Economics:
Focus on Africa: The Sudan:
Empowerment:
An Important Factor in Aggravating Poverty, Inequality & Injustices in
Sudan: 1989-2015 – Part I
by Professor Ali Abdalla Ali
Omdurman Ahlia University
Sudan
The
story begins like this…
“A
conference on Urban Planning was held in Paris. A top Sudanese official was
sent to represent the Sudan in that conference. On his left happened to sit a
French lady engineer. She greeted the Sudanese representative and asked him
about his position in Sudan. The Sudanese proudly answered that he was the Head
of the Sudan Farmers’ Union, a member of the Board of the Central Bank of
Sudan, member of the Board of the Telecommunication Corporation, Head of the
Human Rights Organization, the CEO of the Gum Arabic Company and a member of
the Transitional Authority of Darfur. The French lady asked him with surprise
as to his original occupation. He answered that he was a Medical Consultant.
The lady stood up and walked to the organizers to find her a seat away from
this crazy Sudanese participant.”(!).
INTRODUCTION;
In
a very interesting lecture given by the Managing Director of the IMF, Christine
Lagarde at the London School of Economics (Friday 8 June 2014), on Empowerment,
the Amartya K. Sen lecture, Lagarde tried to elaborate on the issue of
empowerment which Sen has been thinking about for so many years. In fact she
made a very sharp presentation on the question of empowerment; first of “the
individual –
and what that means for economic policy. Second, what is
needed to help individual empowerment – the empowerment of
the institutions. Third, what is needed in turn to help national economies
flourish –
empowerment of multilateralism.”(Lagarde). Then in the
end she tried to show how the institution she heads (the IMF) has applied the
idea of empowerment and provided some cases. In fact I was attracted by the
presentation such that I thought it worthwhile since it reflects a high degree
of human morality, justice, sanity and wisdom to venture and see how it has
been applied in a less developed country such as Sudan (my home) between 1989
and 2015.
On
the question of the individual Lagarde states that there are many obstacles to
empowerment –
obstacles based on income disparities and obstacles based
on gender. She then goes on to say that “the gap between the haves and
have-nots has risen substantially in recent years. In many countries the
wealthy are taking home a greater share of the rewards today than at any time
in the postwar era” (Lagarde 2014). According to her, Professor Sen would argue
that we should look beyond income inequality and worry about a wider set of
disparities –
such as health, education, unemployment, and social exclusion.”
She goes on to say that “for some decades now, Professor Sen has developed an
approach to inequality based less on income and more on capability. This
approach judges people’s advantage by their capability to do the things they
value. It is opportunity, about giving a person the means to live.” (Lagarde
2014). She goes on to say that “in more unequal societies, many people lack the
basic tools to get ahead –
decent nutrition, healthcare, education, skills ,and
finance. This can create a vicious circle, whereby economic insecurity causes
people to invest too little in skills and education.” (Lagarde 2014). Then she
goes on to say that “This is why I believe that policies [devised in order] to
tame excessive income inequality are win-win – if carefully
chosen and calibrated, they can spur empowerment and advancement. Think of
policies like boosting spending on health, education, active labor market
policies, and in-work benefits.” (Lagarde 2014).
As
regards obstacles related to gender, Lagarde says, ”Globally, women earn only
three-quarters as much as men, even with same job and same education. They are
underrepresented in the formal sector and overrepresented in the informal
sector. They spend twice as much time on the household chores as men, and four
times as much on childcare. They make up to 70 percent of the billion people
living on less than a dollar a day, and are the first to be submerged by
economic crisis.” She goes on to say that “Bottom line is that women are
underutilized, underpaid, under-appreciated and over-exploited.” (Lagarde
2014).
As
regards the empowerment of institutions she goes on to say, ”As people strive
to achieve their potential, they are not striving in a vacuum. They are
navigating the dense of thicket of institutions and governance structures that
run through the economy.” (Lagarde 2014). Then she says that “Good institutions
are founded on principles of accountability, transparency and impartiality.
They facilitate empowerment by letting success depend on competence rather than
connections, participation rather than patronage – by offering
an open hand rather than a closed fist.” This statement is followed by Lagarde
mentioning, “a narrow subset of institutions – ones that
contribute directly to economic wellbeing by providing strong frameworks for
fiscal policy, monetary policy, and financial sector oversight. Without good
institutions in these areas, and without capable people behind them, policies
will be ineffective, and avenues for empowerment will be blocked.” Then she
says, “To use Amartya’s language: if we want better capability, then we need
better capacity.” (Lagarde 2014).
The
third dimension is empowerment of multilateralism. She says that “In a very
basic way, today’s challenges are increasingly global challenges. Empowerment
today depends not just on what is happening in your country, but what is
happening in the wider world. We live in a world that is simultaneously coming
together and drifting further apart. Coming together due to the dense and
intricate web of interconnections that run through our global economy – in
trade, finance, technology, communications. Coming apart due to the increasing
diffusion of power across the world – towards more diverse
geographical regions and more global stakeholders, a more tribal mentality.”
(Lagarde 2014).
Then
Lagarde ends her interesting lecture by saying, “Let me conclude with some
wisdom from Charlotte Bronte: ‘Liberty lends us her wings, and hope guides us
by the star.’ This is really what economic empowerment is all about – freedom,
dignity, opportunity. We must do whatever we can to help people help
themselves, to let people lift themselves up – through
enabling policies, enabling institutions, and enabling modes of international
cooperation.” (Lagarde 2014).
THE CONCEPT OF EMPOWERMENT
AS PRACTISED IN SUDAN (1989-2015):
In
fact through all the recent history of modern Sudan the country went through a
series of changes in governance alternating between military governments and
civilian rule from 1956 until 1989 when the present government took over rule
with the help of the military collaborating with the National Islamic Front – NIF
(a Sudanese political group whose original version of Islamic ideology was
greatly influenced by Sheikh Hassan Al Bana’s Muslim Brothers of Egypt). In
1969 a similar military coup took place with the help of the Sudanese
Communist Party (SCP). They tried in 1971 to topple ex-President Nimeiri (1969-1985)
but his supporters were able to end them in a move which did not last long,
only a few days! The present government lasted for more than a quarter-century
simply because it was able to play on the very strong sentiment of Islam which
most of the population believe in. In other words it is now 60 years since
Sudan obtained independence from the British rule. Then the Sudanese had a
choice between remaining within the Commonwealth or join with Egypt, the
decision was to become independent of both. Because of the frequent alternation
between military regimes and democratic governments, for 51 years Sudan
remained under dictatorial regimes with democratic governments not exceeding
nine years. These 51 years of comprehensive rule had deprived the Sudanese
people from deepening the concepts of democracy, transparency, accountability,
justice and social cohesion and the absolute rule of the law. Moreover, with
each change, those who took over – whether military or
democratic parties –
such changes were automatically followed by another
serious wave which constituted removal of many qualified cadres – whether
from the military or from the civilians – who were managing
the State machinery, either as being not faithful to the regimes that took over
or they are just not liked or potentially trusted by those who took power.
Gradually the country was siphoned off from those qualified Sudanese who were
managing the country. They had, therefore, immigrated outside Sudan as we will
see helping in developing countries other than their own specially the Gulf
countries. Many still laud and reminisce with great admiration the civil
service system that was left by the British administration before they left as being
the best civil service in Africa. It had its own imperial logic. It was a good
system for what it was designed.
The
degree of such changes was not that tense during the years following the
independence of the country in 1956, as the British heritage was deeply rooted
and was strictly followed. The changes were mainly in the top of many
institutions. In addition to migration after the seventies and mid-eighties
when Nimeiri’s regime faced various economic difficulties coupled with the
Arab-Israeli war in 1973 in which oil was used as a weapon by the oil rich Gulf
countries. This resulted in such countries acquiring windfall gains in foreign
exchange from oil. This also necessitated the starting of huge development
plans in the Gulf countries. Such development activity created a golden
opportunity for the Sudanese as well as others from Asia, the Arab and African
countries from all walks of life to emigrate with the aim of improving their
welfare. The Sudanese were largely trusted and liked by people in the Gulf
countries as well as in a place such as UK where the Sudanese medics are highly
respected and needed to serve in the British National Health Service (NHS).
However,
it is only after this present government which took over in June 1989, that a
real and intense degree of empowerment whether on the individual, the
institutions or empowerment of multilateralism as stated above, took place
manned only and on all levels of the state machinery with the cadres of the
Islamic Front, thereby excluding those who are not members or who do not see
eye to eye with them or considered secular, communist or traditionalists or
even non-believers. Even if they were the most learned or qualified Sudanese,
one had no chance except to leave the country. This kind of bias (within
political parties) took place during the years immediately after independence,
but not with a high intensity as was the case after this present Islamic
government took over. The present government, which has been led by the Islamic
Front, decided to adopt Islamic Sharia in Sudan as compared to the unclear,
erratic and secular behavior of previous governments which governed Sudan since
independence. However, it must be noticed that during the years of governance
until the present government took over, the policies adopted were primarily
done with a top down approach affecting mainly the management on the top i.e.
ministers, undersecretaries, governors of the Central Bank of Sudan as well as
some heads of the various government corporations, on the strict belief that
the rest of the government machinery will automatically be taken care of. In
the case of the present Islamic government, the approach was still the same,
i.e. top down, but this time the changes went deeper to the roots, filling
posts even with smallest jobs as we shall see. In addition to this, the present
government was quick enough to exercise intelligent control over all the organized
trade unions which existed since independence and who were the prime movers of
any political protests against any government, as can be seen in Sudan’s recent
history. For example the trade union of Sudan Railways, that was the longest in
Africa at the time of independence in 1956, consisted of a labor force more than
44000 strong, well-organized and comprised of both skilled and semi-skilled
workers. In order to be fair, such an exercise was started by the late
President Nimeiri when an attempted coup was launched against him by a section
of the SCP in 1971 as mentioned earlier.
In
fact in the mid seventies ex-President Nimeiri was approached by Prince Mohamed
al Faisal of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to allow him start a bank that would
adopt Islamic Sharia (at a time when the Kingdom itself had no banks operating
along Sharia basis until now!). Such a bank was later known as Faisal Islamic
Bank (FIB) and was given the license to operate from the Presidency rather than
the Central Bank of Sudan (CBS), which operated on traditional lines and was
the only authority charged with the responsibility of establishing commercial
banks. This bank gradually gave those members of the IF the chance to prepare
their cadres and train them for some hidden future objective. In fact it was
some of the members of the IF who convinced Prince Faisal to start such a bank.
Other Islamic banks followed and were allowed to operate vide a license from
the CBS and not from the Presidency as was the case with FIB. This is because
these new Islamic banks became very successful, specially with customers who do
not accept interest as in the traditional banks. Between the mid-seventies and
early 1980, these banks gained real presence in the Sudanese banking system .With
such success, these banks and those who operate them gradually acquired
experience and knowledge on the Sudan’s economy and this gradually gave them a
sort of hidden political power since money means power. Therefore, in 1983
Nimeiri, largely influenced by the performance of these Islamic banks (as well
as the collaboration of the IF members with Nimeiri ), declared the adoption
and application of Sharia. In 1984 an Act was declared (the Civil Transactions Act)
prohibiting interest (as usury) in all financial transactions in the whole
economy.
EMPOWERING OF
THE INDIVIDUALS, THE INSTITUTIONS & MULTILATERAL:
At
the time of independence in January 1956, the population of the Sudan was about
10.2 million people distributed unevenly among the various regions of the
Sudan. There was a very striking imbalance between the various regions of the
Sudan which was under the rule of both Egypt and Britain from 1898 and under
the sole responsibility of the British after the incidents of 1924. The Sudan
was under the Home Office, in contrast to other British colonies which were run
under the Colonial Office. Its administrators were mainly drawn of from the
British diplomatic service who were also drawn from the well-educated British
cadres from Oxford and Cambridge, etc. In spite of this unbalanced state of
affairs, the British were very keen to provide the necessary social services to
almost all of what was considered as Sudan. Education was free, as well as
healthcare. Education was even compulsory to every child above seven years.
Some used to be pulled from their families in order to be enrolled in an
elementary school irrespective of their tribes or ethnic group. Schools were
furnished with all necessary books and pencils. Religious schools called
‘Kalwa’ were allowed before entering the elementary stage. This helped
children to be competent in Arabic before becoming well versed in English
which used to be taught from the Intermediate level. Hospitals gave free
medical care whether as out-patients or inside the hospitals. Patients were
provided with free medicines and free meals, a kind of treatment which people
cannot dream off after so many national governments that came after independence.
Gordon Memorial College, which was established in memory of Governor Charles
Gordon and later became Khartoum University, the students even some years after
independence enjoyed free lodging and free meals. At that stage students were
very well versed in both Arabic (their mother tongue) and English. The latter
was cancelled during the regime of late Nimeiri and completely disappearing
after 1989 when the present government decided on Arabization of teaching in
schools and institutions of higher learning, thus depriving many generations
of the ability of commanding a second language in which the Sudanese were so
good. Even before the rainy season starts in Sudan the British companies
operating in Sudan as well as the British administration used to stock all
necessities up-country so that such towns and villages would not experience
shortages during the rainy season, during which the rail system used to experience
wash outs as a result of heavy floods.
Such
treatment by the British was not without its own legacy and rationale which
subsequent national governments failed to understand, and tried to realign such
legacy and logic to the needs of the newly independent country. Since the type
of empowerment that had taken place been in Sudan since 1989 is so vast in
coverage, and so deep and intricate than was the case before taking power, one
would like to provide the significant examples that took place in the three
mentioned areas above, leaving the remaining more detailed cases for a future
research. However, one important matter was done by the British Administration
which had future implications for the whole Sudan, i.e. the complete exclusion
of South Sudan from getting equal development with the other parts of the
country. This was done on the basis that the South is different from the rest
of the Sudan. The intention was to have the South as part of a Greater East
Africa which did not materialize. Moreover, the rest of the country was
governed by the Closed District Ordinance of 1925 which prohibited the people
from moving from the countryside to the centre where the major activity of
producing cotton was not to be disturbed. This kind of colonial legacy needs to
be fathomed and studied afresh.
ON THE AREA OF
EMPOWERMENT OF THE INDIVDUAL 1989-2015;
A
few days after the military took over the political authority on 30 June
1989 it gradually became clear that the people behind the coup were primarily
from the IF. As mentioned earlier, they were able to institute Islamization of
the economy, specially banks, in the mid-seventies which culminated in the
Transaction Act of 1984 which was intended to apply Islamic Sharia on all
financial and economic transactions in the whole economy as mentioned earlier. Through
this achievement they were able to train many of their cadres in banking,
insurance etc. Thus when they took over 1989, they were able in a short while
to man the various high positions whether in ministries or government corporations
as well as the press media. These cadres were moved from one post to another
just as in a chess game! This was carried out immediately after holding two
conferences, one on politics and the other on the economic problems of the
country.
This
was the first indication that such posts shall go only to those individuals who
were members of the IF and not to non-members of the IF. The obvious remark on
such appointments as will be seen later, the criteria was not only being a
qualified member of the party, but even without necessarily having the required
qualification. This was started in two directions: First by ending the service
of those who were in key posts manning the government machinery and replacing
them with the cadres of the IF. The second direction was in ending the service
of qualified cadres who manned the various ministries and institutions. For
example, the writer happened to see a decision by the President ending the
service of 16 most trusted and most experienced Sudanese ambassadors before it
was officially declared .The IF government also started to call back many of
its members who had been forced by late President Nimeiri to live in exile in
Arab and some Western European countries. A good number of the IF cadres who
are in key positions enjoy dual nationality (US, Canada, UK etc.). In fact a
number of ministers and their families have two nationalities. After
independence no Sudanese could dream to enter the foreign service if one is
related to any foreigner whether in terms of nationality, passport or a wife.
This is so because a good number of the IF cadres were discriminated against by
a previous regime. That is why many sought asylum in Western Europe, in USA and
UK and were able to acquire residence and nationality. A number of this cadre
has their families in the USA or UK. A good example is that Sudan’s ambassador
in Geneva, which is home to a number of international agencies, holds a British
passport in addition to his Sudanese nationality!
Many
of those IF cadres who came back to fill important posts were highly
differentiated from other civil service members in respect to wages and
salaries and additional privileges. These cadres used to get the same allowed
salaries and wages. At the same time, those who were requested to come back got
under the table the same high salaries that they used to get outside the Sudan!
This created an unusual gap in the salary structure of the civil service.
Considerable resentment started to accumulate among other members of the civil
service who were not political animals. In addition to such differentiated
wages, they had had under their authority funds to be used as incentives and
other purposes. Such funds were rarely subject to scrutiny or auditing. A
number of this cadre also were able to do their own private business side by
side with the official posts ignoring any sort of conflict of interest. In
fact, these gaps widened further as years passed and became a major factor in
the exodus of many qualified personnel to the Gulf countries and Europe. A
report by the agency responsible for Sudanese Working Abroad, cited that
between 1975 and 2009, 10 million Sudanese left the country, 85% of them during
the period of the present regime.
Each
minister is entitled to have five vehicles for himself and his family. In
addition to that, he is allowed many allowances such as travel allowance
outside Sudan, free medical treatment outside Sudan, allowance for dress,
etc.etc. The case in many public sector corporations is even more intense where
some heads used to get their wages in foreign exchange instead of local
currency. When an official fails in his job, he is appointed to another post
without questioning the causes of his failure in his previous job. Loyalty to
the party was the essential factor. In fact such treatment created a rich class
of civil servants not known before in the country and elsewhere. Some reports
indicate to the fact that the government employees are considered a one of the
richest groups of people in the country. An estimate (Alrakoba.com-24.12.2015)
indicated that 46% of the rich Sudanese are civil servants. In addition to 625
ministers and state ministers as well as 5000 members of the Parliament
(National Assembly –
the members of which are given salaries more than double
that of a professor, plus a car) and other constitutional appointees, plus the
cost of the administration of the National Congress (NC), all financed from
public funds. Have and have not is not exclusive to businessmen and tycoons.
When one talks about an individual one has to differentiate between an individual
who belongs to the IF and an individual who is just a simple Sudanese without
any political background. One basic result from such an empowerment was that
those IF members who are mostly ignorant of the rules of the civil service,
which was basically British in origin, never abided by such regulations and behaved
as if these funds were God-sent and not collected from the Sudanese tax payers!
In
fact the party strong hand, which is called the NC, was not only a political
arm of the regime, but it was de facto a very strong parallel and
competitor to the Civil Service operating behind the scenes. In fact the
borders between the Party and the government is not sharply laid out.
When
simple citizens cannot stand against the tyranny and insecurity they quietly
leave the country. This state of affairs had its impact on the productivity of
the civil service as well as the unfair distribution of the budget resources on
unjustified priorities. In other words the budget resources were disbursed in
accordance with the desire of the Head of the State in the direction of mainly
defense and security, leaving nothing for production or for that the social
services, specially for those in the rural areas where more than 65% live on
agriculture and allied activities. In fact, as result of the outright
liberalization policy started in February 1992 and a devaluation of about 500%,
there were many losers and winners. The result was the gradual disappearance of
what was known in Sudan as the middle class (consisting of government civil
servants, petty traders, private sector employees in general, the self employed
etc.).These were phased out by the cadre of the IF. These were the segment of
the Sudanese society that suffered most because of losing their incomes, and
the privilege of getting free education and free health care.
The
farmers in the countryside suffered most because of lack of support to their
activities. Government funds which were meant to be spent on developing
agriculture after the disappearance of oil and the departure of the South in
2011, were ill-directed to other than agriculture (such as renovating the house
of the State Governor and purchasing a new car, etc.) thus making it difficult
for the small farmers to find financing for their activities. No one in a
responsible post is taken to task (no accountability). On the contrary that
might be a promotion to another higher post(!). Moreover, the major development
scheme (Gezira) went into shambles and all its assets sold out thus putting the
farmers in an area of 2 million feddans (one feddan is equal to 4500sqm) in
real difficulties including poverty. The government intention, instead of
helping these farmers and empowering them by giving a new life to the project
to contribute to production, toys with the idea of leasing and selling land to
foreign governments, e.g. China and Egypt maybe in return for past debts in the
case of China. Therefore, empowering other than the Sudanese individuals and
creating a potential social time bomb, to the extent that the new foreign
owners of land refuse to employ locals in farming. Those responsible seem to
have more confidence in the foreigners than the locals.
Therefore
, it could be said that those who belonged to the IF were able to acquire a
share of wealth much greater than the ordinary Sudanese, and that is why
whoever was able to run out of the country did so. Those who were unable to emigrate
remained behind living under difficult conditions, unable to find decent healthcare
or any degree of education for their children.
Another
crucial aspect was the new policy brought up by the Minister of Higher
Education. When the present IF government took over in 1989, there were many
Sudanese youth who were sent abroad by their families to obtain a better
education at their expense. The new policy called upon all those who were
studying abroad to return to Sudan since the financial authorities were short
of foreign exchange. This created considerable inconvenience to the families of
those students. While this was being done, the children of the members of the
IF continued to remain outside doing their education in foreign
universities(!). One positive aspect is that when the present regime took
over, there were only five universities in Sudan, while presently there are
more than 60 universities, but poorly staffed and with very limited resources.
Moreover, the government shed off its responsibility of free education, which
had been the general rule up until that time. If 60-80% of the Sudanese budget
is utilized for Defense and Security what is then left for social services such
as education, health. etc.? Higher education in Sudan is at present only for
those who are financially able. More than 46% of the 30 million Sudanese are
below the poverty line.
The
same applies to health services, which used to be free before the advent of the
present IF regime. Since little is given to health services, many private
hospitals and clinics were opened and run on pure commercial grounds and mostly
owned and operated by influential members of IF or their allies. Therefore, it
could only be afforded by those who are rich. If a normal citizen dies in a
private hospital his/her body will not be given to their families unless
hospital fees was fully paid. The same with operations: no sick person can hope
to get operated upon unless the cost of the operation is fully settled in
advance. The government-owned hospital system has been drawn down in favor of
private hospitals and clinics. As for the officials and their families, they
have the privilege to travel abroad at the expense of the taxpayer no matter
how much it costs in foreign exchange. In line with the expansion of private
hospitals, a good number of medical schools were established, mostly owned and
run by those related to the ruling party.
Yet
another factor which led to reducing chances for the majority to continue
obtain decent employment is the fact that major projects in the Sudan were
actually put out of business, e.g. the Great Gezira Scheme (two million Feddans)
which used to produce cotton and had sustained the Sudan for decades, the Sudan
Railways that used to be the longest in Africa with more that 44,000 workers,
the Sudan Line (sold out), and Sudan Air, which was famous long before
Ethiopian Airline or Saudi came into existence. Instead of empowering those
operating these institutions through new ways and modern technology, they were
pushed into a state of pauperization.
The
logic behind these destructive attitudes, i.e. of dismantling institutions in
order to lay off labor which were organized into very strong trade unions, is
unfortunate. Every government that came put a careful eye on such unions. Since
nationhood was not fully established since independence in 1956, these unions
were very strong political groups, guarding the politics of the country as well
as their interests. Most had socialist tendencies, such as the Railway Union,
since some of their cadres were of the famous Sudan Communist Party. In fact,
since the advent of the present government, they assigned the responsibility of
controlling these unions to a dental surgeon, a job in which he achieved
considerable success.
The
present government was even very wary about the Sudanese middle-class, which
used to embrace the most educated of the Sudanese people and were politically
more aware. The present government was able, through gradual and subtle
policies, to eliminate the middle-class which used to be the safety valve
between governments and the general public. They were also a source of
resistance to governments.
Moreover,
instead of supporting the creation of strong political parties in order to have
a strong opposition, the general tendency was to infiltrate and weaken the
traditional parties. The IF holds no belief in democracy and democratic practices,
thus it was able to dilute the impact of traditional political parties and
trade unions that used to be very alive in creating problems for governments.
In addition, they operated using the cover of religion, and were thus able to
survive for more than a quarter century.
Is
there any attention to the rest of the ordinary Sudanese, whether in the urban centers
or in the countryside? Are there any methods through which they could be
empowered in order to develop themselves? Such attention is supposed to be
carried out as part of the responsibility of the union ministries and the state
governments, and carried out through the national budget and the encouragement
of private initiative. In fact, the country’s strategy gave the private sector
was given more than 72% of the production in the whole country, yet it was
loaded with heavy taxes and wrong macroeconomic policies so that a good number
of them ran off to invest in neighboring countries, specially Ethiopia where
the investment environment is more conducive. There was also differentiation
between those in the private sector who belong to the IF and others who have no
political affiliation, i.e. members of the NC who do not belong to that
political clan, particularly in the area of custom and tax exemptions. There
are even indications of discrimination among traders, i.e. those who are
members of the IF and others who do not belong its major political party, i.e.
the NC.
For
most of the quarter-century in which the IF ruled the Sudan, the country was in
constant turmoil, in the South, the Western part (the Blue Nile, Darfur and
Kordofan) as well as the rest of the country. In addition to some external
activities related to the political objective of the party, which themselves
were part of current problems, leading to a country such as the USA to impose
boycott on Sudan in 1997 as harboring terrorism (a boycott which still holds
and renewed every year by the American President). Therefore, what is needed of
just and proper empowerment was mainly for the members of the IF and those who
are fellow travelers who could no longer resist low incomes and poverty. The
rich and highly paid in the Civil service are those who are members of the IF.
In the private sector, it is those who were able to enter with no business
experience except that they belong to the ruling party and receive special
treatment. As a result, many traditional Sudanese became marginalized and many
went out of business or fled the country to thriving neighboring countries such
as Ethiopia and Egypt as well as to Chad. The same happened to qualified
Sudanese such as medics (males and females), engineers, university lecturers
and teachers (both males and females). Although those responsible
underestimated such exodus of qualified cadres are now complaining about lack
of qualified personnel in various professions, specially in Sudanese
universities and hospitals and other government agencies. One striking feature,
as regards the individual, is that law and justice are applied with clear bias
to those who are members of the IF and its political institutions.
ON THE AREA OF
EMPOWERMENT OF INSTITUTIONS: 1985/2015
As
stated above Sudan was a unfortunate country because it had never enjoyed more
than eight years of democratic rule since it obtained it independence in 1956. The
remainder of 60 years since independence the Sudan was under military rule,
alternating between various ideologies and schools of thought. This led to similar
changes in the structures that managed institutions and the economy as well as
the affairs of the Sudanese population in general. The administrative setup and
the laws and rules left by the colonial authority had worked well during their
presence, since it was meant to be a very effective, and sound services structure
following their imperial objectives. In fact the system continued being used
long after the Sudan attained independence. For example, the Companies Act of
1925 has been resorted to until it was recently amended by the present government.
It could be said that the rules and regulations left by the colonial authority
have been adhered to in the process of taking care of the population and
amended from time to time in a positive manner. Moreover, the choice of various
cadres were done to a great extent on the basis of competence and experience,
specially during the early years of independence and also during the years
1969-1985 (during the era of late president Nimeiri, who attracted many
technocrats from various professions).
But
since the present government took over, the system was greatly changed and even
distorted to a great degree which rendered the management system ineffective
and without providing a decent alternative. According to Lagarde, “…good
institutions are founded and formed on principles of accountability,
transparency and impartiality…They facilitate empowerment by letting success
depend on competence rather than connections, participation rather than
patronage –
by offering an open hand rather than a closed fist.” She
goes on to say, “a narrow subset of institutions – ones that
contribute directly to economic wellbeing by providing strong framework for
fiscal, monetary policy and financial sector oversight – without
good institutions in these and without capable people behind, these policies
will be ineffective and areas of empowerment will be blocked.”
Now
let us see to what extent the words of Lagarde apply in the case of the Sudan
during the period mentioned.
The
government machinery, the private sector, the banking system and monetary
policy, fiscal aspect and fiscal policy and development policy and
international trade shall be some of the major points which will be discussed .
The government
machinery and the private sector:
This
was one of the first institutions that was targeted by the NIF. Immediately
after taking over, the NIF held (end of 1989) two major conferences, one
political and the other economic. These two conferences tried to invite most
Sudanese irrespective of their political inclinations. It was intended to give
the impression that they took over authority to improve political and economic
and social conditions of the people. The real intention was to gradually
introduce some of their cadre to such selected audience and secondly to try to
convince those present that they wanted real improvement of general conditions
along the lines of the reasonable recommendations of the two conferences.
Thereafter, a gradual cleansing of the government machinery started. For
example, the writer had seen (after five months) a letter showing the dismissal
of 16 of the most experienced and respected Sudanese ambassadors. The minister
who was made to sign the dismissal letter did not belong to the I. At the
beginning, non-IF cadres were appointed as cover-up. The disappearance of
experienced diplomats had a lot to do with the performance of Sudanese
diplomacy in later years. Starting in 1990, when they were satisfied that no
one shall stand in their way, they started to appoint their fellow IF members.
Those experienced civil servants, whether ambassadors, medics, university
staff, economists or engineers started to find their way out of the country to
the Gulf countries, Western Europe and as far as Australia. This cleaning
exercise was applied to all the government machinery as well as public
corporations. The Electricity Corporation, as an example, was divided into
four companies and most of the old staff were dismissed, some on the charge
that they belonged to the Sudan Communist Party. The irony is that a number of
those engineers who were dismissed sought asylum in the USA and UK and still
live there.
That
is why it is not surprising to see that since 1989 about ten million Sudanese
(about one third of the present population) left the country. According to
official data, 85% of them left during the years of the present regime. The
exodus still goes on until the present time with visible deterioration in the
performance of the government machinery. The point worthy of mentioning is
that those who belong to IF were to a great extent not the right replacement. The
criteria was not competence but allegiance to the Party. If an IF cadre fails
in his assignment he is not relieved and made accountable, but given another
job even better the one in which he had failed. Another example which showed
clearly the manner in which empowerment was exercised in favor of the IF cadre
was in the area of privatization of public sector entities as an instrument of
economic reform. A good number of government entities were privatized
gradually. However, after a while the government started to establish a good
number of entities side by side with the privatization of public sector
entities. Such new entities were established in various ministries. The
number was about 810 such entities. Each entity was chaired by an IF member
with staff that also belonged to the IF, financed from government resources
which consist of taxes and dues paid by the Sudanese! All these newly established
companies were given preferential treatment in the form of tax exemption, etc. They
were able to compete with the traditional traders. Such companies used to even enter
into government contracts thus under-cutting those who were in business long
before the present IF government came in. Even some of these new breed of
entities tried to take away the representation of foreign companies from the older
companies so that they could control all trading activities. The establishment
of private consulting or research canters was made difficult for non-IF entities
so that most of the existing canters are supported by the government funding
thus trying to control public opinion. A number of previously established
private canters were closed on the premise that they advocated ideas not
acceptable to the government or that such canters are being supported and
financed by foreign agencies and institutions.
Fiscal aspects
and fiscal policy; The banking system and monetary policy:
In
addition to what was stated about the Islamization of banks, in this section what
will be mentioned is about how the members of the IF were able to make use of
the resources of the Islamized system. In fact the idea of Islamic banks was
introduced by an IF member who was close to the Saudi Prince Mohamed Al
Faisal. The idea was taken up by late president Nimeiri and covered the whole
economy in a few years. Most of the banks were managed by the some of the
members of IF. Therefore, the first persons who were able to take advantage of
the resources of these newly Islamized banks were the members of the IF. Many
of them suddenly became rich through business and financial facilities afforded
to them through breaking all the strict rules that governed the traditional
banking system. From rags to riches in a few number of years. Moreover, these
Islamized banks became a sort of incubator of cadres who were able to jump into
the government machinery and the private sector after 1989 when the present
Islamic government took over. The Central bank of Sudan was headed by a member
of IF. A good number of those who were running the show were thrown out in
spite of their very high qualifications and experience because they were not IF
members. The structure of wage was raised to an unusual level, enriching those
on top and creating a huge gap between the Central Bank and the Civil Service.
The monetary policy itself was geared in favor of those institutions owned by members
of the NIF.
The
system that the NIF established in 1989 was gradually destroyed without
providing an Islamic alternative. Under the strict rule of force and lack of
justice, non-transparency, non-accountability, non-competence, etc. corruption
became so rampant that is was officially recognized by the government and a
Commission was proposed – but never materialized.
This is Part I of a two-part series;
Part II will be featured in the July-August issue.