Culture: Political Science:
Misunderstood Myanmar: Chapter III: The Milieu Interieur (Part II) By Koh Kim Seng, Ph.D. International Business Executive, Political
Scientist Singapore Editor’s Note:
This paper is the fifth of a series of chapters excerpted from Dr. Koh’s book,
‘Misunderstood Myanmar: An Introspective Study of a Southeast Asian State in
Transition’. With years of experience operating a business in Myanmar (Burma),
Dr. Koh has first-hand knowledge and a deeply practical understanding of the
economic and administrative opportunities and challenges currently existing in
the country. This segment explains Myanmar’s internal affairs scenario. -JP Addendum
Notation: Chapter 3 has been divided into three segments, the second of which
is presented here; the first segment of Chapter 3 was published in the
preceding issue of this Journal. - JP A
Perspective from the General’s Aide Having heard some of the Sayamagyi’s “reminiscences”
on “Burma’s Marshal Tito,” as some have labeled General Ne Win, and bearing in
mind what I have, over the course of years, heard about some of the reasons for
Myanmar’s “downturn,” I thought it prudent to pursue the subject further as
Sayamagyi had suggested. This I did with
my other key respondents who were aware of the goings on at the “power center”
at the time. At this chat session, I
raised the point of the attribution by many, that some of Myanmar’s problems
lie in the disaffected, disenfranchised and disgruntled (the “3-D”)
Myanmas. “Would this be fair comment?” I
asked. Brother, who had sat in as my “chairperson” rather
quietly and disinterestedly, responded thus: “I am not surprised over
this. Part of the problem is that our past
experience has perforce taught us not to release information too freely. The end result is that especially foreign
Myanmar watchers/analysts depend on the rumor mill, often enough propagating
and perpetuating misinformation, disinformation, half truths and to be
impolite, lies. Let me just illustrate a
couple of instances where such people (and subsequently their beneficiaries)
have been at the Government for many years.
Let me try to explain and you be the judge!” “Let us
consider the case of U Aung Gyi. He was
sent as Chief Negotiator, by Gen. Ne Win to Japan in September 1963 to discuss
Japanese Reparation payments. The amount
mooted was US$3.0 billion but he settled for US$300 million without reference
to the home Government as he had been instructed to do so by Gen. Ne Win before
his departure, for which reason all communications facilities were made
available to ‘report-back on discussions at all times.’ He failed to do so, until after his return. Gen. Ne Win was upset for two reasons, namely,
apparently the settlement amount was ‘unreasonable’ and was not even in cash
but in kind, by way of equipment and other such moveable assets like buses,
railways etc., left over in Myanmar by
Japan. This naturally constituted
“disobedience,” which is a very serious offence with the Military. Consequently, towards the end of 1963 / early
1964, Aung Gyi was removed from office
and exiled to the Northern Kachin State (Puta-O).” “In 1972 for the Yangon University blasting of
students on campus, Col. Sein Lwin who was Permanent Secretary in the Home
Affairs Ministry gave the order to have the paramilitary police force (Lon Htein) eject the students off the
campus resulting in a number of deaths. He
thus became known as the ‘Butcher.’
Apparently, on the side lines Aung Gyi made comments that those
responsible, the “culprits,” ought to be held responsible for the deaths and be
punished but Gen. Ne Win had said that considering the situation at the time,
it could not be helped. It seemed that
the feeling was that Aung Gyi ought to have known better than to have made such
comments and this caused unhappiness between the two.” “Furthermore, it appeared that in May 1987, in the
absence of Gen. Ne Win who was traveling overseas, U Aung Gyi wrote a 43-page Open
Letter criticizing the Government for the slackening GDP, the demonetization
exercise, the application of the LDC status.
This was circulated by U Aung Gyi to all foreign embassies, foreign and
local newspapers, the UN, etc., etc..
When Gen. Ne Win returned he found this out to his consternation, since
Aung Gyi was one of the “architects” of the LDC application. The LDC application had been sanctioned by
the Prime Minister, Maung Maung Kha as well as the Cabinet. This naturally was considered a non-kosher
practice and U Aung Gyi was made to do time.” “After his release from jail at 1.00pm on 16th
June 1988, U Aung Gyi made a
Speech in Sanchaung / Yangon – highlighting the ‘blunders’ of the
Government but rather cleverly advising / warning people ‘not to touch the Tatmadaw; not even with the mind,’ that
is, not even contemplate or to think of such a move.” I quickly interjected, “this seems odd
because if by the time he had been so disillusioned and disgruntled with Gen. Ne Win and therefore with the Tatmadaw, why was he trying to support
the Tatmadaw again?” Brother explained that “at the time it was
generally felt and rumored that there
was going to be a coup d’état and the general feeling or belief was
apparently that U Aung Gyi felt that there was a chance for him to emerge as
Number 1 in which event he should need to give his backing to the Tatmadaw.” I then remarked, naively, “but U Aung Gyi was, as
you said, very close to and was indeed one of Gen. Ne Win’s advisors, so how
could this happen?” The patient reply
from Brother was: “[That’s just the point. A long time ago, in one of our
chats, I said that one of our problems is that there are too many disgruntled,
disaffected, disenfranchised Myanmas.
This is only one case; there are many others. But if it is of any consolation in this
special case, according to Col. Khin Maung Than, the then Military Attaché in
London who arranged for the return to Yangon of U Aung Gyi’s wife after
her demise in London after unsuccessfully seeking medical treatment there, in
1972 (and Brother knew both the people), his assessment was that ‘Ne Win and
Aung Gyi are as different as day and night’ and that ‘not even Jesus can
reconcile the two.’ “But why so, is the question,” I wondered aloud. To pursue the matter further, I queried, “You said
this is ‘only one case.’ Can you cite some other significant case?” “This is not a problem,” Brother replied,
“because albeit not a terribly
significant figure at the time, I had the opportunity to have worked close
enough to the powers that be. So, the
other ‘significant figure/case’ is that of Gen. Tin Oo who was in his time
Chief of Staff/Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. In 1963, Gen. Tin Oo’s second son was in
London for treatment against Leukemia but unfortunately he did not make it and
expired. Gen. Tin Oo then unilaterally chartered an aircraft to bring the
corpse back to Yangon without permission/authorization of the Ministry of
Defense or any “higher ups.” This was
disallowed as being “irregular” because the normal practice is to have the
corpse properly dressed/packed and returned to Yangon by normal
airfreight/flight and thus it sparked off disagreement with Gen. Ne Win.” “Furthermore
around 1972/1973, the Government had a stage performance in the State Guest
House. As a result, musical instruments
had to be brought in and for the purpose the person assigned to supervise this
was the Personal Assistant of Gen. Tin Oo.
Fortunately or unfortunately inspection was made of every crate which
was supposed to hold the musical instruments.
Apparently what was found in some crates were various arms. This fell on the shoulders of Gen. Tin Oo,
who was apparently ‘linked’ to the episode - so you can understand.” Brother
continued, “both U Aung Gyi and Gen. Tin Oo subsequently hooked up with Aung
San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and became Central Committee Members of the NLD with U Aung
Gyi leaving the group later on because he disagreed with ASSK’s approach
towards the Country and the Government.
Also, in this connection there is yet another significant player, namely
U Aung Shwe who became the Chairman of the NLD, of which ASSK is Secretary
General. And so,
Brother concluded, “what you have heard is correct. You should know of the primary actors of Myanmar’s
recent history and you can draw your own conclusions as to whether or not the
Country’s position/situation would have been different without such
‘disgruntled, tangential forces’ acting, and whether or not the Government has
utilized such people as expedient excuses for the measured rate of development
and for always being careful and skeptical.” Independence First and Last I made arrangements for another “casual” dinner cum thesis research session for the
purpose of ascertaining the state of play as far as infrastructural and other
developments go. For this, the general sense, as stated earlier in this Thesis,
is that Myanmar is caught in a “time warp” and that developments thus far have
been merely “cosmetic.” After the usual “niceties,” I remarked that, “you
know the usual allegations about Myanmar having been caught in a time warp and
developments taking place in Myanmar being merely cosmetic. Is this fact or fiction?” The response of
BG. Myo Thant, former Minister of
Information, was that “there have been ups and downs in Myanmar history
since our Independence. Then we launched
into self dependence in the early 60s and actually we were cut off from the
world, virtually. We bothered no one and likewise no one bothered us. We were at peace with ourselves and we
managed. However, expectedly, without
foreign finance, technology and interaction we slipped. When we opened up post-1988 and foreigners of
all hues came, naturally they were understandably shocked to see the state of
repair of our infrastructure. This is
particularly true of foreigners who have visited or lived or in one way or
another worked with, on or in Myanmar in the 1950s when we were well ahead of
other Southeast Asian countries. Hence
the reason for the comment on our ‘time warp.’
It was an ‘experiment’ we tried out with the obvious consequence that
the world passed us by.” “But what about the ‘cosmetic’ part?” I
interrupted. Brother responded, saying,
“You have been here for nearly 20 years and you have seen for yourself, so what
is there for us to say. In any case I
feel that this is another mistaken notion.
In the early days post 1988 naturally, we had to tidy up the urban areas
– sprucing up of buildings, road repairs, removing shanty towns, improving
telecommunications and public utilities, etc etc, so visitors concluded that
developments were ‘cosmetic.’ We had to
start somewhere but of course, especially for Myanmar, there are many
‘detractors’ who are usually foreigners abetted by their local “satellites.” “To tell you objectively, by the first half 1990s,
foreign business interests were ‘shocked’ by the progress we had made – in our
economic, political and social fronts.
Foreign Direct Investments were pouring in, trade with our neighbors had
become so important to them, that every time our trading borders were closed,
for one reason or another, they felt the pinch.
This to the extent that for the year 2000 we were ranked 4th
in the world for economic growth or GDP (Gross Domestic Product) by Asiaweek.26 Furthermore with our 1996 ‘Visit Myanmar
Year’ Sports Event held at the Aung San Stadium in 1996 when all members of the
Diplomatic Corps and other foreign direct investors were invited and attended,
that same evening the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Voice of America
(VOA), Australia Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) etc. were shocked over the
scale and display with parachutists dropping into the Stadium with colored
smoke signals etc., etc., that they commented on it. This also applied to the Trade Expositions we
held at the Tatmadaw Hall. These were attended by the foreign and diplomatic
community and they could not believe that these were of such an international
standard. One of our Ministers making opening speeches at various expositions gave
figures on trade and other Foreign Direct Investments received. The foreigners were shocked!” “In retrospect, perhaps we have been a little too
“loud.” Perhaps we should have kept a
low profile and not revealed our progress.
The wonder must have been, when and how did this sleepy and sleeping
country wake up?” “You mean to say these foreigners did not know what
had been happening over the period 1988 – 1996?” I enquired. Brother responded, “of course those involved
directly in oil and gas, forestry, gemstones, knew well. They had been prospecting/dealing, but this
does not imply that the others, including foreign diplomatic representatives
and foreign businessmen (not in these trades), knew. Certainly they did not have gross/cumulative
trade statistics as we do not normally issue them, but these were trade expositions
and we had to reveal some figures. If
you will only recount, you will see that trade sanctions came about only after
1996 (and the Asian Financial Crisis occurred in 1997). Do you think that this is a mere
accident? This is in part, because the
US feels that we are a ‘China surrogate’ as well; we know the problem!” At this juncture BG. Myo Thant chipped in: “I cannot
contribute to the analyses just made by Brother, but I can tell you my own
observations. Having had to visit many
places throughout the Country over the years, the changes I saw in the
landscape in Heho in the early 1990s compared to changes over a 5-year period,
were just amazing. Everything became so
beautiful and well planned. In the
Northern Shan State, roads which were not tarred a few years earlier were now
paved and there was heavy traffic flowing – surprisingly, trucks, container
semi-trailers, motor cars, motor-cycles, etc.
The only bad thing I would say is that there were toll-stations set up
and one had to pay. It is amazing how
quickly our Transport Minister caught up with the developed world, collecting
toll!” What a “bad habit,” he commented facetiously. “To put it in simple terms,” BG. Myo Thant
concluded, “infrastructural developments were so rapid that I hope the people
do not expect the same rate of development because if we are unable to keep up
with their expectations, there might be trouble for us.” Personally, over a 10 – 15 year period of 4 – 6
weekly visits to Yangon and Mandalay, flying as well as by road transport, I
could not help seeing the tremendous infrastructural and social developments
which had taken place in the Country – roads, bridges, housing development,
schools, universities, hospitals, new townships, the greening of what used to
be vast exposed barren lateritic soil (seen from my flights) and indeed even
the change in weather in Mandalay.
Mandalay used to be extremely hot with hardly any rain being in the
“arid zone,” but in the last few years, rain fell now and then and indeed there
had even been floods periodically in more recent years!” Personal observations aside, I found this session to
be of special interest because clearly it turned out to be a collective, honest
self-assessment of sorts or even an evaluation of the SLORC / SPDC Government’s
performance, in general. Considering this I tried to probe their reticence to
speak up in the open when, among close friends, they were so analytical. I therefore remarked, “you know the general
feeling outside is that Myanmar Generals in particular and the bureaucrats in
general are a bunch of goons or oafs.”
Indeed it has been alleged that Myanmar Generals are knuckle heads and
that if one were to ‘put 4 Generals together, their educational level would not
add up to standard 3’ as already mentioned.
Yet I have known all of you for many years now and I know your
capabilities. Why don’t you make a
rebuttal to such allegations?” BG. Myo Thant’s response was, “We are not, under our
military regulations, permitted to reveal such personal details.27 But you know all of us here today have
been trained academically and professionally overseas. But do not fret because what you have said is
nothing. We have had worse names hurled
at us. We know you must have come across
in your research, how as early as 1796 – 1798 Captain Hiram Cox, the British
Resident in Rangoon labeled our Burmese Court ‘an assembly of clowns and their
followers (as an) ungrateful, rapacious, cruel, treacherous, avaricious and
lazy lot’ according to Dr. G.T. Bayfield. This caricature was finally debunked
by Dr. DGE Hall as being ‘full of blemishes.’29 Further, one Captain Michael Symes based in
Yangon (1802) considered our King Bodawpaya, ‘a half mad bigot’ with little
regard for the laws of the nation in spite of his having admitted that he
enjoyed ‘unlimited freedom,’ and had attention paid to his every representation
and subject.”30 With the ‘moderns,’ I can tell you that people like
Josef Silverstein writing on the 1988 Riots referred to the ‘brutal suppression
of the people’ and of the use of unbridled violence. Then at a UN General Assembly Meeting held in
Rome in 1988, it was known that an international criminal court was mooted to
try states as individuals involved in ‘genocide,’ implying that Myanmar ought
to face the music.”31 “Precisely,” I interrupted, “so why do you not do
some thing about it?” BG. Myo Thant
replied, “the fact is that it is a waste of time trying to debate such topics
publicly. It is expensive in terms of
money and time. Issues may be brought up in Cabinet and debated but there is no
certainty that decisions will be taken.
All depends on the ‘higher ups’ (Ahted
Lugyi).32 Generally we are a military government and
this being the case we do not as a rule try to climb over our superior’s head.”
I commented, “although currently this is not done,
what happens when you are forced to make a decision with an investor, for
example, and the terms breach the Laws of the State?” BG. Myo Thant replied, “this depends on the
individual minister in charge. There are
other ways around the problem. It
depends on the power, grit, determination and imagination of the particular
Minister but obviously some solution has to be found or he is stuck.” I admitted frankly that I had a friend who
had a sticky problem with his contract conditions once, but it was finally
solved.33
B.G. Myo Thant then queried, “so how did your friend solve it? Use the same method then. Your friend is clever and he clearly knows
our early fight for Independence, history.”
He said that Myanmas have over the decades inherited and perpetuated
what is generally known as the “larmei
kyar mei” (On its way but may take a long while), malope machauk mapyoke
(One cannot go wrong if one did nothing) syndrome. He intimated that delays came about because
people tended to drag their feet and they drag their feet because they are not
sure of what to do. Thus to prevent committing
any errors they suspend things because
if one did not make decisions, one could not go wrong. It was said that at ministerial level,
however, they did not see such conduct directly. However, it appeared that they knew about
this. It had become a “culture” in the
bureaucracy practically. But they are
aware of it and had been correcting this since they had complaints from Foreign
Direct Investors. “The situation has
improved considerably. I hope you have
experienced this yourself,” BG. Myo Thant ended. Having (cleared) some of the “niggling past,” I then
moved the dialogue on by asking if there were “ups” in Myanmar’s (recent) past,34 rather vaguely to allow any good man
to utilize his own standard and assessment be that economic, political,
sociological or whatever. Having heard
their analyses of their past problems and after their new found “Plaque Spring”
of 1988, I was interested to ascertain where they were headed. BG. Myo Thant commenced: “With our new found ‘Second
Independence – 1988,’ the SLORC Government’s move may be summed up in three
rhymes: increase in the export of rice, diversification of cultivated crops—rice
and other agricultural products, including multiple cropping of rice – and the
adoption of new methods and technologies in agriculture.” “This is not to mention,” he added, to their
agreement, “the advent of private commercial farming propelled by incentives
offered through the promotion of border trade with neighboring countries and
improved internal infrastructure, as well as the growth of private trucking
business.” The financial sector, Brother
clarified, was “relaxed, including most importantly the plan to solve the
problem of locals handling/possessing foreign currency for which some
“intermediate exchange mechanisms” (use of Foreign Exchange Certificate – “FEC”
subsequently) were implemented to facilitate local or foreign trade/business. This had been a complaint raised by many
locals and foreigners. Locals were not
permitted to hold foreign currencies, prior to this and this impeded business,
especially trading.” “Most
importantly” Brother emphasized, “was the movement away from our long held
dirigisme. In our macro–economy we
instituted market economy, the invitation of foreign direct investments (FDI’s)
and the opening up of the border trade with China and Thailand.” “These moves greatly changed the general
state of affairs in the Country,” BG. Myo Thant chipped in, as Brother
continued, “and the stimulant was the move to enhance the centripetal forces
holding the Country together by trying to nullify the centrifugal forces made
up of the secession seeking Minority/National Races, insurgents, narcotics
groups and even the straggling communists, by inviting them back to the legal
fold. Secondary to this, after
delivering the ‘economic good,’ was to attend to the local political tangential
forces which were being egged on by their external paymasters with their own
agendas.” I was
pleasantly surprised to see that they knew, in my estimation, where they were
headed and that within their ambit of control, they were indeed prepared to
make amendments and changes. This is
with the caveat that their egos are not bruised, that is, if they feel changes are brought about by
their own volition and not that they are pushed into the change – a very
important factor in my estimation from my 20 years experience, for all parties
pushing for change in Myanmar to bear in mind. In the context, as an aside, I might comment, in the
tradition of the “father” of history, Herodotus, that one must remember that
history must have a soul! From the way
the international community has been pushing for change in Myanmar, it is to my
mind a case of the soul of history having been left on the backburner with
nothing learned from it. The pearls of
wisdom of the past colonialists, their bureaucrats, arising from their very acute
observations of Myanmas have either been completely forgotten, overlooked or
simply neglected, not to say that of the observations of the more modern,
objective, analysts / scholars. Indeed just to recall as a matter of expediency a
couple of observations, Myanmas held, even from the days of the Kongbuang
dynasty (and unfortunately seem to hold even now,) namely the Ptolemaic view as
opposed to the more modern Copernican one that the world is made up of four
continents with Mt. Mor (Mt. Meru) as the axis of the sun and the centre of the
continents and the Myanmar Throne / King as the cosmic center, so that the
place of the Throne is designated “mandalay” signifying/implying it is a
Mandala state.35 It is also known that the SLORC / SPDC does
not desire to have foreigners “play the role of financiers of the production”
especially if it is not allowed to direct the drama according to its “own artistic political preferences.”36 Yet another example, which amazingly the group of
key respondents seems to recall well is that, as Brother stated, “it was the
crumbling of the resolve of the Bureaucrats / Government that caused the
problems.” Brother narrated the case of
student riots, which were started because Aung San was expelled because of his
criticism of the Bursar and Principal of Rangoon University when he was
studying there. On remonstrating, the
Government backed down and he was reinstated.
“This was a signal to the students of their possibilities,” Brother noted. In the case of the well known Oil-Field Workers’
strike arising out of a worker having been suspended when he was absent without
leave, the Suspension Order was removed because “it appeared that the
Government ‘feared’ the workers,” according to Brother. The moral of these lessons is that the Government
must always stay firm as demonstrated in history and these have been recorded by others. Thus in my estimation taking a hard ball
approach in pushing for change will have very little chance of success, if at
all. The government knows all too well
from experience that it cannot and must not be “soft.” Which brings us to the way the 1988
Conflagration was dealt with – armored vehicles, tanks, guns etc. “How did the Government manage to contain it
so quickly?” I asked. Brother was quick
to reply: “One of the reasons the Conflagration stopped so quickly and the
students defected to the jungles is that some one had ‘deviously’ or ‘cleverly’
let out the word to the market that the beheadings, arson, looting and total
loss of law and order were considered ‘uncivilized behavior,’ so that it must
be stopped at all and any costs to save the Country.” This was reminiscent, he added, “of Gen. Ne
Win’s earlier reminder that if there was any trouble, their teams of army would
not shoot into the air but directly (on the offenders/rioters).” “But,” I interjected, “Declaration 1/88 for the
formation of the SLORC and Declaration 2/88 covering the Dissolution of the
formal State Organs were made on 18th September 1988 whereas Gen. Ne
Win retired on 7th July 1987 and by 10th July 1988 signs
of trouble were already very much in the air.
For example, as I recall, you mentioned once that posters were already
stuck on the walls of the Kyaiksan grounds denouncing the Burma Socialist
Program Party (BSPP) as ‘fakes’ and by 14th July the Yangon Institute
of technology students started rioting. So
what happened in between this date till the 18th September 1988?” Brother replied, “Oh plenty. On 18th July student
demonstrations started in Sanchaung Township and this escalated to full force
by 8th August 1988.” Brother
provided me with the following list he made of the major events: 9th August: Tatmadaw
took strategic positions in Country. 10th August: 6 men of war vessels (US), sighted in the
Andaman Sea 11th
August: US Ambassador summoned by Government
and ordered vessels out; Battle at Mong Yaung with Burma Communist Party (BCP)
forces (big battle for BCP to capture ground). 12th
August: Rumors floated in Yangon that
Burma Navy and Air Force chiefs had “defected,” joining forces with rioters
controlled by Aung San Suu Kyi. Navy /
Air Force was going to shell Parliament House where the BSPP Congress was being
held. Myanmar Air Force / Navy would be shelling / bombing all key installations. 13th
August: Congress still on, but no
shelling. Rear. Adm. Maung Maung Khin (Chief of Navy) and Gen. Tin Tun (Chief
of Air Force,) confirmed reports untrue and were solidly behind
government. They would protect the
Country. They then went on air to announce this. 14th
August: Conclusion and dissolution of
the BSPP (Declaration 2/88.) “So you see,” Brother explained, “many senior
government members, (a number of whom later decided to assist with my research)
were all huddled in Parliament having discussions and meanwhile the Tatmadaw was fighting big battles and
containing the Conflagration.”37 The above notwithstanding, in the aftermath of the
1988 Conflagration the new military-administered Government headed by Gen. Saw
Maung assumed power, following which a new grand strategy consisting of three
cardinal national aims, namely: non-disintegration of the Union,
non-disintegration of National Solidarity and perpetuation of the nation’s
sovereignty, were emphasized. For the
attainment of these goals, it was envisaged that the SLORC, officially formed
on September 18, 1988, would proceed by way of what was labeled ‘The Four Main
Tasks,’ to wit: 1.
Ensuring
law and order, peace and tranquility; 2.
Smooth
and safe transportation; 3.
Adequacy
of public livelihood; and 4.
Holding
of multi-party democratic general election, in the interest of the State and
People. The tenor was thus set for succession from the
single-party system, in what was envisaged would be a smooth transition, after
some two years of active “revamp” of economic condition/system by the
Government, to a multi-party democratic system through the “restoration of law
and order,” to achieve peace, tranquility and progress. According to BG. Myo Thant, “post the Conflagration
no stone was left unturned to confront and apprehend the western-bankrolled
local forces and even the communist-manipulated political activists of all
hues; the secessionists, communists, drug dealers, the armed insurgents, the
last posing as refugees in neighboring countries; to try to put a stop to the
intervention of foreign political forces - the USA / EU in particular - and
even to deal with some neighboring states - enemies of the state - in order to
move ahead.” The SLORC, in view of the
very extenuating chaotic condition earlier, inter
alia, put into effect Martial Law.
Subsequent control, it was said, was then implemented with SLORC
insiders’ perception of what was the “proper democratic delineation” of the
State’s powers “in the exigency of the situation,” at the time. According to BG Myo Thant, “the Legislature has the
right and duty to formulate or promulgate laws, and this right is lodged with
the SLORC; and of course the SLORC had to assume Executive powers.” To this my retort was, “Isn’t it that
‘democratic governance’ must be such that no single primary governmental
branch, e.g., executive, judiciary, or legislative, overlaps [in power] with
other branches of Government?” This query
was raised by me because it is an open secret that practically everybody held
the Myanmar Government to be totalitarian (not just autocratic) and a number of
my Singaporean/Malaysian friends, who were senior bureaucrats or businessmen
involved in external relations and business in the Myanmar sector, had enquired
what laws formed the basis of public administration in Myanmar and whether or
not there was a separation of functions in the various limbs of
governance. Bearing in mind the “apprehension” especially of
bureaucrats involved in foreign affairs and of foreign business people
conducting business in Myanmar as just stated, I mentioned that scholars like
Robert Taylor had said that at one time, after some ten years under Gen. Ne
Win, the latter tried to “withdraw” and attempted to pass authority or delegate
to subordinates but found that both policy development as well as its implementation
became lax. In Taylor’s words Myanmar
became an UNCTAD (Under No Circumstances Take Any Decision)38 country, seeming to imply that the
whole bureaucracy had lapsed into atrophy because the government had been run
on a somewhat “totalitarian/autocratic” manner for too long, although there
must have been other reasons. The response from Brother to this observation was
that, “the new [SLORC] Government, although military, adapts the democratic
system. There is a clear separation of
governmental functions into the legislative, judiciary and executive limbs
responsible to the Cabinet which is chaired by the Hon. Senior General. This is why we have various ministries. SLORC is not precluded from delegating
powers to States and Divisions by Regional/Divisional Commanders, some of whom
are SLORC members and such powers are executed at State or Division, District,
Township, and Ward or Village and Tract levels as well as by the local Law and
Order Restoration Councils.” “While it is good to be assured that there is a
clear separation of functions, it seems a rather complex and circuitous way of administration.
Why not control directly from the
center?” I asked. One of the objectives of this arrangement, Brother
replied, “is to have the administrative / governing functions undertaken
through a form of ‘collective leadership.’
Additionally, this serves as a means of training service personnel to
perform such functions by freeing them from party politics and departmental
work. Because of the clear separation of
functions in Government, taking the example of the judiciary, though the Chief
Justice, Attorney General and the High Court are located in Yangon, in practice
courts of Law in different States/Divisions right down to Townships located in
such areas in the Country are operative and these handle civil and criminal
cases to ensure that due process is followed with full judicial independence as
the circumstances allow.” Brother added, “it is because of this delegation,
decentralization of functions/duties that it was admitted by someone at one of
our ‘Sessions’ that the Government had no illusions that because of this
‘judicial independence,’ being placed at a distance from the locus of control
and poor communications some ‘hanky panky’ might occur but that those involved
do meet their ‘nemesis’ when found out; this same system is applied to all the
other ministries as well.39 So you can see that although control by and
large lies in Yangon, decentralization and delegation in a democratic and
rule/law based system occurs, you might say in a rather tough, military-like
top down way. In a sense we appreciate
that if at all ‘hanky panky’ occurs it is caused by the relatively low public
sector salaries, but we are also looking into this area and as soon as we can
strengthen our economic base, something will be done!” “If you are still wondering, for example whether the
judiciary is independent and you have any doubts whether civil and criminal
cases are handled independently in different parts of the Country, judicial
independence is total and I might recommend you read our SLORC Declaration No.
1/90 of July 27th 1989 para 19, on Law courts, judicial independence
etc. In the context, you will recall
that the son of one of our Brothers, a General, was involved in a motor
accident. He was sent to jail where he
had to sit for his final medical examination.
There was no getting around the problem.
Luckily he passed his exams and today he is full fledged foreign-trained
cardiologist. Furthermore you are
yourself aware that a Director General of a Ministry was dismissed because he
approved the application for one piece of land on the basis the applicant was
the daughter of one of our ahted lugyis. Even in your own case, in
both your projects you could not get land leases of more than 30 years, even
though you tried. You know yourself
perhaps, how the facts differ from the usual foreign media reports.40
In the context of course there is some measure of corruption, nepotism,
cronyism, etc., but such malpractices are being monitored all the time and if
established beyond doubt the culprit is made to face the music.” One weekend, I arranged another chat and meal with
my key respondents because this is quite convenient. Ministers have their personal assistants even
on weekends, whereas certain weekdays like Thursdays are “hopeless” because it
is “Cabinet Day.” At this session, I
commented that SLORC is in place as we know, but I asked, “is the de jure status accepted by the people,
really?” In general terms, there was consensus by those present including
Brother, Sir, Cousin and others at this Session that after the 1988
Conflagration, SLORC is not an organization which observes any prior
Constitution, but that SLORC never intended to govern the nation under Martial
Law as a military administered government, initially. However circumstances were such that there
was, according to Brother, “no other organization which had the wherewithal to
run the country and SLORC, encompassing the Tatmadaw,
was thrust with the problem. As it
turned out, within a relatively short period of time, the de jure status of the SLORC government was recognized by the UN and
the world at large as a duly constituted government.” BG. Myo Thant added that “the military
administered government, SLORC, was, ipso
facto, recognized as the de facto, and
the de jure government of the Union
of Myanmar.” Quite
apart from the generally held and reckoned view of the military Junta being “repressive” although it is
accepted as the de jure government of
Myanmar by the world at large, M.S. Dobbs-Higginson’s piece quoted below
presents a rather different picture from the popularly
held belief that the SLORC/SPDC government is totalitarian and as some
may think, that the leaders are “bigoted” and
resistant to change. According to
Dobbs-Higginson: It is
interesting to note that since SLORC was formed, there has been no military
dictator. There has been no Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek, no General Park
Chung Hee, and no President Ferdinand Marcos figure. Rather, SLORC has been,
and still is, a collective leadership and thus is more balanced and reasonable
in approach. The top members of SLORC
realized that jointly, they must bring about change, albeit gradually.41 Unquestionably,
this opinion runs contrary to the popular view that the Regime is
totalitarian. My own empirical
observations as well as that of “small
talk” with some of the Generals point in the same direction as that of
Dobbs-Higginson. Simply put, the
SLORC/SPDC realizes that change is inevitable.
Those in charge are constantly grappling with this problem but it is the
modality or pathway to bring about this change and the rate of change
(especially when it seems that it is really the milieu exterieur that is pushing for it), which annoys the
Government. The
historical baggage of having been taken for a ride by past colonialists is the
cause of the Junta Generals’ fear and
skepticism, especially when the British are involved. The quarter century of “closeting” under
NeWinism and the worry of making yet another wrong move in advancing
precipitously, weigh down heavily on the Junta
members, from what I could gather over the years. They seem to be haunted by the past. In the
above context, these words of Brother, who was deeply involved in policy
planning were particularly eloquent: “It is easy to change but history has
shown that we have been deceived politically, economically, and socially by the
West and the other colonialists. We have
changed more than once, from the Stone Age to the Feudal Age. But change has been gradual with perhaps
unfortunately power being the doctrine of success and stability. In our modern history change has too often
been done too quickly. The question is
who will underwrite the damage if the change is wrong? Let us get our basic infrastructure right,
first – micro and macro-economic - food, shelter, transport, communications,
removal of the problem of the secessionists elements, insurgents, drug lords,
communists, trade and investments, etc., etc., before we can talk of the political
position and international relations - no thanks to our colonial masters. Given time, change will yet come but it will
be from within and the armed forces will play a crucial role.” Having
heard my key respondents out and looking at events post the 1997 joining of
ASEAN, it is obvious that change can still occur with the Myanmar
Government. The Junta’s participation in regionalism clearly demonstrates that not
having any particular “fear” or “prejudice” in dealing with Southeast Asian
states, there is no question that the Junta
can change – they have indeed become quite “Asianphile,” which is a very far
cry from the early days pre – 1988. To
quote, BG. Myo Thant, “you know that from time to time, we have had problems
with our neighbors but at the end of it all, we can and do reconcile and change
because they do not interfere with our internal problems but only with a
particular problem, mainly, for example, boundary.” The Tatmadaw
On my request to the Group to “elaborate on the Tatmadaw,”
Brother Myo Thant commented with, “The Tatmadaw
is the pivotal institution on and around which practically all of Myanmar’s
governance hinges, internally. While on
the one hand the populace is cognizant that it was the Tatmadaw members which secured independence for the country and
ensured its overall survival and integrity whenever there was a crisis,
paradoxically on the other, externally, it has been viewed that as the vehicle
running the government it is repressive, totalitarian, guilty of human rights abuses,
etc. Indeed the fact is that even from
the very early days, “all matters” no matter how trivial had to be referred to
the Cabinet42 and the Cabinet is the Tatmadaw members. This sentiment is strong enough for journalist
Dominic Faulder to report what one of the NLD leaders, U Kyi Maung said in mid
– 1990, namely, that “some personalities of the Tatmadaw should be sent to the Nuremburg Trials,”43 implying that the Generals are
responsible for all the alleged human rights abuses. The foregoing
notwithstanding, the role of the Tatmadaw
traditionally and historically is probably best encapsulated by Dr. Maung
Maung, a legal scholar and the last President of the Socialist Republic of the
Union of Myanmar, when he wrote in his magnum opus The Tatmadaw and its Role in the National Politics, inter alia, that : “the Tatmadaw was conceived … in national
liberation struggles … in anti-fascist movement.” Its policy at the time was “Freedom”
throughout – this policy and concept being consistent with the aspirations of
(the) “national political forces.”
Later, when the Tatmadaw had
to “wage anti-fascist resistance” its policy under the Tatmadaw leadership changed to “Independence … Democracy …
Socialism,” in order of priority and to “have an alliance with democratic
forces to wage an anti-fascist (resistance) struggle.” The Communist and Socialist Parties on the
other hand wanted socialism.44 Coming from one no less than Dr.
Maung Maung, a highly considered individual, it is patently clear that the Tatmadaw has a pivotal role to play in
national affairs. Nevertheless he does
not provide any insight into the whyfores of
how the Tatmadaw got into such
a pivotal position in the national political, sociological and economic
architecture. This is particularly true
when considered in the light of the oft repeated assertion that the Tatmadaw is the savior of the Country
firstly and secondly of the claim that the military Junta of SLORC/SPDC are “superior people” who hold sway not only
over “this worldly” matters but also the “other worldly” affairs. In short, Myanmar cannot do without the Tatmadaw and the Generals are
omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient – both on earth and even when pertaining
to “extra terrestrial” matters, it appears.
The impression I get talking to the public and private sector
individuals is that there is general acceptance that the Tatmadaw did indeed fight for independence, got the Union going and
continue to maintain autonomy and sovereignty of the State because they are
people of high karma. However the negative aspect is that power is
utilized all the time and that they have total monopoly of this even as many
people hope that this might change. Considering what turned out in my research, I
decided to call upon my key respondents, who are mainly Tatmadaw generals, to see their take on how they succeeded so well
in creating and holding such a nodal position in all spheres of Myanmar life
and living. At this get together with my
key respondents, after the usual exchange of pleasantries, I raised the
question of how it is that, within the ASEAN states, it is patently clear that
only in Myanmar does the military, the Tatmadaw,
virtually run the whole country even though in the other States, technically,
civilians run and form the Government and run the country even if these
civilian leaders are most of the time backed fully by the military. “What an enviable position to be in. What is
the secret?” I queried. Brother’s retort was, “I am not sure whether it is
an envious or unenvious position to be in, in the first place. It is hard work and even in terms of human
casualties, the Tatmadaw suffers
heavily fighting insurgents, secessionists (this has in recent years been a lot
better), communists, drug armies, not to mention discontented citizens,
militant students, external hegemons and their local nominees / ‘axe handles,’
uncoupling and demolishing the vestiges of unsuited and incongruent western political
philosophies of overly enthusiastic practitioners of liberalism, and so forth.” “The result is that as part of the Government and as
members of the Tatmadaw we have to
keep our eyes open and ears peeled all the time. Most trying and it appears sometimes to be a
thankless job, but the milieu exterieur
gets the impression we are having a whale of a time. This is not to say generals do not take some
advantage of their position. Some do,
but any non kosher practices only leads one to his nemesis.” “I quite understand,” I remarked, “having seen how
you Generals had to work virtually 18-20 hours a day in the first few years
post the 1988 Conflagration. But quite
apart from this, how did you get to such a nodal position controlling the whole
country?” Brother continued, “I am glad you asked this because
we note most people draw conclusions without fully knowing the history,
political development, culture, phenomenology, psyche, morass, etc., of the
people/country as well as the Tatmadaw. Hence let me say that from the analyses,
criticism and perception of even so called experts on Myanmar, I must say, with
respect that some of these are overly simplistic and some are written in vacuo,
for two main reasons. The first is the Tatmadaw and Myanmar cannot be analyzed
by the occasional or short term visits nor, secondly, by secondary source
materials, though understandably primary source material on Myanmar is
extremely difficult to come by, no thanks to our former colonialists – we have
been played out too many times to let information out too freely. Secondary source material tends to suffer the
defect that if the initial assumptions/analyses are wrong, the error gets
perpetuated. Hence we are pleased that
after 10 – 20 years you who are familiar with the whole picture are attempting
to write a thesis on Myanmar.” At this stage of the discussion, judging from the
analyses, language and flow of Brother’s delivery and of the others present
listening intently and some nodding in
agreement with the narrative, I could not help sensing the members’ sense of
“frustration” over inaccurate reports of foreign authors, journalists, etc, and
I wished that some of the foreign Myanmar authors, scholars and journalist
could have been around to see and hear for themselves, the level of education
and the actual quality of some of the Generals from their analyses of
problems. Considering my own sense of the direction the chat
was going, I remarked: “So why do you not, as I have suggested before, run
seminars to explode some of these ‘disinformation and misinformation’ as
Brother Myo Thant has called it?” BG.
Myo Thant’s reply was that, “really we are not permitted to, and frankly our
worry is that what we say may be distorted and sensationalized and we do not
have the resources to fight or rebut thereafter. By the way, have you ever read the book Straight and Crooked Thinking? If you have, you would get a good idea of how
even though scholars are supposed to be objective, stories are written and
slanted to suit their own agendas. The
funny thing that all of us realize is that the Myanmar story – past, present,
though we hope not the future – has been one of the vicious circle of ‘torsion
– distortion – contortion’ brought about by denials – normal or artificially
self induced – by all the actors, including ourselves in so far that we do not
provide the basic information; others have to double guess and draw their own
(false) conclusions!” I thought it prudent to seize the opportunity to
ensure there are no distortions and so I suggested, “Let me try to put some of
the distortions right. What about the Tatmadaw and what it was, is and will be
doing?” Brother replied: “Now for the
political history of the Tatmadaw. Even for the anti-Tatmadaw faction of the population, they are perfectly aware
of the fact that throughout the hundred odd years of colonialism, the
colonialists created only two classes of people in Myanmar, which incidentally
is made up of some 80 percent of Bamars.
These are the Ruling Class – a negligible number - and the Working Class
the latter of which, to call a spade a spade, is nothing but serfs. They never cultivated an educated Middle
Class. Imagine in over 100 years, we had
only one university. Indeed, whatever
little squires we had were converted to landless proletariat by the Thosaung Kalas (British) and also the
money lending (chettiar) kalas, so
the dilemma was how do we get out of this poverty trap (and incidentally to
ensure that our cultural practices are respected and not destroyed)?” By getting rid of the colonialists. Thus a
number of social groups were formed to fight for independence but because of
the educational level, leadership was lacking and no cohesive force could be
formed between and among such groups, until the military group of the Thirty Thakins was formed.” “It was this Thakin group which was able to galvanize
and mobilize the nation to finally fight for and gain independence. It is this group which was the germ of the Tatmadaw. And the people know this and even those who
have for some reason felt disenfranchised, disillusioned, disaffected would not
deny this. It is just that in more
recent history, foreign interference has raised doubts in the minds of some
people.” “This is not new for Myanmar because for a number of
reasons Myanmar does not seem to be able to be politically unified. This is evidenced by the fact that even the
AFPFL which was thought to be the strongest association, politically, finally
split.” “Also, throughout the history of Myanmar there has always
been strong external interference and influence in the internal affairs of the
country. Further evidence to this can be
gleaned if you were to read the “Glass Chronicles”45 from which you will see that foreign
interference from outside brought about three wars each for Myanmar: with
China, Thailand and the British, not to mention feuding with the French,
Portuguese. Internally there were many
incursions into various states and regions, e.g., the Arakan Uprising, the Shan
Uprising, etc.” “Also, the notion to form separate independent
states existed even from the early days (no thanks to the British carving out
the country) and finally how and who solved these problems? – the members of
the Tatmadaw by way of the Panglong
Agreement, the abolition of the Sawbwas (Shan
Chieftains), the Duwas (Kachins) as
well as the Karens, Chins, etc., etc., – all
Minority peoples. All these were
achieved by the Government which essentially is the Tatmadaw.” “In spite of all, including the Panglong Agreement
and the toning down of the Minorities, there were still attempts at breakaways
from the Union, in 1950–51, 1958–60, 1962-88, even to date.” “It was, considering the problems, only in 1958,
that the Tatmadaw published the first
Military Doctrine spelling out Democracy as the first political priority; open
economy as the second and an independent Legislature as the third. And you might hazard a guess as to who was
responsible for keeping the Burma Communist Party (BCP), the Karen National
Democratic Organization (KNDO) which subsequently became the Karen National
Union (KNU), the Shan State Independence Army (SSIA), the drug lords and their
armies in the Kokang and Wa States, the fleeing Kuomintang
Divisions etc., etc., in check? It was
the Armed Forces that saved the Country from all these disruptive elements and
prevented the total disintegration of the Country.” “However, what is true is that after the formation
of the BSPP post 1962 and the emergence of the 1974 Constitution, a
single-chambered parliament and a uniparty political system was put in place
and this left democracy out in the cold and people had to live with this till
the Conflagration of 1988 because it appeared (especially with foreign egging)
as though the Government and hence the Tatmadaw
had “fooled” them,” Brother concluded. Editor’s Note:
Chapter 3 has been divided into three segments, the second of which has been
presented above; the final segment of Chapter 3 will be published in the
following issue of this Journal. - JP 26 Michael Aung-Thwin, “Parochial
Universalism, Democracy Jihad, and the Orientalist Image of Burma: the New Evangelism.” Pacific Affairs Vol.74, No. 4, p.500 27 Over the 20 years experience to members of
government/bureaucracy, I discovered that under military rules they are not
permitted to reveal their qualifications. However with good quanxi, I was able to ascertain that
most are very well schooled, read and opinionated. This is the reason I always
enjoyed our tetes-a-tete which ranged
from government, economics, politics, sociology, history etc etc. Indeed
objectively out of 10 each of Generals /Ministers/bureaucrats/administrators in
the medical/engineering/professional fields, I know personally, many are
foreign trained and educated and if not, they are graduates of the Defense
Services Academy (DSA) or the Officer Training School (OTS) which provides
tertiary education. 29 Dorothy Woodman, The Making or Burma, The Cresset Press London, 1966, p.44. 30 Ibid, p.50. 31 Silverstein, Burma and the World, p.120. 32 I have been fascinated by the fact that the
general public and even generals are bound consciously, subconsciously or
culturally by their believe in pon, awza and
ana so that in a group one does not
generally speak up unless one is No. 1. This means in practice that in policy
formulation/implementation, the decision invariably lies in the “higher
up/higher authority” – “ahted lugyi.”
Who the “higher ups/higher authorities” are, is unclear and not even at
Ministerial level is this precisely known. It appears to me to something quite
vague and amorphous and yet omnipotent. 33 The Government is usually very sticky when it
comes to contract with foreign parties. However as with the Panglong Agreement
when there was a dispute among various ethnic groups about the 10 – year
secession Clause, the problem was resolved using a confidential “Side Letter.”
This kept the Agreement “clean” and yet satisfied all parties. 34 At an early stage, the premise, i.e., that
Myanmar seems to have had pitfalls leading to its vicissitudes, was hinted at
to the key respondents, to gauge the response.
35 Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Background of the Burmese Revolution, 1965, p.101. 36 David Steinberg, The Road to political recovery, the salience of politics in economics,
The World Peace Foundation and Harvard Institute for International Development,
Cambridge Massachusetts, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C. p.272 37 Should Mr Barak Obama be elected President
one wonders if pressure on Myanmar would be increased as his Vice-Presidential
running mate, Mr Joe Biden is one of the
19 Senators (including Senator Jesse Helms (the architect of the US Sanctions
on Myanmar) – House Representative, Mr Stephen Solarz (Chairman, House of
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs) who wrote as the United States
Congress, to the Chairman SLORC Sr.Gen.Saw Maung on 3rd August 1989
to release Aung San Suu Kyi from House Arrest, inter alia, accusing Myanmar of human rights abuse. See U Tin Htwe
– The Conspiracy of Treasonous Minions within the Myanmar Naing-Ngan and
Traitorous Cohorts Abroad – News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of
Information of Government of the Union of Myanmar, p.235. 38 Taylor, “UNCTAD,” Asian Affairs, February 1998, p.7. 39 At the Yangon City Development Committee because of such “non kosher practices,” at one go, practically half a dozen senior officers including some colonels were removed; likewise at one time, a number of senior officers from the Mandalay Electricity Department (MEPE) were removed from office. 40 This is a case I can confirm because I was in
Yangon at the time and the Hon. Minister was keeping a close tab on the
condition of the victim. The General happens to be an internationally renowned
Medico and has contributed one chapter on Internal Medicine, in an Oxford University,
Textbook on the subject. The case of the Director General who was dismissed, is
also a friend. I am aware of the case. 41 M.S. Dobbs-Higginson,
“Myanmar (Burma), Previously a
Tragic Exercise in Futility-Real Change now appears Possible,” The New Light of Myanmar 06 August 1997,
p. 3. 42 R.H. Taylor, Myanmar: Army Politics and the
Prospects for Democratization, Asian Affairs Journal of the Royal Society for
Asian Affairs, London, p.7. 43
Union of Burma, State of Law and Order Restoration Council, Gen. Khin Myunt,
The Spin 110th Press Conference, p.41. 44 Dr Maung Maung (Min Maung Maung) Burmese
Nationalist Movements, 1940-1948 (Scotland Kiseadale Publication, 1989),
p.164/165. 45 P e Maung Tin and G.H. Luce, The Glass
Palace Chronicle of the Kings of Burma, New York, AMS Press, 1976. [ BWW Society Home Page ] © 2014 The Bibliotheque: World Wide Society |