Culture: Political Science:
Misunderstood Myanmar: Chapter III: The Milieu Interieur (Part III) By Koh Kim Seng, Ph.D. International Business Executive, Political
Scientist Singapore Editor’s Note:
This paper is the sixth of a series of chapters excerpted from Dr. Koh’s book,
‘Misunderstood Myanmar: An Introspective Study of a Southeast Asian State in
Transition’. With years of experience operating a business in Myanmar (Burma),
Dr. Koh has first-hand knowledge and a deeply practical understanding of the
economic and administrative opportunities and challenges currently existing in
the country. This segment explains Myanmar’s internal affairs scenario. –JP Addendum
Notation: Chapter 3 has been divided into three segments, the third of which is
presented here; the first and second segments of Chapter 3 were published in
the two preceding issues of this Journal. - JP But how could and how did the Tatmadaw perform the way it did being in effect practically hard
authoritarian or autocratic without having some kind of “rebellion” from the
populace or even from within its ranks?, I asked the group. Brother replied: “From the anecdotes I related, you
will see that whenever there has been a crisis, it was the Tatmadaw that stepped in to resolve the problem. Indeed the Tatmadaw has been labelled by locals or written about by
foreigners, as having been the ‘Saviour’ of the Country and this is a
fact.” “This notwithstanding, both locals as well as
foreigners advocating a change in government are perfectly conscious of the
fact that the Tatmadaw is very much a
part of the governing equation and the Generals are part of the control system
of the country. Hence any precipitous
change of Government will throw everything out of gear. What is perhaps true, is that there is a
general sense of Orwellianism pervading the atmosphere but this is only because
admittedly the Tatmadaw tends to
operate on a rather Cicerosian philosophy of
“oderint dum metuant” -- i.e.,
let them hate as long as they fear – something Myanmar learnt from the former
colonialists, good or bad, I am not certain.
This for those who are au fait with Myanmar, is truly a necessity
because if you let go freely, before you can say Jack Robinson, ‘mischief’
occurs.” “It is therefore “a means to keep everyone on the
straight and narrow,” interjected Sir, who added, “indeed even with this we
still have the occasional bombs exploding.” Brother then continued, “now to address your other
query, about the possibility of a rebellion from within the Tatmadaw. This possibility, though we are aware that
many are wondering (and perhaps hoping that it comes to pass) is a piped
dream. Let me offer you reasons based on
training and culture. Our military
training is such that ‘total obedience’ is the norm of our governance policy –
be it the military or government. Hence
commanders and other leaders always have the last say. You might say that it is a case of power or
might is right. This maxim existed even
in the days when we were colonized, and after that during independence when we
had to fight what was classified the “Deep red communists,” that is the
communist Party members. This was drummed into me even when I was a young
officer. The public will confirm this
and even the Myanmar scholar Dorothy Hess Guyot made the observation of how the
Japanese in their time experienced Myanmas’ absolutist or stubborn streak (oddly
enough probably tutored by the Japanese themselves through Dr. Ba Maw) whence
the philosophy of ‘tathway, tathan,
tamient’ – one blood, one voice, one command got into its psyche.” “I know you have once quoted Governor Dalhousie on
how he saw Burmans as being the most arrogant people in the East and the most
pertinacious in the pursuit of it, not excluding in his estimation of our
pretensions over it. If this holds water
and the Tatmadaw is responsible for
the defense and therefore the integrity of the State, should it not be tough
and mindful of any external interference and local disturbance so that the Tatmadaw government has to practice a
hierarchical, top down and autocratic form of governance? And by the way, if you know political
philosophy it is quite different from what some scholars term us as being
‘totalitarian’ or ‘fascist’ when indeed our main political party in the old
days was named AFPFL (Anti Fascist People’s Freedom League). Perhaps one might call our system strong
authoritarianism or more properly ‘oligarchic authoritarianism’ if you like.” “Now it is quite clear that any “rebellion” from
within is not possible because the Tatmadaw
operates on the adage of “Nwa Kwe Kya
Kiak/Swe,” that is, where one or two
cattle stray from the herd it makes it food for the tiger, and this is well
drummed into each and every soldier.
Hence any hope of a fracture from within is improbable unless there is a
neglect of the welfare of the populace because any ‘stand alone’ (as opposed to
united) policy if put into practice would prove disastrous. I hope you now have a pretty good overview of
the philosophy, structure, role and position of the Tatmadaw in the history and development of Myanmar and it is up to
you and future generations of Myanmar and Myanmar scholars / analysts /
watchers to extrapolate where Myanmar will go with its Tatmadaw.” Sensing that the gathering, having heard the
responses, felt the meeting had ended, I quickly interrupted with, “I have no
doubt that all of you are fully aware that many foreign Myanmar watchers have
the impression and indeed criticize the Junta
Generals for considering themselves egoistically as being superior to civilians
and all others and of egoistically proclaiming that only the military can save
the Country from disintegration. Indeed
I recall on a number of occasions when not only Generals but also bureaucrats
have said that even spirits would defer to generals. In many ways, I do get the same impression. What do you feel is the answer to such
criticisms?” This time BG. Myo Than replied in his very debonair
way that, “to take your second point first, as you have just heard from
Brother, history has proven that indeed this is the reality of the position. The Tatmadaw
has always emerged to save the Country!
It is thus in a pole position but candidly not necessarily a nationally enamored
position especially by those who feel rightly or wrongly that they have been
disenfranchised. Every Myanma knows that
but for the Thakins, the Tatmadaw, we would have continued to be
a colony even though historically by the late 1940s whether or not in fact the
British could have continued to keep Myanmar (and for that matter India) as
colonists, is a matter for conjecture. The fact is that it was the Tatmadaw that fought for Independence
and returned it at least in part to its past glory of its independent status if
not its total Mandala and galactic state position.” He continued, “after all, I can tell you that if you
look into our Archives you will find that in our ancient history when under
attack by Sir Archibald Campbell’s forces in the Rangoon Area, our military
under General Bandula held on in spite of heavy odds, preaching to his men the
gospel that in the event they lost the battle, it must be only because of the
loss of its Supreme Commander (i.e. Bandula himself) and not for any other
reason – certainly not because the British is a superior force, and every
Myanma who has studied history knows this.” “On your first point, this is something which is
rather complex which I am afraid analysts particularly of the western mould or
indeed occidental scholars will take a very, very long time to comprehend
partly because of their own ethnocentricity.
It is not a question of egocentricity on the part of Generals but rather
one which lies in the religio-cultural sphere of Myanmas. Perhaps in an occidental way I might say that
this question of ‘superiority’ is a
zero-sum game; one of complementarity; of culture imbued in Confucianism –
punishment never being served up and courtesy never extended down and yet no
one consciously goes out to demand either.
Basically we have no illusion that we should never lead the emperor but
only serve him. This is the reason why we have so often maintained that those
attempting to write and analyze Myanmar politics and development should never
do so until they have taken the trouble to understand our religion, culture,
history. From this point of view a
Myanmar scholar wrote that Myanmas are inherently unable to serve as ‘internal
observer and constructive critic’46 and do
you agree with this after some 20 years with us?? “Perhaps you might undertake some research on how
many writers on Myanmar are anthropologists. You will find that most are
political scientists, historians with a couple of (local) economists who have
had some foreign exposure but who are out of touch with government policies
both pre -1988 and post -1988. Most
depend on secondary material as well as most dangerously, the rumor mill, as
basis for their work.” “But what then of culture and religion from the
Generals’ point of view although I have experienced a fair number of situations
which are rather complex to comprehend in my own western-orientated,
scientifically-trained mind,” I interrupted. BG. Myo Thant’s response was, “even though we are
Buddhists, historically Hinduism by virtue of trade exchanges since the second
century BC has had great influence on Myanmar and you know our leaders have
always been accorded the status of the Bhodisattava
(future Buddha). Indeed the son of King
Anirddha, Kyanzittha was referred to as such in a number of stone
inscriptions. Also for Myanmas the King
has always been a Chakravatin
(Universal Monarch), a Dhammaraja (King of Buddhist Law), so that he is
endowed with practically divine power as well as some “magical” power. Generals are considered by people as being an
equivalent of kings. Hence this is
perhaps why people treat Generals with awe and respect and accord them dues
which sometimes I feel are over the top.
These facts you will be able to gather from the writings of a few
scholars and perhaps you have read them.”47
“But,” BG. Myo Thant continued, “let me tell you
what is perhaps less known, and that is our traditional belief is manussutta bawa dullaba, that is, the
golden opportunity of rebirth as a human being is as rare as it is precious and
hence the belief in the sanctity of the human being and its inherent dignity
and value and therefore by this anything is possible since the result is
reincarnation positively. This
particular philosophy was presented as an Ideological Defense Working Paper at
a National Security Council Meet in 1959.”47 I then returned to the question, or rather
accusation, of “General’s egocentricity,” in spite of which it is noted that
they appear to have to “humor” Sangha members.
BG. Myo Thant responded thus, “as a researcher, you
must know of concrete examples in Myanmar history where civilians (not too many
of them) have reached high positions and have Endeavour to run the Country;
these far and large have resulted in ruination.
Just think of Dr Ba Maw, U Saw and even U Nu. Their terms of office have
been very short and problematic. As for
generals who might have ‘come to grief,’ it is because they probably did not
continue to do good in their present life, and the karmic force which was responsible for their high positions ran
out. Karma
is rather like accounting. There is a
debit and a credit side, with good deeds – making sacrifices, giving donations,
building monasteries, supporting the Sangha
– these give credit. Not doing good
deeds, increases the debit side. And if
one actually does bad acts he accumulates bad karma – Yadaya Chay.” Sir, obviously bearing in mind BG. Myo Thant’s and
Brother’s accounts, butted in and said, “now on your observation of generals
visiting monasteries to offer gifts and to pray, you might like to know that
this is not peculiar to Myanmar Generals only.
You may like to know generally in Buddhist-inclined countries this is a
very common occurrence. On a very, very
confidential basis, in a regional country, in two of its most recent coups d’etat, its military leaders were
in Yangon praying at the Aung Myay
(Victory Corner) of the Shwedagon
Pagoda, after which they returned to their country and the following day the
coups were executed successfully.” Citing Daw Ni Ni Myint’s work, Sir further
explained: “Also not only do our Generals pay respect to the Sangha members and their leaders, –
“abbots” – but also the British appeared to realize the potency of the Sayadaws’ influence and power. In the time of Lord Dufferin, for example,
the British too ‘humored’ the Sangha
(even if with their shoes on in and around Pagodas / Monastries48), during the Burmese struggle against
British Imperialism 1885 - 1895. They
got the Thattanabaing from Upper
Myanmar to visit Yangon so that he could exert his authority over the Sayadaws of Lower Myanmar. Furthermore the British also utilized their
services to curb [sic] the
anti-British resistance movement as in the case of having the Thathanabaing in Mandalay declare that a
certain Sayadaw who had assisted a
pakan ‘Prince’ to create an uprising was a man whom pongyis should not associate with!
49 So you see we too work with the Sangha.”
Brother added, “one of the key functions of the Tatmadaw to ensure that the primary aim
of the Government to achieve peace, stability, order and security prevail
within, among and between the diverse ethnic groups, is achieved - Myanmar
being a very heterogeneous nation. The Tatmadaw you might say must serve as the
‘UN of Myanmar’ in Myanmar, and incidentally this is why you will find in the
‘7-Point Road Map’ to a Democratic Government, that 25% of the seats in
Parliament are reserved for the Tatmadaw.”51 Seen in the light of the above exposition by my
respondents, some of whom had worked very closely with the key decision making
Generals in the past, it is inevitable that, as Lee Kuan Yew concluded after
the crackdown on the NLD in May 1966, that at the end of the day, “the
Opposition in Burma has to face the realities in life. The one instrument of effective government
there is the army50.” I then posed the subject of how I had queried one
senior bureaucrat in charge of the clearing of cemeteries for the construction
of roads, especially where it is known that the site is haunted, what he would
do because “In Malaysia and Singapore, contractors will not undertake the
contract, causing project delays”. The
bureaucrat told me in Myanmar, he has, “no problem as long as the order came
from a high ranking official like a General.” I enquired if this is a fact and
the reason for it. BG. Myo Thant replied, “This is true because the
sense has always culturally been that Generals are people of high karma and therefore are powerful so that
whatever the ghost, it will defer to Generals.
Naturally some prayers would have to be offered.” “On the other hand,” I remarked, “whenever generals
leave their bases and visit another area, one of the first things they do is to
visit a monastery and ‘pay obeisance’ to the Sayadaw and deliver ‘offerectories’ (gifts) to them. Does it imply that Sayadaws are more powerful than the Generals even though I can see
logically that Sayadaws have their
pongyis and lay ‘flock’ who owe some ‘allegiance’ to them if nothing else and
playing ball with Sayadaws makes
sense?” BG. Myo Thant’s response to my remarks on visiting
monasteries was, “it is generally felt that “[T] he spirits or ghosts are
subservient to military officers (generals) because such people are ‘high’ and
if they ordered construction over a ‘ghost infected’ area, the ghost would
‘concede.’ There is no retribution,51 if that is what you are getting
at.” It thus seems to me that military
officers believe they have control and influence not only over what is seen and
known on the countenance of their land but also of that which is unseen and
unknown. The reference to “unseen and unknown”
in Mansell’s work on the paranormal52 applies here it seems. The Generals appear to believe that such is
their ‘unseen and unknown’ power and omnipotence. In addition, BG. Myo Thant responded as follows to
my remarks on visiting monasteries: “You are observant and indeed we make it a
point to pay our respects to the Sayadaws
but your interpretation is all too secular even if politically it is only right
to court everybody.” He then went on to elucidate his point: “But let me inform you what is really in the
deep subconscious and culture of every Myanma which causes them to put Generals
on the pedestal. This is Buddhism which
forms the superstructure and substructure of every Myanma’s psyche and this
includes that of our Generals. This is Karma and the impact of Karmic forces. “ Brig. Gen. Myo Thant continued with, “while nature
and nurture do play a part in our development as military officers, these in
themselves are dependent on a force superior to nature because the nature
aspect itself is controlled by the karmic
force of what one did in the previous life.
It is this karma which is
responsible for the pon, awza and the ana characteristics which keep military
officers superior and this position can be maintained and improved on (or
perhaps lost depending on one’s actions) in the current life.” At this point I barged in, commenting that,
“Civilians too do reach high positions in life and likewise there are Generals
who get knocked.” Sir countered, “It is
true civilians too can be endowed with such merits if their karma has been good but unlike generals
who are prepared to sacrifice life and limb for the Country, you will find very
few civilians in really high positions and even when in high positions they are
not accorded the same status and respect.” Sir continued, “how many can you name in Myanmar’s
history even going back to the pre-colonial days who have been granted the same
respect as Generals and for how long, even if ever?” BG. Myo Thant then
illustrated his point by referring to the Governments run by Dr. Ba Maw, U Saw,
U Nu, etc., all of whom being civilians and obviously of high karma because of their past lives;
nevertheless they did not persist in accumulating, over their present lives and
by their actions, karma so that yadaya chay developed and the Country
did not make progress under their tenure nor did they last long. Indeed he
thought the civilian governments torpedoed the very foundations of governance,
as in the case of the “AFPFL Split.” After some twenty years of dealing with both the
Generals and Myanmas in general, what is clear to me is that as Ileto pointed
out, even in history, the Sangha Sametgyi of the organization of political
works was the Sangha Sametgyi of the
organization of political monks and was prophesied to be the Setkya Min representing the cosmic-center
of the empire of the world. Moreover
there are expectations of the Maitreya
Paya Alaung bringing about a perfect Buddhist society. These and the
forceful and nonchalant way the British brought about the fall of the Konbaung
Dynasty 53 linger in the collective memory of the
Generals (and the people). So why should the Generals not prudently venerate
the Sayadaws, one might ask, perhaps? As
Sarkisyanz has noted, in the context of the struggle for independence, Buddhism
represented a religious means for attaining political ends as far as members of
the intelligentsia were concerned, whereas for the majority traditionalists,
Buddhism represented a political vehicle towards attaining a religious end54.
Finally, with respect to the military which operates
a monopolistic state, which by its very nature implies authoritarianism and
state political hegemony rather in line with Castell’s (1992) concept of
developing states (or states in transition), there is hardly any necessity to
pretend to be legitimate as far as the acquiescence of their subjects are
concerned. This “legitimacy” may be
exercised for society, especially in a case which is not yet fully aware of its
destiny and interests.55 No doubt, however, the humanism of Buddhism
will modulate all actions taken by the Junta. My long exposure to them has persuaded me
that they are perfectly aware of this.
These issues concerning the boundaries of the humane may be summarized
in the oft repeated Myanmar philosophy of: “once you have eaten one grain of
rice from someone, you must never forget it!” And they do not. In point of fact, even to get rid of rabid
dogs running around Yangon/Mandalay, two sets of meat - one laced with a poison
(which I usually supply) and the other a piece of normal meat - are placed side
by side for the dogs to consume so that those in charge are not guilty of being
“inhumane,” taking a life or killing a living being, because it is up to the
dog to choose! Brother mentioned how there are
some scholars who are aware that Myanmar is serious about developing a modern,
democratic state and not engaging in Fabian tactics. To reinforce his point he
suggested, “read the August 1st, 2003 issue of the Nation Column and
you will find Professor Jeffrey de Celte from Columbia University saying that
‘the US needed to rethink planned sanctions against Burma!’ Also in the International Herald Tribune
dated 9th September 2003, Professor Brigitte Wells writes,
‘sanctions worsen Burma poverty.’ On the
push, especially by foreign parties, for change, Brother said that, the Hon.
Senior General, Than Shwe is on public record as follows: “We have no intention
of prolonging the process (of democratization) unnecessarily. If we receive
international assistance and support, the process of establishing a democratic
system in our country will be speeded up. But if there is a hostile attitude
from other countries, the process of democratization could be prolonged.
However, we on our part, have no intention whatsoever to unnecessarily prolong
this process.” “So why should anyone doubt?” Sir queried. Following this,
Brother added: “From the above it can be seen that it is worthwhile for all
those pushing for rapid change in the system, including the removal of the Tatmadaw in the Country’s developmental
process, to be cognizant of the Myanmar political culture, history, landscape
and ground conditions. Any student of Myanmar’s developmental trajectory must
bear these points in mind. Without citing specific scholars, Myanmar
watchers/analysts and international professionals and governments, it is too
well known that the pressure on the Military Junta is principally to
democratize and liberalize a’la West.
For this, the much touted starting point is the handing over of power to Aung
San Suu Kyi’s NLD Party because they ‘won’ the General Election held in 1990
and this ostensibly would be the panacea of all of Myanmar’s problems.” Brother continued, “then there is the accusation of
Human Rights abuse and the ‘cure’ for this problem is trade and other sanctions
laid out by the Americans? But we must
persist against these odds and soldier on and by the way it is not as though we
do not try to accommodate Aung San Suu Kyi or that she is not aware why a
handover of governance is not possible.” On delving more deeply into the question of the
relationship between the Junta Generals and the Sangha, it seems that some of my key respondents are aware of the Sangha Sametyi and the prophecy of the coming of the Setkya Min, which
makes the King/Throne presumably considered in modern terms as being
represented by the No.1 General (and indeed all generals). When we add to this
BG. Myo Thant’s reference to the influential U Pa Murak of the U Yin Tauk
Monastery and of his reference to him having considered that politics is
Buddhism and Buddhism is politics, the inevitable conclusion must be that the
nexus between Generals and Sangha is
tight and that it would at least account for their visits to monasteries, as
part of the tacit “protocol” whenever they are on outstation visits. “But
Brother”, I interjected, “what seems incongruent to me is that ostensibly the
State-Sangha relationship from what I have heard thus far is more than cordial.
Indeed looking at State Television, I cannot help seeing how Generals venerate
Sayadaws, yet in September 2007, the “Saffron Revolution” occurred! In
point of fact I was caught in a traffic jam at a road junction in Mandalay
caused by some 1,000 monks marching five abreast. There must have been 1,000 of
mainly 20-30 year olds with few 40-50 years old. They marched barefooted,
orderly, some chanting but most appeared rather “disinterested” being more concerned
with attending to the problem caused by the hot sun – wiping their perspiration
and obviously feeling the discomfort of the hot road. Following
my description, Brother responded with, “this is a fair point you have raised.
We can assure you that the State-Sangha relations are the best. The September
2007 “anomaly” is the result of mainly militant pongyis who had crossed our
borders to a foreign country and were instigated and supported by foreign
elements which I cannot mention but which perhaps you can guess. We have been
having problems with it for some years at the border. What is most unusual in
that generally, after early morning alms collection monks are not permitted to
leave their monasteries and yet these pongyis (monks) were out on the streets
even during mid-day and to ensure that the problem was contained the relevant
Law was applied to stop the march which in some areas in Yangon was turning
rowdy. After controlling the street rioting, we got down to the roots of the
matter and found some arms and ammunitions in some monasteries. We then
informed and called upon the State Sangha Council members to inform them of the
problem, seeking their opinion as to whether the problem ought to be resolved
in a religious way i.e. by the Sangha Council or by the State/Government. The
response positively was that the problem was not a religious one but rather, a
political one55. Hence it was the
Government which would be the appropriate authority to deal with the
“recalcitrant” monks and so indeed we did”. Indeed,
when it comes to the preservation of the unassailable position of the Junta and its leaders, no stone is left
unturned. It is incumbent on the
Generals to secure maximum karma and
in this instance one of the top leaders even acted as Patron of the Boddhi
Tatung (1,000 Buddhas) Monastery in Monywa, the Chief Abbott of which is the
renowned and highly respected AGGAMAHA SADDHAMMAJOTIKADHAZA BHADDANTA NARADA
MAHABAWDHITATAUNG SAYADAW, or simply known as Sayadaw U Narada. With his
urging, the LAYKYUN SSETKYAR BUDDHA IMAGE, a 424ft high, - 380 ft high image
sitting on a 44ft base/throne - the highest standing Buddha image in the world
which took some 13 years to make, was finally completed and “commissioned” in
February 2008. The patronage ostensibly
was to confer prolonged rule, good health and success for the Patron and his
family, among others. Equally
interesting is the fact that the desire for “karma”
is not peculiar just to Myanmas only so that their monasteries are kept so
sacred and as a place of repose for all reasons and at all seasons. This applies also to a number of ASEAN and
South/North Asian States. The earlier
story of top military leaders of a country in the region praying at the Yangon
Shwedagon Pagoda a couple of days before executing a successful coup in their
country demonstrates the esteem held upon certain very holy and “accurate”
monasteries. Military
leaders could sometimes be at the receiving end of the abovementioned religious
or superstitious practices, as Brother intimated in the following story. According to him, there was an attempt to
undermine the position of the top Generals of the Junta in very recent times.
In this case under the practice of Yadanache56 (small changes made to effect major
changes or to change the luck/fortune of a person) the services of a very well
known Auklan-saya (an occult
practitioner) was secured, to plot the downfall of the Generals. As soon as the information leaked out, Sir
added, “I was told that the parties to be adversely affected immediately sought
the services of an Ahtetlan-saya
(Sayagyi Maung Shein) an equally renowned practitioner to counter any moves
which had been made by the Auklan saya. Simultaneously the Auklan-saya’s house was raided and the paraphernalia consisting of
golden statues (each with a square horoscopic chart of the subject to be targeted
at its base, the In), fashioned in
the image of the people to be ‘punished,’ were seized. The Auklan-saya was sentenced to 27 years jail for the occult practice,
after a trial.” On
the matter of the role and position of the Tatmadaw,
I asked the final question of what the problems might be for the Tatmadaw Generals. BG. Myo Thant’s response was, “those who
write and analyze Myanmar’s Tatmadaw,
in subjective focus lack the comprehension of our history, culture, psyche and
ethics. In objective terms they do not
understand the internal dynamics of our State governance and politics. This is partly the legacy and burden of our
colonial past and of our colonial past actors currently impinging and
distorting the perceptions of locals and foreigners.” BG.
Myo Thant continued, “the Tatmadaw
Generals have no problems except in facing foreigners who feel that they are
God’s nominated agents of change without realizing that there is a time for
everything and that the Tatmadaw and
its Generals will decide the appropriate time because historically when under
threat from both external and internal forces it was always the Tatmadaw that saved the day.” Brother rounded the session off by saying, “I
hope it is obvious to you that the very philosophy abetted by our culture implies that succession in the Tatmadaw will, ― unlike those who
do not understand the psyche and tradition of the Tatmadaw / Government leaders and the military structure so that
they talk in terms of a ‘coup’ ― always be an orderly affair. In fact, as
you know, there is no need for ‘military coups’ when there are other
‘non-bloody’ forms – ‘non – traditional security threats’ - as you have just
heard, available, although Generals need not and do not indulge in these. We just pay homage and pray at proper
monasteries to Buddha.” En Route to Democratizing Myanmar
Experience of the practice of democratic
governance and laisseize faire economics inherited from the British,
post independence, proved chaotic to Myanmar. Indeed Gen. Ne Win who was the personification
of the Tatnadaw had to step in, two times, in 1958 and again in 1962 by
applying a tough top down, authoritarian form of governance so admired by his
former collogue and leader Gen. Aung San – the Heibei Kyoku system. This
despite in Western tradition, the military would steer clear of any
governmental, political, economic and governance areas of a state. Likewise
Gen. Ne Win held that laissaize faire economics served to enrich
foreigners at the expense of locals by their utilizing all sorts of commercial
tricks like undeclaration of commercial invoices and considering that the key
element, rice was readily available and people would not starve, self
dependence, undependent of any import would be feasible. This took Myanmar down
the autarkic road.
Considering the pivotal role of the Tatmadaw in Myanmar’s political,
economic and sociological spheres not to mention the maintenance of state
stability as illustrated in the foregoing ‘chats’, Gen. Ne Win’s move in the
direction of autocracy and autarky caused Myanmar to become of little
geopolitical and geo-economic significance to the international community so
that it posed no ideological political or geo-economic threat to any party and
no party took an interest in it. Its firm neutralist international relations
policy and low profile under Gen. Ne Win, who kept the internal politics
humming for quite a long while, led foreign scholars to mention facetiously
that if Myanmar had been totally devastated by an earthquake, the international
press would have reported, “Ne Win dies, takes Burma with him57”, implying that the Myanmar Military
acts much more than the normal military force of a democratic State so
everything is controlled by the military and that only one man counts.
Talking to various Junta
members, the sentiment that came through is that the role played by the Tatmadaw in governance is something
which has been thrust upon them by history and their predecessors. In the words of BG. Myo Thant, “we inherited
the work of the 30 Thakins, which formed the nucleus of the Tatmadaw. In recent years you have seen for yourself
the kind of sacrifices we have had to make over and after the 1988 riots, so
need we say more? Foreign forces project
the false image that our Junta is
having a good time and will hold on to power in a repressive way; that we will
not relinquish our hold. This is totally
wrong. Actually, the current Chairman of
the SPDC, Senior Gen. Than Shwe, in his first official interview with the press
in 1998 after the “8888 Conflagration” discussed several of the oft
misunderstood issues encountered by the State, the Government and its
people. During the interview, he stated
categorically, inter alia, ‘… my
genuine desire is to see our Country develop and prosper, and to see the
emergence of a democratic system’ 58”. BG. Myo Thant continued, “having been posted
of the goings-on in the world at large, but bearing in mind the somewhat unique
position of Myanmar, the Senior General Than Shwe was desirous to rectify
certain misconceptions pertaining to the policies and goings-on within the
Country. In this vein, he outlined our
Government’s policy saying: We are vigorously engaged in the national
reconstruction of this country. We are
working for our nation’s peace and development. At the same time, we are trying
to place our country on the path of democracy and to build a democratic
system. So, first, we have to establish
conditions for peace, tranquility and law and order. At the same time, as we are trying to
establish political stability; however, we must also hold up the economic
foundation of our nation. So we are
definitely trying to do both.” It seems that some people, especially locals who are influenced by
external forces were not quite satisfied with that, Sir said, “Gen. Than Shwe
had declared including his assurance that the Tatmadaw had no intention to … prolong the process unnecessarily.59” Though the standard view in western
democracies is that it is not normal for the armed forces to assume
responsibility for the State for any extended period of time, it may be worth
the while “to Endeavour to understand that because of the particular
circumstances and condition in Myanmar, the Tatmadaw
believes that it has to assume responsibility for a ‘certain period of
time,’” Sir added. Despite the
clarification and assurance that the military government’s aim was to move into
a democratic form of government, and to improve political and economic
condition within the State, some countries like the US decided to impose
sanctions on Myanmar (as will be discussed lengthily in subsequent
chapters). As cited previously, the
International Herald Tribune on 22 June 2004 quoted Professor Steinberg’s
article entitled, “How to Influence Myanmar: Sanctions may be satisfying, but
they do no good.” Steinberg’s call
suggests that certain informed scholars have been aware of goings-on in the milieu interieur of Myanmar. In sum, the
comprehension and ideals of some (but all too few) scholars seem to be in
relative accord with the policies of the military government. It seems that Myanmar cannot be more explicit
in its political and economic ideologies than what has been committed and
guaranteed by the Senior Gen. Than Shwe in his press conferences as narrated by
Brother, when he reiterated that “having international assistance and support
will greatly facilitate our economic and political endeavors and will also help
to build a democratic system more quickly, by facilitating the handing over of
state power back to the people. We could reach this goal within three years.” The conditions
for the transition to the oft declared move towards a “modern democratic state”
are clear, at least according to my key respondents. Given that the Minorities/National Races,
secessionists, insurgency, narco-problems are resolved; given that the
disengagement and non-interference of foreign forces and/or the termination of
the bankrolling of opposition political forces by foreign parties occur, the
transition to “modernity/democracy” will be set in motion even faster. In such circumstances, there should be no
reason to be suspect or assume that the fulfillment of Myanmar’s Seven-point
Road Map to Democracy would be aborted or that there would be any reason to
take the Senior General’s commitments cum
grano salis. On the contrary,
this should be taken by foreign powers that are meddling in the internal
affairs of Myanmar as warning that their much touted desire for a democratic
governmental process in Myanmar is determined, paradoxically, not entirely by
the Myanmar Government but also by fiddles they either play or do not play,
that is, largely dependant on them. Time and again, in informal chats on the
subject of transition to a modern, democratic liberal state, with a broad
spectrum of government members of SLORC/SPDC, what came through repeatedly is
that they are disappointed that foreign governments, especially, and even many
Myanmar scholars, seem to be unaware of which countries were involved in what
the military Junta considers the
sacred document, namely, “The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” crafted
and endorsed by Zhou En Lai, Nehru and U Nu, in 1954. In point of fact on one occasion, a former
Minister of Information seemed a little “irritated” when the issue of change
and democracy was raised by me and he remarked, “read the ‘Five Principles’ and
you will see that the sacred cow is the non-interference in the internal
affairs of member states. Also, do you
know that this Document is the germ of the Bandung Conference and the precursor
document of the Non-Aligned Movement?
Let me also let you in on another point.
There is a move to revive/review the basic concepts on the 50th
Anniversary, i.e., in the year 2004.”
Admittedly, I felt a lot silly and ignorant, as a research student! In summary, the
Government in general and the Generals in particular have asserted in more ways
than one and on more occasions than one that they are on transit to a modern
democratic system of government.
Practically in every copy of The
New Light of Myanmar, the Government’s newspaper, this is declared but time
must be allowed for them to gain adequate confidence or alternatively to get
out of their “xenophobia”, in particular their “Anglophobia” or aversion to the
British politics, culture etc brought about so obviously by their past colonial
trauma. Any hard sell or push to move
quickly will only cause the Generals to withdraw into their comfort zone, clamp
up and ossify. In this situation perhaps
the best axiom to bear in mind is that, unlike first principles of geometry
wherein the shortest distance between two points is a straight line, in
politics the reality is (and especially with respect to Myanmar which is in the
books of the milieu exterieur, the
“xenophobe”) the longest distance between two points is the straight line, from
what I can see. Oversight of Governance
As the past is the
antecedent of the future, it would be instructive to have an introspection of
some of the phases of development, which undoubtedly have caused the SLORC/
SPDC military government to tread gingerly.
Indeed, in retrospect, there are frank admissions from former key
government officials self-tagged as “oversight” when referring to certain moves
undertaken in the exigency of the time, which are expounded below. First, B.G. Myo
Thant referred to the Multiparty Constituent Assembly General Election
(MCAGE) held within two years after it
assumed governance produced negative impacts such as internecine warfare,
clashes between the military government and the so called elected generally styled
“Opposition” and the conundrum of over-commitment and over-stretching in its
promise of the achievement of democracy.
In that context, on a number of occasions over friendly chats about
progress, or lack of it, made by the Government in its transition to
multi-party democratic form of government and economic liberalization,
Government members among my key respondents categorically mentioned that, “the
task was more difficult than had been anticipated.” This is embodied in the words of Brother as
follows: “The situation in 1988 was so critical that it was analogous to that
of the Shakespearean Desdemona falling in love with any first person who came
along including that of the Ass, Bottom.
The difference, if at all, is that foreign forces unaware of local
conditions of Communists opportunistically trying to grab the ground, supported
the local elements, thus unraveling the change we were trying to make.” Brother continued:
“Modernizing the economy without the appurtenant infrastructure in terms of financial
and technological capital and international connectivity in place was in itself
a gargantuan task. When added to this,
you have the local centrifugal forces financed by external forces, not
excluding the disenfranchised ‘Myanmar Diaspora,’ trying to change the
political system, post haste, to ‘political laissez
faireness,’ then you have an enormous problem.” I then enquired, “in what manner did this
affect Myanmar’s economic progress?” His
response was, “progress in both the economic and political fronts must
reasonably be expected to be derailed.
Even we did not anticipate the robustness of the reaction.” It appeared to me from the remarks of Brother
that the implication was that, since the Country was on the verge of an
anarchic state, “fire fighting” moves had to be made by the Government for
damage control. Ad hoc measures to appease the ground including announcements of
the implementation of “perestroika and
glasnost, mistakenly a là the West” were made to diffuse the
pressure and to remove the pervading sense of Orwellianism. To engender the
process, in quick succession roads were repaired and widened; urban slumps were
cleared – for which the Government was criticized, in spite of alternative
sites being provided (a sore point according to Sir) - buildings which were
left unkempt for years were required to be spruced up (owners were given
deadlines to do so, or Government teams would undertake the sprucing at a fee);
border trade with neighboring countries was opened; the all important agricultural
requirements were tended to and the patient looked well enough to go in for
major surgery – “the Multiparty Constituent Assembly General Election”
(MPCAGE), in BG. Myo Thant’s words, in the tradition of the past. From what I could
glean from my key respondents, a
posteriori, the ground was obviously misread. In spite of the removal of certain
“unacceptable personalities” and the ostensible appeasement of the populace
with the change of governmental system (the latter of which I suspect was not
“radical” enough), the impact of foreign intervention and support of what was
thought to have been a spent force – the “Opposition” made up of former
disenfranchised and sidelined government members including the most
unanticipated appearance of the charismatic alter ego of Gen. Aung San, Aung
San Suu Kyi – the remodeled /reincarnated “Government Party” lost the
(MPCAGE). A reappraisal, it
appears, revealed the potency of support or interference from external/foreign
parties on their local “satellites” - a key point, according to BG. Myo Thant,
“the Government might have borne in mind considering the ‘backroom maneuvers’
undertaken by some US senators’ (including that of Mr Solarz), direct
negotiations with the Government on the role of Aung San Suu Kyi in governance,
not to mention the unusual appearance of the six US naval vessels in the
Andaman Sea/Bay of Bengal area.” In BG.
Myo Thant’s view, the US wanted a “total handover of Government to NLD, which
of course was out of the question.” A second point brought
up by BG. Myo Thant was that the Government was unable to contain the
exaggerated peoples’ accusation of it indulging in Fabian tactics in moving
towards democratic governance and of the right or legitimacy of which of the
two protagonists should constitute the Government, that is the Junta or the Opposition NLD, the latter
of which had actually won a vast majority of the seats in the MPCAGE. A third point was
that convening - the nation into a National Convention in 1993 to set up a
Constitution was overly premature or, as some Government members put it, was a
case of “rush invariably producing rash.”
“While pressure to change on the ground was high,” as BG. Myo Thant puts
it, “the move to appease the ground and the decision to have the Constitution
written and taken so quickly do not appear to have been a very appropriate
move. It was perhaps reminiscent of the
rather precipitous ‘throw out’ of the British, for independence.” Interestingly enough, in this context, BG.
Myo Thant soliloquized: “Did history repeat itself?” I presume he was alluding to the much needed
but rather precipitous push in 1947 for Independence or even the 1974
Referendum/Election. BG. Myo Thant
continued with the fourth point - that the coming to terms between the Government
and the National Races/Minorities60 did
not work out as smoothly, satisfactorily nor quickly as had been anticipated
and indeed produced somewhat more issues than solutions. This is because the British Government made
the granting of Independence conditional upon a 10-year Secession Clause for
the Minorities to be incorporated in the Agreement. Considering this, some of
the National Races/Minorities were still gunning for their state independence
despite their original agreement to, by way of a top secret “Side Letter” (the
existence of which had been explained by Brother earlier), not to implement
this 10-year Secession Clause which had been entered into among and between the
parties. On this Brother lamented, “Old habits die hard. These people have been so used to running
their own affairs for such a long time and some like the Karens, Kachins had
been put in ‘privileged positions’ by the British, so it was obviously a little
difficult to swallow, being ‘controlled,’ despite the “Side Letter” to negate
this clause as I have explained previously and as Brother Myo Thant, reminded
again, not to mention their having signed a “Renunciation Treaty” on this
matter in 1959, and their leader’s receipt of heavy compensation to Minority
leaders by the Central Government, subsequently. This historical element along
with the lack of development in the Border Areas and egged on by external
elements to go independent, created problems unexpectedly.” Indeed from the discussion it appears that
some of my key respondents are not sure if succeeding generations within the
National Races/Minorities had been fully apprised of the real situation by
their forefathers so that, to quote Brother, “the younger leaders now probably
feel that we have taken them for a ride.” After hearing the
narrative, I enquired: “What is the secret “Side Letter” about which I have not
come across anywhere?” Brother replied:
“This is understandable because the Letter is top secret. Briefly, the top secret “Side Letter” which I
have never seen except on one occasion when the Senior General Saw Maung in a
discussion with me called it up to review. I saw that it was signed by Gen.
Aung San and the Mong Pang Sawbwa (the Chief Shan Spokesman), negating the
Secession Clause with the undertaking that they would always remain part of the
Union. This as you probably have seen in
a copy of our 1947 Constitution was included to achieve Independence as the
British wanted it so. You may recall I had explained this previously.” For this
slip, I apologized. Brother continued:
“In 1956 the Government came by a document by some Sawbwas entitled ‘The Shan
States and a Federal Policy,’ wherein an armed movement was planned along with
a Rebel Army. This turned out to be the
Shan State Army (SSA), which was being secretly organized. In 1959, the Shans started putting on the
heat on the Government, at which time all the Shan Chiefs were brought down to
Yangon and shown the ‘Side Letter Agreement.’ Having been persuaded, after
seeing the evidence, their governing authority was subsequently dissolved by a State
Notification; compensation was given to the leaders in full. Since then the
whole Country came under the Central Government/Administration in Yangon. I
hope the picture is clearer to you now.” Finally, in my
view all action taken without prior confidence-building measures (CBMs) between
the various factions probably caused some “suspicion/unhappiness.” Thus, for example, according to BG. Myo Than,
some opposing participants made the last point in the guidelines for the new
Constitution for which the National Convention was set up, a crucial and
critical issue. The last point which
became a bone of contention was the clause allowing the Tatmadaw a definitive role in the national political leadership; a
role which the Tatmadaw had in any
case played especially in times of crises or turmoil in Myanmar’s past history,
as the rakyat / populace itself
realizes. The end result was that the
NLD delegates decided to walk out and boycott the National Convention set up to
write the new Constitution. The question is, was the calling of the National
Convention premature and who should be held responsible for the delay in the
march to a democratic system of governance?, Sir queried. In sum, the
perception from the Government’s view point appears to be that the call for a
transition to democracy is a great idea but time and space are crucial
ingredients for a successful transition for, alas, should a mistake occur, the
consequences would be profound. Because
of this the Myanmar government had raised the perennial question of who would
underwrite the risks, come the time.
This is the dilemma posed for the Tatmadaw
and the Junta. As for Aung San
Suu Kyi’s persistent push for the rapid transition to democratization and all
the other western liberal ideas, the comment and prevailing sentiment from the
members of SLORC/SPDC camp, including that of Lt. Gen. Kyaw Ba,61 is that, in his words, “because of
ASSK’s overly long exposure to western influence, she has romanticized such
Western ideologies that they have become idée
fixe with her - no one can fail to see that there is more than a little
‘deculturization’ in her approach.” From
what I could make out, he meant that Aung San Suu Kyi is hardly “Myanmar”
anymore in her ways and her thinking and is quite out of touch with the ground. Political
liberalism must be driven, both internally and externally, with foreigners
playing important roles in bringing transparency and information especially to
a closed and isolated country, asserts David Steinberg. 62
The fact of the matter, historically, is that the Tatmadaw has always been the “savior” of the integrity of the State
and the vanguard of national independence and sovereignty for the Country, and
this is generally known not only by the people, but also by members of the
NLD. This slow pace of change is,
therefore, not generally a question of “delay” as some perceive it, 63 on the part of the Tatmadaw, assert some retired Government ministers, but more of the
“keeping of tradition.” On this I concur
as the government seems not to be “ready” because of the unsatisfactory past
experience of doing things precipitously.
Indeed, the NLD, including Aung San Suu Kyi herself, is conscious of
this fact, and of the fact that any progress to be made in the transition to a liberal
and democratic form of government, can only come about with the concurrence of
the SPDC and when the Country is fully ready for it. When asked, Brig. Gen. Myo
Thant speaking obviously on behalf of his colleagues present, expressed it
thus: “We cannot launch into another ill prepared 1990 Multiparty Constituent
Assembly General Election when all governmental institutions are not fully in
place.” This sentiment was unanimously
accepted. Additionally,
considering that it is well known that foreign forces are instrumental in
instigating and agitating change not to mention bankrolling the “oppositional
forces,” the country leaders are even more suspicious of what might happen if
they were to accommodate the NLD’s push.
The NLD itself is not unaware of this and of the fact that any
dissention within the Tatmadaw could
spell trouble for the Country. Equally,
based on the skepticism of my key respondents, the Tatmadaw is conscious of the fact that “the NLD is endeavoring to
generate trouble between and among the Tatmadaw
leaders, particularly the “Triumvirate”, so that an opportunity might arise for
it to strike,” in Brother’s view. “To put it simply,” as Brother commented, “any hurried
and aggressive push on Myanmar in the democratic transition particularly if it
is towards democracy a là the West,
and especially if supported by external elements, or for that matter, any
attempt of alignment with the NLD to push for overly rapid democratization,
will prove to be anathema to its very achievement.” Thus it became patently clear to me, based on
my experience communicating with some of the other policy makers, that any
“hawk” in Government pushing this line of “accommodation” with the NLD as well
as liberalizing / democratizing too rapidly or vigorously will, in my judgment,
be castigated because as stated earlier in this Thesis, the Junta members recall very distinctly the
causes for the collapse of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) over Gorbachev’s move towards the
overly rapid launch into Peristroika and
Glastnost. If we recall Brother’s
earlier comment on Tocqueville’s view that “the change from any autocratic
governance to a liberal/democratic system is perforce a hazardous one,” it
should not surprise us that for the Junta,
in Brother’s words again, a “middle road” has to be found and time must be
allowed for this. The happy position or
consolation is that none of the main actors has any illusion over this and all
opposing factions attuned to the culture should be cognizant of this. Editor’s Note:
Chapter 3 has been divided into three segments, the third of which has been
presented above; the subsequent chapter will be published in the following
issue of this Journal. - JP 46 My subsequent research revealed that this bit
came from David I. Steinberg, The Road to Political Recovery, The Salience of
Politics in Economics, in Burma: Prospects
for a Democratic ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Cambridge: The World Peace Foundation and Harvard
Institute of International Development, Washington D.C., Brooking Institute
Press, 1998) p.272. 47 Readings of references BG. Myo Thant made
have been checked and the relevant publications are : John Cady : Religion and Politics in
Modern Burma, Far Eastern Quarterly, p.6 Lucien Pye and Mary Pye: Asian Power and
Politics: The Cultural Dimension of Authority, Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1985. 47 Hawkers of Human Hope and Ideological Defense Working Paper presented at “The Conference of the National Security Council, 22nd
April 1959 by the Director of Education, Psychological Warfare, Ministry of Defense, Burma p.6. 48 The “Footwear Incident” is said to have been
one of the reasons for the fight for independence. When visiting monasteries or
the palace, all visitors are required to take off their shoes, something the
British refused to do and this was considered
disrespectful and caused great unhappiness among the locals. 49 Daw Ni Ni Myint – Burma’s struggle against
British Impalism 1885 – 1895. p.96/97. 51 E.Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Backgrounds of the
Burmese Revolution: The Hague/Martinus Nijhoff, 1965, p.135. 50 in Bertil Lintner, Narco–Politics in Burma, p.435 51 This view coincides with what U Kyi Win, the
former Joint Secretary of the Yangon City Development Committee (Yangon
Municipal Council) who was in charge of Yangon environmental health matters
including that of having to clear such “infected roads/areas.” He was also the
former Head of Cleansing, involving but not limited to crematorium services
for Yangon and faced this situation a
number of times. 52 Donald E. Mansell, The Unseen Unkown. 53 Reynaldo C.Ileto “Religion and Anticolonial
Movements” in N. Tarling Ed., The
Cambridge History of Southeast Asia
(Vol.2), (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992). 54 E Sarkisyanz, Freiburg University, Buddhist Background of the Burmese
Revolution, The Hogue/Martinces Nijof, 1965, p.135 55 Gillian Koh, Ooi Giok Ling, Relationships
between State and Civil Society in Singapore; Clarifying the concepts, assessing the ground, ISEAS, 2004,
P. 168/169. 55 In spite of the Sangha Council
attributing this to “political problem” some of the ring leaders were disrobed
by the Sangha Order before their imprisonment. 56 Golden statue in the image of the targeted
person is made; an “In” in the form of a square horoscopic chart of the subject
is placed at the base of the statue
which is then put on an altar (auklan.)
A gold or black candle (Mahadepan candle) is then lit and prayers are offered, whereupon the
problem for the target subject starts – sickness or accident or whatever
is desired. In this event 7
leaders/commanders were targeted. 57 Robert H. Taylor Myanmar: Military politics
and the prospects for Democratization, Asian Affairs Journal of the Royal Society for Asean Affairs, Vol. XXIX, Part 1
Pg.3 February 1998. 58 Reproduced in The New Light of Myanmar, 14 June 1998. 59 Ibid. 60 Although the expressions “minorities,
ethnics, ethnic minorities” had been widely used in early years, in more
recent times, post the 1988
Conflagration, the preferred expression is “National Races” as this gives a
more acceptable connotation of integration
of the Nation. 61 Lt. Gen. Kyaw Ba (Retd) is a former Regional
Commander and Minister of Hotels and Tourism/SLORC/SPDC Member. 62 David I. Steinberg,
“The Road to Political Recovery, The Salience of Politics in Economics,” in Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future, ed.
Robert I. Rotberg (Cambridge: The World Peace Foundation and Harvard Institute
for International Development,
Washington D.C., Brookings Institute Press, 1998), 269. 63 Specifically, the U.N. declares in a
statement that the Myanmar’s Roadmap to Democracy is bound to fail for failing
to set a timeline, ergo delaying the efforts. [ BWW Society Home Page ] © 2014 The Bibliotheque: World Wide Society |