Management:
Corporate
Strategy for Dramatic Productivity:
Negative Effects
of International Politics
by Professor
Emeritus Akira Ishikawa
Aoyama Gakuin
University, Tokyo, Japan
Former Dean,
GSIPEB
Senior
Research Fellow, ICC Institute, University of Texas at Austin
Doctoral
Program Chair
by Dr. Akira Ishikawa
With regard to Japanese defense power, which is also
closely associated with international politics, I would like to point out just
how much it differs from the defense capabilities of its neighboring countries.
As a conceptual framework to maintain international
peace and order, the theory known as Balance of Power was made much of in the
field of international politics, in particular after the 19th century. Mainly
championed by the UK, it was inherited in the 20th century when the Cold War was
taking place, and to this day, it remains influential.
The results of the research conducted by Organski,
Kugler and others are well known. Upon examining the Franco-Prussian War, Russo
Japanese War, World War I, and World War II and analyzing the conjectured national
powers of nations 20 years prior to the outbreak of each of those wars, the
political scientists found that the incidence rate of a war occurring was more
than 50% between nations whose military powers varied by more than 20%.
In that case, what would we see if we compare
national powers between Japan and its neighboring countries, particularly in
the area of defense capabilities?
As partly shown in Diagram No. 1 of the 2010 Defense
White Paper (5 pages) appearing in Fig. 51.1, North Korea’s armed forces, which
was responsible for attacking Korea’s Yeonpyeongdo Island, killing many, including
private citizens and soldiers, is estimated to comprise of an army of one
million soldiers (27 divisions), an air force of 620 planes, along with 63
submarines and more than 10 nuclear warheads with at least 10 nuclear
facilities and missile bases in eight places. The military is also in
possession of dozens of missiles named Taepo Dong Type 2 and Type 1 (which are
estimated to have flying distances of 6,700 km), the Nodong, the BM25 Musudan
(flying distance of 3,000 km), and the Scud-B&C (flying distances of 300
km–650 km).
Notes:
1. These datasets are extracted from the publicly
disclosed materials of the US Department of Defense, including one titled Military Balance (2010) (For the end of 2009, the figures
for Japan reflect its actual forces)
2. The land-based military force of the United
States Armed Forces stationed in Japan and Korea refers to the total number of soldiers
in the army and the Marine Corps.
3. With regard to combat aircraft, naval
carrier-capable are included.
4. The figures in the brackets indicate the total
number of basic military units, such as divisions and brigades. With North
Korea, only divisions are reflected. With Taiwan, MPs are included.
5. With regard to the United States Seventh Fleet,
the indicated military forces are those that have forward deployment in Japan and
Guam.
Fig. 51.1 The overall situation of the military
powers in the Asia-Pacific region
Source: Ministry of Defense, Intensification of
international competition and the need for innovation, 2010, Defense White
Paper.
Of course, China’s military capabilities are
incomparably more than North Korea’s, as it has a total of approximately
1,600,000 soldiers, 10,000 marines, a naval force made up of 950 ships, an air
force made up of 1,950 planes, along with 46 Intercontinental ballistic
missiles ( ICBMs), 35 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles ( IRBMs), 725
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) in addition to 12 submarine launched
ballistic missiles. Clearly, China’s armed forces are far superior to North
Korea’s forces.
Furthermore, with regard to Russia, even if we
underestimate its capabilities, we can say that it possesses approximately
5,600 nuclear warheads, 489 ICBMs, 180 SLBMs, and even if we don’t take into
account the rest of its military power, the nation secures a military capacity
that far
outstrips that of China.
But that is not all. In both India and Pakistan, the
number of nuclear warheads that Japan lacks is estimated to be at least 50. In
other words, Japan’s military pales in comparison to the total military power
or nuclear capabilities of neighboring countries in East Asia whose sizes show
a
double-digit difference.
From the perspective of the Balance of Power theory,
Japan has been totally dependent on the United States to counter the most
important part of this extreme asymmetry, while walking the extremely dangerous
tightrope of having to trust the good will of its neighboring countries.
Amid such a military milieu, Japan has no other
options for survival but to fully trust the security provided by the American
nuclear umbrella and develop super-weapons far superior to nuclear weapons, or
increase the nation’s information gathering capability to an extremely high
level.
One potent and simple means to strengthen and
maintain this capability is to utilize a sufficient number of
information-gathering satellites. Currently, Japan’s information-gathering
satellites are in orbit at a height that is 400 km to 600 km higher than that
of American satellites, but then
it is still necessary for Japan to have its
satellites orbit at the ultra-high altitude of approximately 20,000 km like the
global positioning satellite cluster and communication satellite networks, or
add self-defense 310 Corporate Strategy for Dramatic Productivity Surge capabilities
to counter-attack or evade enemy attacks, or continually prepare complimentary
satellites.
Furthermore, in the event of an emergency, Japan
must be in a state of readiness by developing a technology that can destroy
satellite clusters orbiting at ultra-high altitudes. As some commentators on
military affairs have suggested, the need to establish an Aerospace
Self-Defense Force is necessary to aim for using the realm of outer space.
The reason for this is that if these satellite
clusters and satellite networks were to be destroyed, guiding precision smart
bombs and missiles, and determining positions of aircraft and vessels will
become difficult, making it impossible to successfully wage modern warfare, a
system that
is linked to computer networks.
Note:
Chapter 3 of Part I, Chapter 16 and Chapter 23 of
Part II, Chapter 36, Chapter 42,
and Chapter 51 of Part III are all based on essays
in the “Seminar” column of
THE NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN. Their respective dates of
publication are
8 December 2010, 3 March 2010, 19 January 2011, 12
January 2011, 5 January
2011, 15 December 2010, 22 December 2010, and 26
January 2011.
Bibliography:
1. Kazuhisa Ogawa, Japan’s War Capability, Ascom,
2005.
2 . Nobuhiko Ochiai, Urgent warning — The Nation
Will Die, Shogakukan, 2003.
3. Nobuhiko Ochiai, The Birth of a Nation with the
Best Information Strategy, Shogakukan, 2007.
4. Buntaro Kuroi (editor), The Total Picture of the
American Information Agency, JAPAN MILITARY REVIEW, July 2006 supplemental
issue, World Intelligence, Vol. 1, JAPAN MILITARY REVIEW, 2006.
5. Masaru Kotani (editor), World Intelligence —
Deciphering the information wars of the 21st century, PHP Institute, 2007.
6. Eisuke Sakakibara, Japan Will Fall, Asahi
Shimbun, 2007.
7. Toshiyuki Shikata, Japan Cannot Survive in this
Situation, PHP Institute, 2007.
8. Defense Research Center (compilation),
International Military Data 2008–2009, ASAGUMO NEWS, 2008.
9. Gen Nakatani, The Truth About the Ministry of
Defense No One Was Able to Write About, Gentosha Literary Publication, 2008.
10. Ministry of Defense (compilation), 2010 Edition:
Japan’s Defense — Defense White Paper, GYOSEI, 2010. Available at http://www.clearing.mod. go.jp/hakusho_data/2010/2010/figindex.html
(20110528)
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