Abstract

Based on the theory of subjectivity according to Guenther, a formal model of intersubjective communication is proposed and demonstrated on the glia-neuronal synapses (tripartite synapses) of the brain. Due to the double structure of tripartite synapses, the embodiment of subjective (volitive) subjectivity and objective (cognitive) subjectivity can be attributed to each synaptic component. The communication between subjective subjectivity (“I”) and objective subjectivity (“You”) is based on a cyclic proemial relationship, a novel type of relation that may underlie consciousness generating processes. Moreover, the cyclic proemial relationship between subjective  and objective subjectivity in tripartite synapses allows the description of an elementary mechanism for human-robot communication.

 

Key words: intersubjective communication, tripartite synapses, proemial relationship, human-robot communication

 

1. Outline of the model

 

The present paper is a further contribution to brain theory and robotics based on Guenther’s theory of subjectivity (Guenther 1976; Mitterauer 1998; 2010; 2013a,b; 2014, 2021). I start with this question: where and how in the brain could the basic interplay between the subjective and objective parts of subjectivity be generated, based on the dialectics of volition and cognition?

 

My hypothesis is that the interplay of the subjective subjectivity (“Ego”) and the objective subjectivity (“Thou”), or in other words, the dialectics of volition and cognition, already occurs on the synaptic level of the brain. Applying the model of a tripartite synapse, the glial component embodying the subjective (volitional) subjectivity and the neuronal component embodying the objective (cognitive) subjectivity can be described. The subjective volitional functions are formalized as ordered relations (→), the objective cognitive functions as exchange relations (⟷). Both synaptic components interact in a dialectic manner generating a cyclic “proemial relationship” (Guenther,1976). This novel type of relationship may underlie consciousness generating processes in the brain based on intersubjective communication.

 

Of significance, if robots have a personality corresponding to humans it collaborates with, human-robot communication can be interpreted as I-You communication outlined in the brain model here proposed.

 

2. Formal conception of intersubjective communication

 

Before presenting my synaptic model of subjectivity, it is necessary to outline the formal conception of subjectivity according to Guenther. Generally speaking, “subjectivity is a phenomenon distributed over the dialectic antithesis of the Ego as the subjective subject and the Thou as the objective subject, both of them having a common mediating environment” (Guenther, 1976). At least from an ontological point of view, classic logic does not refer to this ontological differentiation of the concept of subjectivity in treating subjectivity as a general conception. In addition, the concept of volition presupposes a logical frame that describes the distinct domains of relations between subjective subjectivity (S^s), objective subjectivity (S^o) and objectivity (O). Guenther (1966) provides such a tool. His propositions are as follows (see Figure 1): If S^s designates a thinking subject and O its object in general (i.e. the universe), the relation between S^s and O is undoubtedly an ordered one, because O must be considered the content of the reflective process of S^s. On the other hand, seen from the viewpoint of S^s, any other subject (the Thou) is an observed object with a place in the universe. But if  S^o is (part of) the content of the Universe, we again obtain an ordered relation, now between O and S^o . This is obviously of a different type. S^o is not only the passive (cognitive) object of the reflective process of S^s. In turn it is in itself an active (volitive) subject that may view the first subject (and everything else) from its own vantage point. Therefore, S^o may assume the role of S^s, thus regulating the original subjective subject S^s to the position of an objective subject S^o. In other words: the relation between S^s and S^o is not an ordered relation, but a completely symmetrical exchange relation, similar to “left” and “right”.

 

 

 

Figure 1. Diagram of the four categories of relations constituting intersubjective relationships (Guenther, 1966) S^s: Subjective subjectivity; S^o: objective subjectivity; O: object (environment)

 

Most importantly, Figure 1 shows even a third type of relation, originally called founding relation, now “proemial relationship” (Guenther 1976). This type of relation applies between a member of a relation and the relation itself. Guenther (1976) describes the general structure of the proemial relation as follows:

 

“If we let the relator assume the place of the relatum, the exchange is not mutual. The relator may become a relatum, but not in the relation from which it formerly established the relationship, but only in a relationship of higher order and vice versa…if:

 

R_i+1(x_i,y_i)

is given and the relatum (x or y) becomes a relator, we obtain

R_i(x_i-1, y_i-1)

where R_i = x_i or y_i. But if a relator becomes a relatum, we obtain

R_i+2(x_i+1, y_i+1)

where R_i+1= x_i+1 or  y_i+1. The subscript i signifies higher or lower logical orders.

 

Now, the interplay between a relator and a relatum can be interpreted as a dialectic process of volition and cognition, concerning the attitude of a subject to its subjective and objective environment. If a subjective subject dominates the environment, it is acting in a volitive manner, where the environment represents its cognitive content. In the inverse situation, the environment dominates the subjective subject, playing a volitive role in regard to the cognitive content of the subjective subjectivity. I will now attempt to outline these mutual relations between subjectivity as cognition and subjectivity as volition via glial-neuronal synapses, the elementary information processing devices of the brain.

 

3. Model of a tripartite synapse

 

The basic anatomical structure of a tripartite synapse consists of four components: the presynaptic neuron, the postsynaptic neuron, and two glial components with a synaptic cleft in between. The interactions in such chemical synapses occur via neurotransmitters (NT), gliotransmitters (GT), and other substances (ions, neuromodulators etc.) It is meanwhile clear that glia have a modulatory function what the efficacy of neuronal information processing concerns (Noriega-Prieto and Araque 2021). One can also say that glia exert a spatio-temporal boundary setting function in synaptic information processing (Mitterauer 1998).

 

Figure 2. Basic pathways of information processing in a tripartite synapse. NT: Neurotransmitter; GT: gliotransmitter; peR: presynaptic receptors; gR: glial receptors; gj: gap junctions

 

Figure 2 depicts a very schematic model of a tripartite synapse.The information processing between the four components of the synapse may be basically this: neurotransmitters (NT) released from the presynaptic neuron occupy glial receptors (gR) embodying an ordered relation (1). In parallel, NT released from the presynaptic neuron occupy postsynaptic receptors (poR) and are reuptaken in the presynaptic neuron, designated as an exchange relation (2). Already activated by NT, glia release gliotransmitters (GT) that occupy receptors on the presynaptic neuron (peR), turning off neurotransmission temporarily, in the sense of an ordered relation (3). In addition, a glial intercellular signaling through gap junction (gj) mediated by GT represents an exchange relation between glial cells (4), building a glial network (for details see Verkhratsky and Nedergaard 2014; Zhou et al. 2024). Of note, in these networks intentional programs may be generated (Mitterauer, 2007).

 

 

4. Proemial synapses

 

Taking a closer look at the types of relations shown in figure 2, we can see two exchange and ordered relations each. The relational interplay of these four relations generates a proemial relationship, but of a special kind, called cyclic proemial relationship (Kaehr, 1978). This type of relation may be an inevitable prerequisite for any theory of consciousness. Its formal description is as follows (figure 3):

 

Figure 3. Formal description of cyclic proemial information processing in tripartite synapses. G: glia;

N: neuronal component; →: ordered relation; ⟷: exchange relation;

(1) ... (4): cyclic sequence relations

 

Glia (G) dominate the neuronal components (N) by modifying them. Therefore, G play the role of a relator (1) and N is the relatum. If this relationship changes inversely (2,4), N becomes the relator and G the relatum (3). Since the proemial relationship is cyclically organized, glial-neuronal synapses are capable of changing their relational positions in the sense of an iterative self-reflection mechanism. One can also say that glia exert a volitive function and the neuronal component represents their cognitive content and vice versa.

 

 

5. Proemial human-robot communication

 

A proemial synapse allows the description of an elementary mechanism for human-robot communication as follows (figure 4):

 

Figure 4. Schema of proemial relation communication between a human person (hP) and a robot person (rP)

 

if the communication between the human person (hP) and the robot person (rP) starts out with an ordered relation of the human person, he (she) exerts a volitive action to the robot person, so that the rP is trying to recognize appropriate objects in the environment. This is basically cognition. However, the realization of the volitive actions of the human person is dependent on the results of the cognitive function of the robot person with regard to its testing of the feasibility of the intentional programs of the hP in the environment. Now, the position between the partners reverses and the robot person activates the sensory-cognitive systems of the human person playing an active role determining the environmental information. This change of relationship makes the human person temporarily to a cognitive system reflecting the results of the original cognitive computations of the robot person, holding on to the intentional programs or changing them in the sense of adaption.

 

Keeping on the intentional programs can be interpreted as a kind of radical-selfrealization. One can also say that, if the human person as a relator becomes a relatum, this change increases the complexity of human-robot communication.

 

Importantly, Maturana (1970) states that “the nervous system only interacts with relations, mediated by physical interactions”. At least in chemical synapses the types of transmitter substances may determine the set of synapses that qualitatively cooperate with or embody communication domains (Mitterauer 2012). Maturana speaks of the domains as interactions. Most interestingly, he also describes an orienting behavior. It consists of an orienter and an orientee, where the orienter orients the orientee in a common cognitive domain of interactions and vice versa. This scientific approach describes or interprets intersubjective communication seemingly comparable to our model of intersubjective communication. However, it is based on a classic interpretation of subjectivity, since in Maturana’s conception of subjectivity the observer plays the role of a general subject not referring to the ontological distinction between subjective subjectivity and the object subjectivity in the interaction of the subjective systems with the environment.

 

6. Concluding remarks

 

For the implementation of a proemial human-robot communication, the robot should be equipped with typical human capabilities and individual traits embodying a personality. Importantly, Lim and coworkers (2023) provide an extensive quantitative and qualitative study exploring robot personality. According to Chelba and colleagues (2020) existing models of inner speech inspire computational tools to provide a robot with this form of self-awareness. It is also suggested that if a robot brain is equipped with a network of modules of self-observation, the robot may generate subjective perspectives of self-observation indicating self-consciousness (Mitterauer 2021). From the viewpoint of collaborative cognition robots are good thought partners which can understand us; which we can understand, and which have sufficient understanding of the world that we can engage on common ground (Collins et al. 2024). Moreover, robot personalities should be able to generate intentional programs.

 

Admittedly, the human-robot communication here proposed is based on a formal brain-oriented model that must be elaborated for the implementation in a robot brain. This may enable the robot to simulate within its brain the communication with humans on the behavioral level (Mitterauer 2013c). In essence, the novelty of the proemial communication is the interplay between a volitive action and its cognition reflection based on the exchange of the positions of the partners by movement.

 

Prospects: robots with the capability to selfprogram intentions could show an autonomous will. As in human history robot societies may be faced with the problem of free will.

 

 

Acknowledgments

 

I am grateful to Christian Streili for designing the figures, and to Marie Motil for preparing the final version of the paper.

 

 

References

 

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