after independence. It is only after the late seventies and eighties when efforts to develop took shape in the form of external borrowing because the domestic savings were not growing in accordance to general needs. Because the status of the exchange rate was not  a very crucial matter, there was always reluctance on the part of policymakers not to accept changes in the exchange rate. Moreover, there was always the belief that devaluation of the currency is a blunt monetary instrument which can have its effect on the monetized part of the economy rather than the non-monetized sector. Therefore, there was a reluctance to accept devaluation. The February 22, 1992  devaluation was forced on the people without any consultation (except that which was within the inner circle  of the NIF) and it had serious effects, among which was the total disappearance of the Sudanese middle class which used to be a desirable safety valve. That is why the governments started entertaining the idea of reopening the oil fields which were closed by Chevron (a US company). The choice was  to go east to China. When oil was produced by a consortium, Sudan became an oil exporting country, beginning in August 1999, with the first shipment.  From 2000 the rate of exchange remained stable because of the ample resources of foreign exchange accruing from oil export. The rest was mentioned above, i.e. the fact the departure of the South Sudan as an independent new nation in 2011 took with it 75% of the oil resources since the oil fields were primarily in the Southern region.

 

Moreover, the oil revenues that accrue to Sudan were not taken care of in a rational manner so that such revenues were to be directed towards the development of the major natural resource which is agriculture where most of the population worked and lived. The authorities behaved in the same way as any oil country in the Gulf, forgetting that the Northern Sudan had a long protracted war with the South Sudan where most the oil fields were located. In fact it is the exporting of oil that motivated the Southern rebels to come to the negotiating table and to be able to obtain independence with the help of the international community. Since then the North started to experience financial difficulties simply because the authorities did not make hay while the Sudan was shinning. A good portion of oil revenues was repatriated outside the Sudan, US 13 billion alone in Malaysian banks and another US 10 billion invested in some of the Gulf countries in addition to other sums in European banks. At the same time most of the Sudanese infrastructure, such as dams, were financed from financial institutions and Asian governments, mainly China. Agriculture was completely neglected and consequently a good number of the rural population were affected. For example, the Gum Arabic belt sustains about 14 million Sudanese, of whom five million are producers. According to a World Bank study, they do not get more than 10% of the export price (US$ 2800/ton). Moreover, because of the boycott imposed by the United States since 1997, the Sudanese exporters charge the Europeans clients with the above price and resell the Gum Arabic to USA at about between US$ 7000/ton to about US $ 10,000/ton!!(15). To this point ends the comment on the findings of the World Bank report. It is in this context and economic and social environment that the Sudan adopted the same austerity measures that were adopted in 2013 (16)well in advance of the presentation of the budget. This was done because it seems that the government represented by the Ministry of Finance was not sure that such measures might be objected to and opposed  by the National Assembly. So the ministry of finance put the National Assembly in a de facto situation  in which they could not refuse the proposed measures in spite of their illogical direction and in spite of the fact that a good number were not satisfied. In fact this practice was adopted  by a number of ministers of finance, i.e. raising taxes and waiving subsidies starting September of each year in the hope to avoid  discussing such measures in the National Budget at the beginning of each new year.  The measures adopted in November 2016 before the presentation of the 2017 budget included the following;

a)      Erasing of subsidies on electricity and at the same time supporting weak families.

b)      Fuel went up for Benzine to SD.6.17 (about a dollar) per liter from the previous SD4.6. Diesel fuel per liter went up from SD3.11 to SD4.11. Since most of the means of transport is by vehicles using either Benzine or Gas oil fuel, the impact becomes obvious.

c)      Pharmaceuticals were to be imported at the rate of SD.15/1 USD instead of a special rate of SD6/1 USD. Therefore, prices of pharmaceuticals went up more than 100% even for life saving medicines. Pharmaceuticals are usually financed by a portion (10%) of the proceeds which the exporters obtain by exporting Sudanese cash crops. They keep the balance. There is a very strange practice in Sudan where the exporters, instead of surrendering the foreign exchange they obtain to the Central Bank of Sudan, they keep 90% of it and actually trade in it. This practice was lastly nullified. In this case importers try to seek their own needs of foreign exchange from the informal sector rather than being availed by the Central Bank of Sudan.

d)       Gradual erasing of subsidies on sugar and reducing public expenditures by 10% (which never happens in real practice).

e)      Banning of importation of certain commodities, including animals, meat, decorative flowers (!!) and fish (!!). The minister forgot to ban milk and yogurt from Saudi Arabia as well as ice cream! The minister, while declaring these measures, explained that it will lead to a reduction in the trade deficit and will also lead to a reduction of the rate of inflation to no more than 15%. The actual rate of inflation in February 2017 went up to more than double, i.e. 32.8%!

 

In fact the public was aware that these measures which will impart real difficulties for the majority of them, decided that they will declare a national disobedience on December 19. Through the modern technology of social interaction people were mobilized and they succeeded  in sending a message to the government. However, the attempt was not very successful. This is so because the government authorities, aware of what happened in 2013, where more than 200 citizens were shot dead. They took measures to insure that the civil obedience shall not succeed. Government employees were required on that day to register their attendance, schools and students were on vacation. The trade unions have been penetrated and domesticated by the government. Sudan used to have well-known and strong trade union movement for all professions. Moreover, the government was fully ready, mobilizing the police, the army and the securities and other forces. So the general public and other opposition forces felt that the government was very serious and meant real business. That is why things came back to normal. But what was not normal is the pathetic outcome of the general measures.

 

As noted above, the actual inflation rate was more than double in February 2017 contrary to what the minister hoped. The exchange rate, in terms of the USD, went up to about SD18/1 USD  while at the time of declaring these measures in November it was about SD11-12/1 USD. Currently, the rate fluctuates downwards whenever news appears in the media that a Gulf country has given the Sudan a certain amount of dollars. Such funds are not without a certain political cost. No sizeable FDI is flowing into the country since those who are already investing in the country are unable to transfer their profits. The Chinese side, as represented by the Bank of China, had halted all projects financed through its bank because Sudan did not honor  its 2017 repayment of arrears in spite of being agreed upon. Total Sudan foreign debt is approaching US $50 billion. It is the first time in Sudan significant and long standing relationship that its major trading partner China stopped dealing with Sudan. Not only China, even a regional organization such as the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah, is now reluctant to allow more borrowing as long as repayment of arrears are not settled. Moreover, the welfare of the general citizens is deteriorating. In fact had it not been for the financial help by the ten million Sudanese of whom 85%  have emigrated outside Sudan since this government took over in 1989, the situation would have been worse. The government had passed all its legitimate responsibilities of social service onto the poor and impoverished citizens. In fact the picture is extremely dim and the authorities do not recognize that there is a problem. If the people cannot protest about their welfare, they are also not allowed to express their conditions. The press media is carefully watched and a TV channel which is owned by a member of the NIF was closed. If people try to stage a peaceful demonstration or express their views they have to take permission from the local authorities, if they cannot find money to buy medicines, if they are not able to educate their children, if they are not able to have a decent diet, what will be the situation? The various policies undertaken during the more than quarter of a century led to considerable impoverishment of the masses as well as the complete disappearance of the middle class. People are either high up in the pyramid or in the bottom. These policies were, during the last fifteen years, largely influenced by a liberalization  policy that meant a gradual withdrawal of the state from its known obligations to an extreme extent. Absolving  itself from providing education, health care, low cost housing, clean water and other basic needs led to a clear deterioration in the welfare of what remained of the Sudanese.  Daily health statistics indicate to the low state of the nation. Emigration of the Sudanese en mass, specially the highly skilled and qualified, is a reflection of wrong economic and social policies which meant empowering the faithful, while ignoring those who are non-partisan. Moreover, concentrating on the belief that the only way to develop the country is through enhancing military and security might, forgetting that decent governance is through justice and the rule of the law, specially since the state’s philosophy is applying  the Sharia’a (law) of Allah (God).

 

Concluding Remarks:

There is no other way to describe such a situation except that it is definitely going to be a gradual voluntary genocide for what remained of  the majority of the 46% Sudanese who are below the poverty line, controlled and carefully watched upon by absolute security and police force.

A Sudanese writer by the name of Wail Ali, commenting on the recent policies adopted by saying that “In any country that erases subsidies can be described in political science as a state that failed to protect its right by monopolizing legitimate force and lost its legality as a result of continued break of the country’s constitution and became unable to provide basic economic and social needs of its people and became also unable to communicate diplomatically with the other countries.”(17)

 

It is also worthwhile  remembering what Christine Lagard, the Chief Executive of the International Monetary Fund, who three years ago WARNED (not advised) the countries of Europe NOT to adopt austerity programmes as a way to achieve economic reforms.

 

She said:

”War is not in Al Anbar not even in Iraq or Syria. War is on the economies of countries and their impoverishment, make its people hungry and deprive them from their financial might and  the military and make them unable to buy a bullet and unable to pay the wages of their staff among them the military and securities forces. Then external forces intervene and break the law, pillage the people and incur chaos and impose dues!”(translation mine)  

 

 Footnotes:

1. Professor Ali Abdalla Ali, Omdurman Ahlia University, Ex-Sudan University of Science & Technology, Ex-Economic Advisor, Khartoum Stock Exchange. Email: aliabdalla.abd@gmail.com

2. World Bank, Sudan Country Economic Memorandum (SCEM), Realizing the Potential for Diversified Development, WB Group, Washington, Sept. 2015.

3. Ali Abdalla Ali, ”The Sudan and the IMF; A policy with Disastrous Consequences,” in Journal of Global Issues and Solutions, BWW Society, 2016 USA. See also Ali Abdalla Ali, “Stiglitz and the Greek Morality Tale,” in Real-world economics Review, issue No.73, 2015.

4. Ali op.cit.

5. Aljareeda Daily, Sudan-21.12.2016

6. World Bank, SCEM.

7. Aljareeda Daily-21.12.2016

8. Aljareeda- No. 1928-22.12.2016

9.  op.cit.

10. WB SCEM, p.10

11. Bank of Sudan Act.

12. WB, SCEM, p.12.

13. Budget Press Conference, January 2017.

14. WB, SCEM, pp.12-19.

15. Interview in Aljareeda Daily, 30.1.2017, with the Secretary General of the Gum Arabic Council, Khartoum, Sudan.

16. Ali. op.cit.

17. Wail Ali, “Erasing of Subsidies; the ready prescription for failed states,” Gezira net, 2016.