On The East and Northeast Asian Communities
by Dr. Ali M El-Agraa
Professor of International Economics
International Economic Integration and EU Studies
Faculty of Commerce,
While president of Korea, the late Roh Moon-hyun called for the creation of a ‘community’ of Northeast Asian nations, built in close parallel by most of the countries involved in the Six-Party Talks, with its main objective being the fostering of peace and prosperity in the region. He ruled out a ‘preferential trade agreement’ (PTA) as the basis for his community since it would obviously be insufficient for the purpose. The incumbent Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama is actively promoting the formation of an East Asian Community. This paper shows the close similarity between the two communities and identifies impediments that have been the cause of friction in the region since their removal is fundamental to the creation of such communities and finds that that they will be around for a very long time. This suggests that the best that can be hoped for is a PTA which makes one wonder why a community is needed, rather than the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 that are presently in the making. Of course, the ‘vision’ is admirable and should be desired by the whole world, not just the parties directly involved, since peace is of the essence.
Key words: East and
I am extremely grateful to Professors Dr David G Mayes (Director,
the European Institute,
Dr Ali M El-Agraa is Professor of International Economics,
International Economic Integration and EU Studies, Faculty of Commerce,
The aim of
this paper is not only to explain the nature of the proposed EAC as envisaged
by Hatoyama but also to show that he is not the first incumbent Asian leader to
seriously initiate it.
Indeed, the late President of
The statements in both the mentioned manifestos however contain no precise details so I shall let them nest in the footnote. Thus the first section of the paper is devoted to Hatoyama’s EAC and the following to Roh Moo-hyun’s NEAC. After showing that the two communities are not that different and that the NEAC is better articulated, the paper then very briefly considers the relevance of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) that founded today’s European Union (EU) since both Hatoyama and Roh have clearly indicated (below) that it has been the source of their inspiration and role model in this respect. The paper then considers some sensitive issues that are proving to be stumbling blocks for cooperation in the region and finishes by setting out its main conclusions.
In his original paper, Hatoyama states that his rationale for an EAC
stems from his basic stance that in today’s world, ‘we must return to
the idea of fraternity – as in the French slogan “liberté, égalité, fraternité”
– as a force for moderating the danger inherent within freedom’.
He is rather vague on fraternity here,
but has tried to clarify it in both his address to the United Nations (UN) on
24 September 2009 and his
lecture on 15 November 2009 after the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum meeting in
The concept behind my initiative for an [EAC] stems from the philosophy of “yu-ai”[] [which] I…cherish…“yu-ai” is typically translated as "fraternity"…[within which] people respect the freedom and human dignity of others just as they respect their own…[i.e.], “yu-ai” means not only the independence of people but also their coexistence (Hatoyama, 2009c).
In the original
paper, he adds that fraternity ‘can be described as a principle that aims to
adjust to the excesses of the current globalized brand of capitalism and
accommodate the local economic practices that have been fostered through our
traditions’. Citing the problems that have arisen from the perception of the
He then tries to be specific:
financial crisis has suggested...that the era of [US] unilateralism may come to
an end…[and] raised doubts about the permanence of the dollar as the key global
currency. I also feel that as a result of the failure of the
He then poses the
question: ‘How should Japan maintain its political and economic independence
and protect its national interest when caught between the [US], which is
fighting to retain its position as the world’s dominant power, and China, which
is seeking ways to become dominant?’ He believes that this is a question that
concerns not only
want the military power of the [
Hatoyama then elaborates on the EAC proposal:
He adds that:
But he is quick to issue a warning which also happens to offer support for an EAC:
other hand, due to historical and
cultural conflicts as well as conflicting national security interests, we
must recognize that there are numerous difficult political issues. The problems
of increased militarization and territorial disputes cannot be resolved by
bilateral negotiations between, for example,
He then highlights his enthusiasm for an EAC by adding that:
Therefore, I would suggest, somewhat paradoxically, that the issues that stand in the way of regional integration can only be truly resolved by moving toward greater integration. The experience of the [EU] shows us how regional integration can defuse territorial disputes (Hatoyama, 2009a, p. 3; italics added).
He elaborates on
the EU experience in his
Europe had the disastrous experience of two world
In the original article, he then expresses the moral behind the EAC story:
believe that regional integration and collective security is the path we should
follow toward realizing the principles of pacifism and multilateral cooperation
advocated by the Japanese Constitution. It is also the appropriate path for
He rounds off the article by returning to the EU:
Let me conclude by quoting the words of Count [Richard] Coudenhove-Kalergi, founder of the first popular movement for a united Europe, written 85 years ago in “Pan-Europa” (my grandfather, Ichiro Hatoyama, translated his book, “The Totalitarian State Against Man,” into Japanese): “All great historical ideas started as a utopian dream and ended with reality. Whether a particular idea remains…a utopian dream or becomes a reality [would depend] on the number of people who believe in the ideal and their ability to act upon it” (Hatoyama, 2009a, p. 3).
What is intriguing is that Hatoyama does
not remind his fellow citizens of the fact that the Count’s mother was Japanese.
Remind them, because it is due to that affinity that the Count has been written
a lot about in Japanese, with several Japanese television programmes based on
these writings devoted to him. An explanation for why he has not done so would
require an article of its own, but a generous gesture would be to state that he
simply missed the opportunity to point out that the fraternity with
What’s gone amiss?
It should be clear from
the above that Hatoyama’s EAC does not offer concrete guidelines on a number of
pertinent critical issues. First, he is not specific on its exact nature. In
I look forward to an [EAC] taking shape as an extension of the
accumulated cooperation built up step by step among partners who have the
capacity to work together, starting with fields in which we can cooperate –
[FTAs], finance, currency, energy, environment, disaster relief and more. Of
This indicates that the totality of the member nations would commit simultaneously to the areas agreed at the outset, then progress in a dynamic fashion to include the rest, which would be consistent with a single community that evolves incrementally. But then he returns to confuse when he refers to ‘open regionalism’ in his Singapore speech, which should come as no surprise at the end of the APEC summit: APEC has always claimed that it stands for open regionalism, one meaning of which is extending all member nations’ privileges to non-members. If that were the case, why ask for a ‘community’: all that would be needed is to simply promote ‘global’, not regional cooperation.
Second, and as is clear from the above quotation, it does not indicate how long it would take to become a reality. This compounds the previous point leading to an EAC which is open-ended both in terms of its nature and transition period to reality.
Third, it is not categorical on how precisely it relates to the EU experience. It mentions the historical background, the desire for eternal peace and the single currency, but does not depict these within the overall nature of club EU. Since a whole section is devoted to this, I shall return to this point there. However, with regard to the previous point, the EU set a transition period of twelve years, divided into three 4-year stages, for it to achieve its original 1957 aims, and beat the tariffs deadlines by eighteen months, but as just mentioned Hatoyama has no such clear vision.
Fourth, it is not
specific on which particular countries it should comprise. Indeed, pressed on
this point at the end of the meeting of the leaders of the countries of the
I stated earlier my belief that the
above, in his original paper,
Hatoyama refers to ASEAN,
vitally, considering that China will not enter into any negotiations that suggest
that Taiwan is not part of it (and that Hong Kong is already integral to it through
the one-nation-two-systems set up, but Hatoyama owns up to this), then China would
rule itself out from the start; indeed, all indications suggest that China
intends to be the leader in this and other respects and is setting its agenda
I shall return to some of these important considerations later in the paper but what is significant is that some of these issues have already been coherently addressed by the late President of Korea Roh Moo-hyun in 2007, directly in the manner that Hatoyama has set out in his EAC paper and speeches. It is intriguing that Hatoyama has chosen not to point this out, especially when it lends support to his dream; speculating on this would require a paper of its own, but I shall consider make a brief statement below.
Roh Moo-hyun’s NEAC
In 2007, the late Roh Moo-hyun, while still President of Korea, inspired by the driving forces behind the foundation of today’s EU, i.e. those that led to the Treaty of Paris (1951), creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which started operating on 1 January 1952, proposed the formation of a NEAC. Although both the idea itself and what the NEAC can learn from the EU experiences have since then been seriously debated in the political, business and academic circles, not much attention was drawn to it by politicians, especially when Roh Moon-hyun so soon left office and sadly committed suicide on 23 May 2009. The culprit could of course be his emphasis on the ‘northeast’, but the point just raised about Hatoyama not being categorical about which countries should be members clearly indicates that the east/northeast divide is a very thin one indeed, hence should be ignored, but I shall substantiate this in what follows.
In airing the NEAC idea, Roh Moo-hyun is very categorical:
Upon my inauguration in February 2003, I laid out
three major national policy goals: Establishment of participatory democracy,
balanced development of society, and the
opening of a new era for a peaceful and prosperous
He adds that:
For the past four years, I have proposed multilateral
security cooperation, as well as regional economic, cultural, and social
cooperation to realize the vision of a peaceful
He then draws lessons
Modern history of
To foster the creation of his regional community of peace and prosperity, he lays four pillars for its foundation:
The first is a new regional
order for economic cooperation and integration. Although economic
The second is the forging of ‘a
regime for multilateral security cooperation in
The third is the underscoring of the ‘role of the [
The fourth is the ‘need to
confront the past and build a common ground of historical understanding.
Note from the above that Roh Moo-hyun specifies as member nations
What do the NEAC and EAC have in common?
Before addressing the
question of what the proposed communities can learn from the ECSC experience,
it is important to highlight what the EAC and NEAC have in common. They both
want to involve some of the countries participating in the Six-Party Talks, but
Learning from the ECSC experience
Having established the close similarity of the NEAC and EAC, I am now in a position to deal with the question of what they can learn from the ECSC experience; obviously not of the entire EU experience since that would require a paper on its own right, and I have indeed done so. The ECSC has however been discussed a lot, so I shall be brief. But before doing so I must point to an irony: the creation of the ECSC by the Treaty of Paris in 1951 actually marked the parting of ways in post-war Western Europe since it was undertaken without the British (below) and Scandinavians, with the former, although back in the fold, is still seen as the black sheep of the family!
The immediate factor in the development of the ECSC was the revival
of the West German economy. The passage of time, the efforts of the German
people and the aid made available by the
The plan had a number of attractive features. First, it provided an
excellent basis for solving the ‘Saar problem’: the handing back of the Saar
As it turned out, the ECSC was much more to the federalists’ taste. That is because its executive body, the High Authority, was given substantial direct powers which could be exercised without the prior approval of the Council of Ministers, the ECSC’s second institution; it also had a Parliamentary Assembly and a Court of Justice.
plan received favourable responses from the Six (the BENELUX nations –
least three points about the ECSC are of direct vital relevance to the EAC and
NEAC. The first is that it was run by the High Authority which acted
independently of the governments of the member nations. In other words, the
High Authority was a truly supra-national institution. Given the experience in
Moreover, if an ECSC-like association is out of research, how feasible would be the attainment of higher levels of integration, leading to a full community? Even without a full community, the establishment of a single currency would require the creation of single central bank, as is the case in the EU, which would issue it, control the interest rate for the entire membership and be in charge of their foreign exchange reserves, i.e. another supra-national institution would be needed. And what are the prospects for resolving those ‘sensitive’ issues that both Roh and Hatoyama have mentioned but not specified? I believe it is vital to state something on these before concluding the paper.
Some Sensitive Issues
Due to space limitations, I will consider only four: the
Massacre, commonly known as the Rape
of Nanking, was an infamous war crime
committed by the Japanese military
(Nanking), then the capital of the Republic of China, after it fell to the Imperial Japanese Army on 13 December 1937. The duration of the
massacre is not clearly defined, although it is claimed that the violence
lasted until early February 1938. During the occupation of Nanking, the
Japanese army committed numerous atrocities, such as rape, looting,
and the execution
of prisoners of war and civilians.
Although the executions began under the pretext of eliminating Chinese soldiers
disguised as civilians, it is claimed that a large number of innocent men were
intentionally misidentified as enemy combatants and executed as the massacre
gathered momentum. A large number of women and children were also killed, as
rape and murder became more widespread. According to the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East,
estimates made at a later date indicate that the total number of civilians and
prisoners of war murdered in
The extent of the atrocities is debated between
Condemnation of the massacre is a major focal point of Chinese nationalism. In
Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine
Strong feelings by both China and Korea over official visits by Japanese prime ministers to the Yasukuni shrine, which honours both those who died fighting for Japan as well as war-time prime minister Hideki Tojo and Class-A war criminals. Since this is a real stumbling block in the efforts to normalise relations, a few words may be in order, but it should stated here that Hatoyama has publicly declared that he will not visit as such.
Yasukuni shrine is a ‘Shinto’ shrine
located in Tokyo
controversy surrounding the Yasukuni Shrine is due to the above mentioned fact
that since 1978, fourteen class-A war criminals are among the 2.5 million
people enshrined there. Because of this, the ‘official’ visits by several
Japanese prime ministers to the shrine since 1975 have
been causing concerns regarding a violation of the principle of separation of
church and state. For some people, especially in the Asian countries which
suffered most under past Japanese imperialism, mainly
Attempts to remove the war criminals from the Yasukuni Shrine have failed due to the shrine's refusal. Other discussions to solve the problem centre around plans to create a currently non-existent alternative to the Yasukuni shrine for commemorating and worshipping Japan's war dead, but Japanese prime minister Taro Aso was known to favour the building of a separate facility for the war-dead.
Although the number of the
abductees is in dispute, in the case of Japan, the DPRK, on 17 September 2002 during a visit by then Japanese
prime minister Junichiro Koizumi, officially admitted to thirteen of the
sixteen claimed by Japan; a possible seventeenth, concerning Kyoko Matsumoto,
has been under evaluation for official recognition since November 2006. Following that meeting, five
abductees were returned to Japan, including Hitomi Soga, and later her two
children and husband (a
Most of the abductees were in their twenties, although the youngest, Megumi Yokota, was 13 when she disappeared in November 1977 from the Japanese west coast city of Niigata. The DPRK claims that she committed suicide on 13 March 1994, but her remains did not meet the Japanese DNA test. It is believed that the victims were abducted to teach the Japanese language and culture at DPRK spy schools. Older victims were also abducted to obtain their identities, but these abductees are believed to have been killed immediately. It is also speculated that Japanese women were abducted to become wives to a group of DPRK-based Japanese terrorists after a 1970 Japan Airlines hijacking, and that some may have been abducted because they happened to witness DPRK agents in Japan, which may explain Yokota's kidnapping.
For a long time,
these abductions were denied by the DPRK and were often considered a conspiracy theory. Despite pressure by Japanese
parent groups, the Japanese government itself took no action because the
now-defunct Socialist Party of Japan, which had maintained close ties with the
DPRK, vehemently denied the abductions.
There are also claims that this issue is now being used by Japanese
nationalists, including former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, to further militarization, push for
revision of the Constitution in order to allow
The Comfort Women
‘Comfort Women’ is a euphemism for women forced into prostitution and sexual slavery for Japanese military brothels during World War II. Young women from countries under Japanese imperial domination were reportedly abducted from their homes against their will. In some cases, women were also recruited with offers to work in the military. It has been documented that the Japanese military itself recruited women by force. Many military brothels were run by private agents and supervised by the Japanese Army. Some Japanese historians, using the testimony of ex-comfort women, have argued that the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy were either directly or indirectly involved in coercing, deceiving, luring, and sometimes kidnapping young women throughout Japan's Asian colonies and occupied territories. Historians and researchers have claimed that the majority were from Korea, China and Japan, but women from the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Dutch East Indies, Indonesia, and other Japanese-occupied territories were also used in ‘comfort stations’. Such stations were located in Japan, China, the Philippines, Indonesia, then Malaya, Thailand, then Burma, then New Guinea, Hong Kong, Macau, and what was then French Indochina. It is estimated that about 200,000 have been procured, but some Japanese scholars believe it to be 20,000 while some Chinese scholars raise it substantially to 410,000.
The disagreement about the exact numbers is still continuing, leading to heated debates and encouraging further discord. The size and nature of sexual slavery by the Japanese military during World War II is still being actively debated because as the issue is still highly political in both Japan and Far East Asia, mainly due to Japan’s refusal to fully acknowledge the matter and pay appropriate compensations especially to those abductees who are still alive. There is extensive literature on the subject, but Hicks (1995), Himeta (1996) and Yoshimi (2000) provide excellent coverage.
These cases clearly show the deep rift that exists between the
members of the proposed communities, especially between
There are also disagreements between
What is of vital importance however is that all these cases are interconnected
since they all emanate from
conclusions arise from the examination of the EAC and what it can learn from
the ECSC. First, the EAC is not well articulated since Hatoyama does not
offer concrete guidelines on a number of pertinent critical issues related to
it. Indeed, his actions clearly indicate that he is in the process of figuring
out what it means: every time he utters something
on the EAC it comes as a surprise. One day it is a ‘community’, i.e. a deeply
involved association; the next day it is a cooperative effort in certain
fields; and then it is ‘open regional cooperation’. Also, he does not indicate how long it would
take to become a reality except that ‘
Second, it does not bode well for the EAC when Hatoyama fails to
acknowledge that the idea was not only fully articulated before him by the late
President of Korea Roh Moon-hyun, but was also clearly set out in Roh’s
election manifesto and made a major pillar of his government. If the failure is
due to ignorance, then how can he expect to be taken seriously by
Third, the drive for such communities is bound to be frustrated. This is because the impediments that have been the cause of friction in the region, the ‘sensitive issues’, the removal of which is fundamental to the creation of such communities will be around for a very long time. Given these impediments, the most that can be hoped for is a ‘preferential trade and investment arrangement’, precisely what Roh Moo-hyun ruled out for being minimal. Yet the experience with regional integration in this area shows that it has been difficult to go beyond that. For example, ASEAN is still not a free trade area and the APEC forum is nowhere near there despite its vehement statements after each summit to commit to one. This leaves one wondering in this particular context why another arrangement is needed, rather than the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 that are presently in the making.
Thus there is very little that the EAC and NEAC can learn from the ECSC experience. The ECSC had a High Authority which was an independent institution, taking its decisions without reference to the governments of the member nations. In other words, it was a supra-national institution. Clearly, no such institution would be feasible in this region and for a very long time to come.
Nevertheless, the proposed communities are admirable and should be desired by the whole world, not just the parties directly involved, so should receive our full and support.
(19917), The Rape of
2. Democratic Party of Japan (2005), DPJ Manifesto for the 2005 House of Representatives Election: Nippon Sasshin: Toward a Change of Government, to be found at http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/indexhtml
El-Agraa, Ali M. (ed.) (1997), Economic Integration Worldwide
El-Agraa, Ali M. (1999), Regional
Integration: Experience, Theory and Measurement (Macmillan:
El-Agraa, Ali M. (ed.) (2007), The European Union: Economics and Policies (
6. El-Agraa, Ali M. (forthcoming), “What can the East and Northeast Asian Communities learn from the EU?”
7. Fukukawa, Shinji (2009), “East Asian Community primer”, The Japan Times, 2 December.
8. Hata, Ikuhiko (1998), “The Nanking atrocities: fact and fable”, Japan Echo, vol. 25, no.4, and at: http://www.wellesley.edu/Polisci/wj/China/Nanjing/nanjing2.html
Yukio (2009a), “A new path for
10. Hatoyama, Yukio (2009b), “Address by H.E. Dr. Yukio Hatoyama, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Sixty-fourth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations”, 24 September. Can be accessed at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/UN/asembly2009/pm0924-2.html.
11. Hatoyama, Yukio (2009c), “
12. Hicks, George (1995), The Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in
the Second World War (
13. Himeta, Mitsuyoshi (1996), Nippon gun ni yoru ‘sankoo seisaku.sankoosakusen o megutte’ (Concerning the Three Alls Strategy/Three
Alls Policy by the Japanese Forces, but not available in English) (
14. Hirano, Ko (2009), “
15. Lipgens, Walter (1982), A
History of European Integration, vol. 1 1945-1947 (
16. Lyou, Byung-Woon (2004), “Building the Northeast Asian Community”, Journal of Global Legal Studies, vo. 11, no.2, pp. 257-310.
17. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (1998) ‘I am sorry?’, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec98/china_12-1.html
18. Ogoura, Kazuo (209), “Significance of East Asia”,
19. Roh, Moon-hyun (2007) “On history, nationalism and a Northeast Asian Community”, Global Asia, April 16, posted in Japan Focus on 19 May 2007: http://japanfocus.org/products/topdf/2424 and can be found also in http://www.japanfocus.org/articles/print_article/2424
20. Sahashi, Ryo (2009), Hatyoama’s new path and
21. Schmitter, Philippe C and Kim, Sunhyuk (2008), “Comparing processes of regional integration: European ‘Lessons’ and Northeast Asian reflections”, Current Politics and Economics of Asia, vol. 17, issue 1, pp. 11-58.
22. Times Online, ‘Nationalists fight ‘lie’ of Rape of Nanking’, http://timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article1455529.ece
23. Zongze, Ruan (2006), “
24. Yoshimi, Yoshiaki (2000), Comfort Women, Sexual Slavery in the
Japanese Military during World War II: Asia Perspectives (
 On 30 August 2009, DPJ transformed Japanese politics by dethroning the LDP, which, apart from nine months, had ruled Japan uninterruptedly and singlehandedly since the end of World War II (from 9 August 1993 to 28 April 1994, the coalition led by Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa was the first non-LDP government of Japan since 1955). It captured 308 of the 480 Lower House seats and with its prevailing majority in the Upper House, the less powerful of the two Diet chambers, its leader, Dr Yukio Hatoyama, had no match hence duly elected Prime Minister on 16 September 2009.
 Hatoyama (2009a).
 Hatoyama floated his EAC idea in a meeting
with Chinese President Hu Jintao in
 The promotion of voluntary regional cooperation in Asia has a longer history: it goes back to the 1979 Pacific Rim cooperation initiative by Japanese prime minister Masayoshi Ohira; see, inter alia, Fukukawa (2009).
 Roh Moo-hyun (2007).
Korean manifesto simply mentions the development of
 Hatoyama (2009a).
 In the original Japanese version of his paper, Hatoyama has this to say about fraternity: ‘Individuals have to solve what individuals can cope with. Families help individuals when solely individuals cannot. Regional communities and non-profit organizations help families when they cannot. If problems [cannot] be solved,…the public administration needs to be engaged. Basic municipalities have to undertake what they can solve. Region-wide municipalities have to undertake what basic municipalities cannot. Central government is in charge of what region-wide municipalities cannot undertake, such as diplomacy, national security, and macro-economic management. Also, as the next step, partial sovereignty, such as currency circulation control, can be transferred to international organizations, as [is] embodied in the EU’ (translated by Sahashi, 2009; italics added). No wonder the International Herald Tribune deleted it from its translation.
 Hatoyama (2009b).
 The APEC forum was established in 1989 by the
then six ASEAN nations (see footnote 13) plus
 “yu-ai”, pronounced yuu-ai, is a combination of two Chinese characters, called kanji in Japanese, with the first meaning ‘friend’ and the second ‘love’.
 See Shashi (2009) and Ogoura (2009).
 The ten members are
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Union of Myanmar (or
Burma), the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. ASEAN was
established on 8 August 1967 in
 Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (who in 1923 was the
Austrian founder-leader of the Pan-European
Movement, calling for the formation of a United States of Europe, his reason being the successful assertion
of Swiss unity in 1848, the forging of the German empire in 1871 and the
independence of the US in 1776) was the second son of Heinrich
Coudenhove-Kalergi (1859-1906), an Austro-Hungarian Count and diplomat of mixed
European origin, and Mitsuko Aoyama (1874-1941), a Japanese descendant of a
samurai family. The couple met in
 Hatoyama (2009c).
 Hatoyama (2009c).
 Hatoyama (2009c).
 See, inter alia, El-agraa (2007) for a discussion of this term.
 The 12 years were to be over by the end of December 1969, but the removal of tariffs on intra-trade and the establishment of the common external tariffs were achieved by 1 July 1968. See El-Agraa (2007).
 At the joint press conference by the leaders of Japan and the Mekong region countries following the Mekong-Japan summit meeting on 6-7 November 2009, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/statement/200911/07mekong_e.html
 Hatoyama (2009a).
 See, inter alia, Hirano (2009).
 Roh Moo-hyun (2007).
 The purpose of the Six-Party Talks between
 See Lyou (2004), Zongze (2006) and Schimtter and Kim (2008) and the references they cite.
 Sarah Palin, US Republican
vice-presidential candidate in 2008, claims to see the
splitting up of
 Hatoyama (2009b).
 See El-Agraa (forthcoming).
 See, inter alia, El-Agraa (1999 and 2007) for a detailed specification and discussion.
 See, inter alia, Hirano (2009) and Ogoura (2009).
 See El-Agraa (2009a,b).
 See El-Agraa (forthcoming).
 All information from the International Military Tribunal for the Far East can be obtained at: http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/IMTFE/IMTFE-8.html
 See Hata (1998) for details on the numbers involved and their sources.
 See, inter alia, Hata (1998).
NewsHour with Jim Lehrer 1998: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec98/china_12-1.html
 See Japanese lawmakers say ‘No massacre in
 Those so indicted by the Tokyo Tribunal following the end of World War II; for details, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Military_Tribunal_for_the_Far_East
 The Socialist Party of Japan and a number of others,
including academic researchers, have pointed out that, despite the abhorrence
of these abductions, it should never be forgotten that
[ BWW Society Home Page ]
© 2009-2010 The Bibliotheque: World Wide Society